“联合成本”模型指出，罢工的动机与工人和企业罢工活动相关的总成本成反比。不仅这个模型的测试结果好坏参半，而且联合成本模型在解释罢工文献中的几个程式化事实时也存在问题，因为较高的罢工成本并不总是产生较低的罢工活动发生率。本文阐述了联合成本模型如何产生这些违反直觉的结果。说明联合罢工成本增加时，罢工发生率不一定降低。创新之处在于以不对称的方式提高工会和企业联合罢工的成本。增加某一方的罢工成本必然会降低其罢工的动机。然而，作为回应，另一方的激励可能会增加，因为在许多情况下，它以更高的概率坚持，以收取相对较大的预期租金，因为另一方的隐含威胁点降低了。为了说明这一点，我们将合同谈判建模为一个简单的单周期博弈。(不需要更复杂的重复游戏，如消耗，因为我们的观点只是尽可能简单地展示为什么联合成本模型会产生模棱两可的结果。)我们使用标准希克斯让步曲线来推导收益矩阵。 The payoff matrix results in contract negotiations following along the lines of a "game of chicken". The solution to the game yields no one stable pure Nash-equilibrium strategy, but instead a mixed strategy so that choices become probabilistic depending upon union and firm concession curve parameters. The results indicate that increasing either party's strike costs can have ambiguous effects on strike incidence. This ambiguity may explain why higher strike costs need not always lead to fewer strikes, and thus may account for the mixed success observed in studies that empirically test the joint costs model with strike incidence data. Although couched in terms of strikes, the results are equally applicable to other negotiation situations.