最近的金融危机，以及大西洋两岸失业率的急剧上升，表明金融冲击确实会转化为劳动力市场。在本文中，我们首先证明了金融衰退放大了劳动力市场的波动和奥肯弹性在商业周期。其次，我们强调了一个将金融冲击与就业破坏联系起来的关键机制，提出并解决了一个简单的劳动力市场搜索和内生金融模型。尽管在正常时期，金融业增加了就业机会和净产出，但它也增强了它们在金融冲击后的总体反应。第三，我们提出的证据与金融衰退期间杠杆率更高的行业就业波动更大的观点一致。从理论上讲，金融的工作破坏效应是这样的。杠杆化的公司可能会发现自己的流动性突然被贷款人收回。这对企业运行和管理现有岗位的能力有直接影响。因此，公司可能被迫关闭部分业务，并摧毁现有的工作岗位。我们认为，在资本市场发达的情况下，企业将有动力更多地依赖流动性，而在正常情况下，深度资本市场会导致劳动力市场紧张。 After an adverse liquidity shock, firms that rely much on liquidity are hit disproportionally hard. This may explain why the unemployment rate in the US during the Great Recession increased more than in European countries experiencing larger output losses. Empirically, the paper uses a variety of datasets to test the implications of the model. At first we identify crises that, just like in the model, caused a sudden reduction of liquidity to firms. Next we draw on sector-level data on employment and leverage in a number of OECD countries at quarterly frequencies to assess whether highly leveraged equilibria originate more employment adjustment under financial recessions. We find that highly leveraged sectors and periods are associated with higher employment- to-output elasticities during banking crises and this effect explains the observation of higher Okun's elasticities during financial recessions. We also argue that the effect of leverage on employment adjustment can be interpreted as a causal effect, if our identification assumptions are considered plausible. All this amounts essentially for a test of the labor demand channel of adjustment.