当个人面临由政策变化引起的工作激励的变化时，调整成本对他们有多重要?我通过利用一个大幅增加工作激励的政策变化，提供了异质调整成本的第一个估计。政策的改变提高了残疾保险项目的豁免门槛。我记录了对工作激励的强烈反应，因为我观察到过量的数量â欧元”“聚集”â欧元”刚好低于豁免阈值，即收入的边际税很低。一个令人费解的观察是，在政策改变后，个人继续聚集在以前的门槛上。这一发现表明，它们在改变劳动力供给时面临调整成本。我使用新阈值和前阈值处的聚束量来估计因个人工作能力而不同的调整成本。能力较低的个体估计的调整成本较高;从零到20%不等，平均为8%。考虑异质调整成本â欧元的收入相对于净税率â欧元的估计弹性为0.2，是不考虑调整成本的估计弹性的两倍。 To investigate the relative size of the adjustment costs to the work incentives induced by the policy change, I evaluate the overall effect of the policy change on the labor supply using a Difference-in-Differences design. I find that individuals who already work, work more, and those who did not work, start working. Policies designed to increase labor supply will work if the induced work incentives are large enough to offset the adjustment costs. Accounting for adjustment costs then might explain disparate findings on the effects of an increase in work incentives on labor supply in disability insurance programs. These findings have important implications for designing policies and targeting heterogeneous groups to increase labor supply in disability insurance programs.