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ABSTRACT

The Performance of Performance Standards*

This paper examines the performance of the JTPA performance system, a widely emulated model for inducing efficiency in government organizations. We present a model of how performance incentives may distort bureaucratic decisions. We define cream skimming within the model. Two major empirical findings are (a) that the short run measures used to monitor performance are weakly, and sometimes perversely, related to long run impacts and (b) that the efficiency gains or losses from cream skimming are small. We find evidence that centers respond to performance standards.

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I. Introduction

Incentives based on performance standards have been advocated to promote productivity and to direct activity in public organizations. Little is known about how performance standards systems perform¹. This paper presents evidence on this question using data from a social experiment on a major U.S. government training program with performance standard incentives. The performance standards system in this program, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), is a prototype for other government programs. The 1993 Performance Standards Act (U.S. Congress, 1993) required the use of performance systems similar to that of JTPA in many other government programs. In particular, JTPA's successor as the primary federal training program for the disadvantaged, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), utilizes an expanded version of the JTPA performance system. Performance systems like that in JTPA are in use around the world.

The JTPA incentive system was unique in providing incentives at the local organization level but not to specific individuals within organizations. Little is known about how performance standard systems at the level of local organizations work in practice. This paper presents new evidence on this issue and summarizes related research scattered throughout the published literature and in government reports. We take it as given that performance standards affect the behavior of the organization (see, for example, Courty and Marschke, 1996, 1997). In that light, we address two basic questions. First, do the behavioral responses further the goals of the program? If not, what do they do instead? Second, how do specific actors within bureaucracies respond to the incentives presented to them?

The main focus of this paper is on the first question. We consider whether JTPA performance incentives promoted “desirable” outcomes. Unlike many government programs, the JTPA program had tangible outputs: the employment and earnings of its participants. There is

widespread agreement that maximizing the gain (for example, the increase in the present value of discounted earnings relative to what participants would have experienced had they not participated) is a worthy goal. In addition, the JTPA program was created with clearly stated objectives, so that there is a well-defined set of targets against which to measure performance. As noted by Wilson (1989), both features of the JTPA program are unusual when compared to the many other government agencies that lack clearly stated objectives or adequate measurements of performance.

Even though the goals of the program are clearly stated, they may be in conflict. The Job Training Partnership Act (Public Law 97- 300) mandated the provision of employment and training opportunities to “those who can benefit from, and are most in need of, such opportunities.” (Section 141 (c)). Since benefit and need are different things, the potential for conflict between efficiency and equity is written into the law authorizing the program.² Whether or not those who benefit most are also the most in need is an empirical question that we investigate in this paper.

The JTPA program was designed to improve the human capital of its participants. Evaluation of human capital projects inherently involves evaluation of earnings and employment trajectories over time, and comparing them to other human capital investments, including no investment at all. This involves two distinct problems: (a) construction of counterfactual states (what participants would have earned in their next best alternative) and (b) measuring outcomes and creating counterfactuals over the harvest period of the investment, which may be a lifetime. Both problems are difficult. Constructing counterfactual states is a controversial activity (see, for example, Heckman, 2001, and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). Tracking persons over time is a costly activity and does not produce short run feedback on the success of the program.

The JTPA performance standards system, and most related systems, attempt to circumvent these fundamental problems by using the outcomes of participants measured at the time they complete the program, or within a few months thereafter. Such measures are necessarily short run in nature. In addition, such systems do not attempt to construct even the short run counterfactual.

Use of these short term outcome measures creates the possibility that the performance standards misdirect activity by focusing training center attention on criteria that may be perversely related to long run net benefits, long run equity criteria, or both. This is especially likely in the context of a human capital program. One benefit of training is that it encourages further training and schooling. Such additional investment depresses measured employment and earnings in the short run, but raises it in the long run.³ In this case, the short run measurements on which performance standards are based will likely be perversely related to long run benefits. We present evidence on this question and summarize other evidence from the literature. We establish that fears of misalignment or perverse alignment of the incentives are justified.

Most discussions of performance standards (see, for example, Anderson et al., 1992, and Barnow, 1992) focus on “cream skimming”. Sometimes this term is defined as selecting persons into the program who would have done well without it. In the context of a system of performance standards, cream skimming is defined as selecting people who help attain short run goals, rather than selecting persons on the basis of their expected long run benefit from participation. In the current literature, the definition of cream skimming is vague and the methods used to measure it are not convincing. Implicit in the current literature is the assumption that program and no-program outcomes are basically the same, except for a positive treatment effect common to all persons. One contribution of this paper is to precisely define the concept of cream skimming in the modern language of counterfactuals and to relate it to an economic model

of performance standards. Cream skimming may or may not be a serious problem. If persons who would have done well without the program have the largest gains from it, then cream skimming may promote efficiency. We present evidence on this question below.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the basic evaluation problem and how performance standards attempt to solve it. We present a model of training center performance under performance standards and define cream skimming in the context of our model. Section III describes the JTPA program and its performance standards system. We show that features of the JTPA system are in widespread use, so our analysis of JTPA has some generality. Section IV describes our data. Section V presents evidence on the efficiency effects of cream skimming. Section VI presents evidence on the effects of performance standards on the behavior of training centers and their staff. Section VII presents evidence on how well the short run target outcomes used in performance standards predict long run impacts. Section VIII concludes.

II. Policy Counterfactuals, Performance Standards, and Cream Skimming

A. A Model of Training Center Choices

Successful human capital investment programs produce a time series of returns after the intervention. For simplicity we analyze a program that takes one period to train persons selected from the eligible population. Training centers face a new cohort of eligible applicants each period. All persons in each prospective training cohort have one chance to train. They are then replaced by the next period's cohort. The environment is assumed to be stationary so that the same decision rules are followed each period given the same state variables (that is, the environment facing the center). There is a benchmark outcome that corresponds to no program or the next best program. Persons participate or not in period "0" of their lifecycle. Thus, we

normalize lifecycle periods relative to the benchmark period when the training participation decision is made.⁴ Participants experience a series of outcomes, $Y_a^1, a = 0, \dots, A$ where A is the final period of the person's life. In the absence of the program, persons experience outcomes $Y_a^0, a = 0, \dots, A$. The per-period treatment effect is $Y_a^1 - Y_a^0 = \Delta_a$. The treatment effect can be negative in the short run if the initial investment leads to additional investment.⁵ To make our analysis fit into a standard cost-benefit framework, let Y denote earnings. Given direct cost, c , and discount rate r , the net present value of the program impacts measured at time zero is

$$(1) \quad \sum_{a=0}^A \frac{\Delta_a}{(1+r)^a} - c = PV$$

for each person. We abstract from general equilibrium effects of the scale of the program.⁶ We assume that (Δ_a, c) varies among individuals but assume a common r .⁷

In our model, we assume that training centers can apply different amounts of “input”, e , to any individual client. In the JTPA context, the input variable represents staff time and the direct costs of the services provided. The inputs affect the outcomes experienced by participants. In particular, input e yields

$$(2) \quad Y_a^1 = f(Y_a^0, e),$$

at cost $c(e)$, where $c(0) = 0$. Total cost $c = c(e) + k$, where k is a fixed cost.

Given these assumptions, training centers have several degrees of freedom. First, for a fixed set of inputs, a training center can choose to serve applicants with different (Δ_a, c) combinations. Second, holding the set of persons served fixed, the training center can vary the inputs it provides to each participant. This changes the set of potential outcomes for participants. This framework recognizes that the inputs provided by training centers will

augment or reduce the potential outcome that participants would have experienced in the absence of participation. Third, a training center can choose how many participants to serve by trading off between the fixed per participant costs k and the variable per participant input costs $c(e)$.

If the goal of the training center is to maximize the ex post present value of the earnings impacts realized by its trainees, it solves a constrained optimization problem that we now describe. Notice that if there were no budget constraints, the center would find the e that maximizes the present value of the earnings impacts for each participant:

$$(3) \quad \hat{e} = \arg \max_e \sum_{a=0}^A \frac{(Y_a^1 - Y_a^0)}{(1+r)^a} - c(e) - k.$$

Training centers operate under a budget constraint B . Thus they face a tradeoff between serving more clients and increasing inputs per client. Let $\{1, \dots, I\}$ be the index set of eligible applicants. Person i has an associated cost (variable, $c_i(e)$, and fixed, k_i). We assume that technology (2) is common across persons although this assumption can easily be relaxed.

Associated with each potential set of trainees, $S \subseteq \{1, \dots, I\}$ is a number of trainees $N(S)$. For each cohort, the center solves the problem

$$(4) \quad \text{Max}_{e_i, i \in S} \sum_{i \in S} \left[\left[\sum_{a=0}^A \frac{(Y_{a,i}^1 - Y_{a,i}^0)}{(1+r)^a} \right] - c_i(e_i) - k_i \right],$$

subject to (2) and

$$(5) \quad B \geq \sum_{i \in S} (c_i(e_i) + k_i).$$

For LaGrange multiplier \mathbf{I} attached to (5), this produces the first order condition for each observation $i \in S$,

$$(6) \quad \sum_{a=0}^A \left(\frac{\partial f(Y_{i,a}^0, e_i)}{\partial e_i} \right) \frac{1}{(1+r)^a} = I \frac{\partial c_i(e_i)}{\partial e_i}.$$

This is the standard efficiency condition for e_i (marginal benefit equals marginal cost). In the absence of a budget constraint, $I = 1$ at an interior optimum. In general, $I \geq 1$, reflecting the scarcity of the resources available to the center, and the center invests less in each person than would be the case if resources were not constrained.⁸

Write the maximized present value that is the solution to this problem as $y(S, B)$, which reflects the fact that present value obtained depends on the coalition S of trainees selected and the available budget. The center's problem is to pick the optimal S, S^* , such that

$$y(S^*, B) = \arg \max_S y(S, B).^9$$

Implementing this optimal ex post solution requires substantial amounts of information unlikely to be available to the center at date "0" when applicants are admitted. Future (Y_a^1, Y_a^0) are unlikely to be available (although past information on Y_a^0 may be available), and other sources of information useful for predicting (Y_a^1, Y_a^0) , $a = 1, \dots, A$ may be available. All of the available studies suggest that forecasting future Δ_a is a difficult problem.¹⁰

Let J_i be the information set about individual i . Then, ex ante, the criterion for optimality becomes (for each S),

$$(7) \quad \text{Max}_{e_i} \left[\left[\sum_{a=0}^A \frac{\left(\frac{\partial f(Y_{i,a}^0, e_i)}{\partial e_i} \right)}{(1+r)^a} \right] - c_i(e_i) \right],$$

$\{J_i\}_{i \in S}$. Then for each $S, \{J_i\}_{i \in S}, B$

and r , we may write the present value solution as $\mathbf{y}(S, B, J)$, where $J = \{J_1, \dots, J_I\}$. The training center seeks to maximize this criterion with respect to S , so that

$$\mathbf{y}(S^*, B, J) = \arg \max_S \mathbf{y}(S, B, J).$$

The center adjusts at three margins: which applicants become trainees, the amount of inputs devoted to each trainee and the number of trainees. The exact tradeoffs depend on the specification of the technology for producing skill and the cost. If the marginal cost of producing skills, $c(e)$, is rapidly increasing, or returns are rapidly decreasing, the center has a stronger incentive to increase the number of trainees than to increase inputs per trainee. In a stationary environment, the training center makes the same decision in every period. We expand on this analysis in Heckman (2003).¹¹

B. Adding Performance Standards to the Model

If the center seeks to maximize the present value of the earnings gains of its trainees given the budget B , ex ante optimality is obtainable. In this setting, there is no role for performance standards even if the training center has imperfect information about potential outcomes. A role for performance standards emerges if the training center has a criterion different from $\mathbf{y}(S, B, J)$, or some monotonic function of it. Suppose that the center has preferences $U(\mathbf{y}(S), N(S), Q(S))$ where $\mathbf{y}(S)$ is the present value of gains for trainee cohort S , $N(S)$ is the number of participants served ($\leq I$) in cohort S (one year's trainees in JTPA, as performance is evaluated on an annual basis), and $Q(S)$ is the “quality” of the persons served. For notational simplicity we suppress the B and J arguments in $\mathbf{y}(S, B, J)$, except where needed.

By $Q(S)$ we mean characteristics of the potential trainees other than their impacts. For example, county and city governments often administer their local training centers, with the result that staff may face pressure to serve groups targeted by the local politicians (see, for example, Smith, 1992). At the same time, concerns about the social welfare of the least well off among the applicant population may lead local bureaucrats to serve persons who would be excluded by criterion (7). In the presence of these preferences for goals other than impact maximization (that is, other than allocation based purely on efficiency concerns), or in the presence of organizational lethargy (the on-the-job leisure enjoyed by the staff may, for example, decrease in e), performance standards may redirect activity toward choosing the persons and treatments that satisfy $\mathbf{y}(S)$.

Courty and Marschke (2003) document that a variety of performance systems currently guide government programs. Most have the following character. The training center receives a reward R if certain short run criteria are satisfied. An idealized version focuses on the short term outcomes of trainees, which we operationalize as the average outcome in time period “1” for the period “0” trainees:

$$Y_1^1(S_0) = \frac{1}{N(S_0)} \sum_{i \in S_0} Y_{1,i}^1,$$

where the subscript on Y_1^1 denotes time period “1”, while the first subscript on $Y_{1,i}$ denotes age “1”, measured relative to the age of training. The “0” subscript on S indicates the current cohort of trainees:

$$(8) \quad Y_1^1(S_0) \geq t,$$

a threshold value, the training center gets R . Otherwise it does not.

Several factors motivate the use of short-term outcome measures. First, in order for a performance standards system to be effective, it must provide quick feedback to program managers. Feedback that arrives years after the corresponding actions by program staff is of little use for short-term decisions, but it may have great scientific value for learning about the parameters of the system and devising an effective performance standards system in the long run. Second, evaluations (whether experimental or non-experimental) that seek to estimate the counterfactual outcomes of participants, which are required to produce impact estimates, take a long time, typically on the order of years. This is true even if the impacts they produce are short-run impacts because of the time associated with collecting comparison group data, cleaning the data and performing econometric analyses. Third, performance measures based on impacts are likely to be controversial, either because of uncertainty about the econometric method utilized, in the case of non-experimental methods, or politically, in the case of random assignment. Finally, performance standards measures based on outcome levels generally cost much less to produce than measures based on impacts, Δ_a . This is important, because an expensive performance management system, even if it accomplishes something, may not accomplish enough to justify the expense. Estimating impacts, either experimentally or non-experimentally, is technically demanding and therefore difficult to automate. As a result, it would likely require the ongoing intervention of expensive analysts. In contrast, as already noted, an outcome-based system can typically rely on straightforward calculations based on administrative data. Both start-up and operating costs are relatively low for outcomes based systems.

Reward R is used to augment the center budget for the next cohort of trainees but cannot be used as direct bonuses to center bureaucrats – or their employees. This incentive directs

attention toward the short run goal of attaining $Y_1^l(S_0)$, which may, or may not, serve to maximize the present value of output $y(S, B, J)$ for the current batch of JTPA trainees.

These incentives create a new intertemporal dynamic that is absent without performance standards. Decisions by the center today affect the quality and quantity of participants today and the resources available to the center to train tomorrow's cohort. The center's problem changes in the presence of the incentive constraint provided by the performance standards system. $Y_1^l(S_0)$ is a random variable as of date "0". Thus, the budget for the next cohort, \tilde{B} , is stochastic, and is realized only after the decision on the cohort S_0 is made. Formally,

$$\tilde{B} = \begin{cases} B & \text{if } Y_1^l(S_0) < t; \\ B + R & \text{if } Y_1^l(S_0) \geq t. \end{cases}$$

The reward can only be spent on the next cohort of trainees.

C. A Two-Cohort Model with Performance Standards

The analysis of a model for a training center that serves only two cohorts is particularly simple, and provides a useful point of departure for the more complicated model we analyze below. Assume that the budget for the first cohort is fixed at B . The choice of S_0 , the initial training group, affects $y(S_0, B, J)$ as before (as well as $N(S_0)$ and $Q(S_0)$). But it also affects the resources available to train the next cohort in the second period.

In the second period, the agency has budget $B + R$ if $Y_1^l(S_0) \geq t$, so that it meets its performance standards. It has budget B otherwise. Thus, in this simplified two-cohort model, the problem of the center is to pick S_0 so as to maximize

$$\begin{aligned}
& U(\mathbf{y}(S_0, B, J), N(S_0), Q(S_0)) \\
(9) \quad & + \frac{1}{1+r} \Pr(Y_1^1 \geq t | S_0) \max_{S_1^1} U(\mathbf{y}(S_1^1, B+R, J), N(S_1^1), Q(S_1^1)) \\
& + \frac{1}{1+r} \Pr(Y_1^1 < t | S_0) \max_{S_1^0} U(\mathbf{y}(S_1^0, B, J), N(S_1^0), Q(S_1^0)),
\end{aligned}$$

where $\frac{1}{1+r}$ is a discount rate. S_1^1 is the cohort selected in the second period if $Y_1^1(S_0) \geq t$, so

that the budget equals $B+R$. S_1^0 is the cohort selected in the second period if $Y_1^1(S_0) < t$, so

that the budget equals B . Solving the two-cohort problem involves a two-stage maximization.

For the second period cohort, there are two possible states, corresponding to whether the first

cohort succeeds or fails relative to the performance standards. The center picks a group of

trainees for each possible budget. Given these optimal values, it picks S_0 to maximize criterion

(9)—given the values of S_1^0 and S_1^1 selected in the first stage maximization.

Heuristically, if S_0 were a continuous variable, and (9) were differentiable in S_0 , the first order condition would be

$$\begin{aligned}
0 = & \frac{\partial U(\mathbf{y}(S_0, B, J), N(S_0), Q(S_0))}{\partial S_0} \\
& + \frac{\partial \Pr(Y_1^1(S_0) \geq t | S_0)}{\partial S_0} \left\{ \max_{S_1^1} U(\mathbf{y}(S_1^1, B+R, J), N(S_1^1), Q(S_1^1)) - \max_{S_1^0} U(\mathbf{y}(S_1^0, B, J), N(S_1^0), Q(S_1^0)) \right\}
\end{aligned}$$

The first term reflects the value of S_0 in raising the current utility of the training center.

The second term captures the motivating effect of performance standards, which equals the

marginal effect of S_0 on the probability of winning the award times the increase in center utility

from winning the award.¹² In the two-cohort model, there is no third cohort whose budget gets

determined by the second cohort, so this incentive effect disappears when the center makes decisions regarding the second cohort.

In this simple model, performance standards may distort performance. Even if the agency would maximize present value in their absence, the performance incentives create the possibility of distortion. If R is sufficiently large and c and r sufficiently small, and if $Y_1^1(S_0)$ is weakly or perversely correlated with present value in the absence of the performance standards, the agency may distort its choices in serving the first cohort in order to get a reward that it can then use to serve the second cohort. If the reward is sufficiently large, it can raise the (discounted) present value in the second period enough to more than offset the loss in present value in the first period. Of course, the actual solution is more complicated because the criterion is not differentiable in S_0 . But this heuristic is a useful guide to the more general solution, which is presented in Heckman (2003).

D. A Model For A Stationary Environment With Performance Standards

This simple two-cohort model abstracts from an important feature of the JTPA system, which we now develop. In reality, training centers serve multiple cohorts of trainees over many time periods. To take an opposite extreme to the one just considered, suppose, for analytical simplicity, that training centers last forever, and that the environment they face is stationary.

Training centers at any point of chronological time can be in one of two states: (a) in receipt of a bonus R , so that they have budget $B+R$ to spend on the current cohort or (b) without the bonus, so that they have budget B . They influence these budgetary outcomes by their choice of S in the previous chronological time period. What they choose depends on the resources available to the center in that period. Since the environment is stationary, and there are only two

states, the model is a Markovian decision problem. This means that the decision variable S does not have to be time subscripted, just state subscripted, depending on whether or not in any given period the budget is B or $B + R$.

Define V_0 as the value function of a center without a reward in the current period and V_1 as the value function for a center with a reward in the current period. Then,

$$V_0 = \max_S U(\mathbf{y}(S, B, J), N(S), Q(S)) + \frac{1}{1+r} \Pr(Y_1^1(S) \geq \mathbf{t}) V_1 + \frac{1}{1+r} \Pr(Y_1^1(S) < \mathbf{t}) V_0,$$

where we make the budget in each state explicit by entering it as a conditioning argument in the utility function. We define V_1 in a parallel fashion:

$$V_1 = \max_S U(\mathbf{y}(S, B + R, J), N(S), Q(S)) + \frac{1}{1+r} \Pr(Y_1^1(S) \geq \mathbf{t}) V_1 + \frac{1}{1+r} \Pr(Y_1^1(S) < \mathbf{t}) V_0.$$

We assume that $V_1 > V_0$, because more resources further center objectives. The optimal choice of S depends on the rewards, the preferences, and the constraints facing centers. Here we present an intuitive analysis of the effects of incentives. We develop this model formally in Heckman (2003), but a number of features of it are intuitively obvious and we record them here without proof.

(1) Let P^{01} be the transition probability of going from no reward to a reward and let P^{11} be the transition probability of having a reward in two consecutive periods. Since having more resources makes it easier to attain all center objectives, including meeting performance standards next period, $P^{11} > P^{01}$. Performance standards impart a value to incumbency.

(2) The analysis of the two-period model carries over in part in this more general setting. With sufficiently large R , sufficiently small r , and sufficiently misdirected performance incentives (incentives not aligned with present value maximization), centers that care only about

maximizing the present value of the earnings gains of participants may choose to divert resources away from that goal in low budget (non-reward) periods. They will do so in order to get the budgetary reward in the following period, which can then be spent to generate a larger total discounted stream of earnings gains than would period-by-period earnings gain maximization. The same incentives are not operative in high budget periods. Thus, in the case where center preferences are the same as social preferences, if discount rates are sufficiently low, misaligned performance standards may distort activity, but only in the low budget state.

(3) For the conditions on center preferences analyzed in point (2), and the same misalignment of performance incentives, if the probability of attaining the reward threshold is sufficiently low, but the reward R is sufficiently high, the introduction of performance standards can lower the aggregate output of all centers. Unsuccessful centers divert their activities away from productive uses and toward meeting the targets. Successful centers produce more human capital because they have more resources. If the gains for the successful centers are sufficiently small and the successful centers are a small fraction of all centers, aggregate output can decrease. In general, the question of whether or not incentives distort or enhance aggregate productivity of training centers is an empirical question on which we provide some information in this paper.

E. Cream Skimming

The most common criticism of the JTPA performance standards system, and other similar systems, is that they encourage cream skimming. That is, by rewarding training centers based on the mean outcomes of their participants, rather than the mean impacts of the services they provide, the system encourages them to serve persons who will have good labor market outcomes (as measured by the system) whether or not the program has any benefit for them, or

for whom there are substantial short run benefits. The performance measures create an incentive to serve persons with a high value of $Y_{1,i}^1$, regardless of whether that high value results from a high value of $Y_{1,i}^0$ or a high value of $\Delta_{1,i}$. The existing literature is vague about whether cream skimming should be defined in terms of $Y_{1,i}^1$ or $Y_{1,i}^0$. The logic of performance standards in terms of program outcomes suggests a definition in terms of $Y_{1,i}^1$.¹³

As noted in Heckman (1992), and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), conventional models of program evaluation assume that $Y_{a,i}^1$ and $Y_{a,i}^0$ differ by a constant:

$$\Delta_{a,i} = Y_{a,i}^1 - Y_{a,i}^0 = \Delta_a \text{ for all } i,$$

that is, that everyone has the same impact of treatment.¹⁴ This is the so-called “common effect” model. In this case, a high $Y_{1,i}^1$ goes hand in glove with a high $Y_{1,i}^0$ and picking persons with a high $Y_{1,i}^0$ helps toward satisfying (8). Assuming equal costs across all trainees, cream skimming (or “bottom scraping” by focusing on the “hard to serve”) is innocuous, because all participants have the same impact from the program.

Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) show that when the ranks of $Y_{1,i}^1$ and $Y_{1,i}^0$ in their respective distributions are the same, one can relax the assumption that Δ_a is the same for everyone, but preserve many of the features of the common effect model without assuming a common treatment effect. In this case, if $Y_{1,i}^1(Y_{1,i}^0)$ is increasing in $Y_{1,i}^0$, the center has an incentive to cream skim on $Y_{1,i}^0$. Cream skimming on the untreated outcome furthers the maximization of the present values of earnings gains if $Y_{1,i}^1(Y_{1,i}^0) - Y_{1,i}^0$ is increasing in $Y_{1,i}^0$. Cream skimming on

$Y_{1,i}^0$ has the same effects as cream skimming on $Y_{1,i}^1$ because the two are monotonically related if the densities of $Y_{1,i}^0$ and $Y_{1,i}^1$ are continuous.

Finally, many of the analyses in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) suggest that most of the variance in $Y_{1,i}^1$ is actually variance in $Y_{1,i}^0$ or, put differently, the variance of $\Delta_{1,i}$ is small relative to that of $Y_{1,i}^0$. In this case, cream skimming based on $Y_{1,i}^0$ will again have essentially the same effects on the efficiency or equity of the program's choices as cream skimming based on $Y_{1,i}^1$. In general, however, the two definitions of cream skimming have different theoretical and operational content.

III. Institutions

A. The JTPA Program

The Job Training Partnership Act program began in 1982. It envisioned a partnership between the private, public and non-profit sectors in providing employment and training services to the disadvantaged. Until recently, when it was replaced by the Workforce Investment Act, JTPA was the largest federal employment and training program. The program operated through local training centers, which usually had a local monopoly on providing JTPA services (though not on government-subsidized employment and training services in general). JTPA was a voluntary program (for both participants and training centers) that served persons receiving means tested federal transfers or with a low family income in the six months preceding program entry. Commonly provided services included classroom training in occupational skills, subsidized on-the-job training at private firms and job search assistance. Among youth, basic education (often leading to taking the GED exam) and work experience were also sometimes

provided.¹⁵ Most services were contracted out to private providers, non-profit agencies or other government agencies (such as community colleges).

B. The JTPA Performance Standards System

The federal government, the states, and the local JTPA training centers all played distinct roles in the JTPA system. The federal government defined core performance standard outcome measures. These measures evolved somewhat over time, but always included employment rates, either at termination from JTPA or 13 weeks after, and average wage rates among participants who found employment, computed for both all participants and participants on welfare. The simple model in Section II, which defines performance in terms of earnings levels, captures only one of the many measures actually used, but can easily be modified for other measures, or for the weighted average of measures actually used in the JTPA system (see Heckman, 2003). Each program year, the federal government defined target levels, or standards, for each core outcome measure, and provided a regression model that allowed states to adjust the targets for differences in economic conditions and participant characteristics among centers.

The individual states could adopt the federally defined standards or modify and augment them within broad limits. Many states added additional measures that provided incentives to serve particular groups within the JTPA-eligible population. States also had substantial discretion over the “award function,” the rule that determined centers' budgetary payoffs as a function of their performance relative to the standards and, in some cases, relative to each other. As documented in Courty and Marschke (2003), these functions varied widely among states on many dimensions. All of the state systems shared the feature that centers were never worse off for increasing average employment or wages among participants. For this reason, and because

the employment and wage rate measures typically received the greatest weight in the state award functions, we concentrate our analysis on these measures.

The individual centers kept track of the participants' labor market outcomes, subject to state and federal reporting rules. At the end of each program year, states calculated the performance measures for each center and determined the reward it would receive. Depending on the state award function and its performance, a center could receive nothing (or even a sanction if it was far below the threshold) or, in the event of success, as much as a 20 to 30 percent increase in its regular budget. Centers valued these award funds because they could be used more flexibly than regular budget allocations.

C. The WIA Performance Standards System

The performance standards systems for many other programs, including employment and training programs in Canada and Germany, resemble those in the JTPA system in their reliance on short term outcome levels as a proxy for long term impacts. Thus our analysis has generality well beyond the JTPA program. The performance standards system for the WIA program, the successor to JTPA, is similar in both its federalism and in the types of performance measures it employs. The WIA system is described in detail in U.S. Department of Labor (2000a,b) and criticized in U.S. General Accounting Office (2002). WIA provides essentially the same services as JTPA to a somewhat broader population. O'Shea and King (2001) describe the program in detail. Its performance standard measures include close analogs to the JTPA measures we study here, such as entry into unsubsidized employment and retention in unsubsidized employment six months after entry into employment (where “retention” need not mean actually keeping the same job).¹⁶

IV. The National JTPA Study Data

We use data gathered as part of the National JTPA Study, an experimental evaluation of the JTPA program.¹⁷ The experiment was conducted at 16 of the more than 600 JTPA training centers. At these centers, persons who applied to and were accepted into the program were randomly assigned to either a treatment group allowed access to JTPA services or to a control group denied access to JTPA services for the next 18 months. Background information including demographic variables, educational attainment, work histories, indicators of previous training and of participation in government transfer programs, and family income and composition were collected at the time of random assignment. Survey information on employment and earnings was collected around 18 months after random assignment and again for a sub-sample of the experimental group around 30 months after random assignment.

V. The Efficiency Effects of Cream Skimming

In this section, we present two pieces of evidence on the efficiency effects of cream skimming in JTPA. We then review the literature on whether or not cream skimming actually occurs in practice.

A. Efficiency Effects of Cream Skimming on Y_a^0 and Y_a^1 .

As noted in Heckman (1992) and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), experimental data alone do not identify both components of (Y_a^0, Y_a^1) or their joint distribution. They only identify the marginal distributions of Y_a^0 and Y_a^1 . We know either Y_a^0 (for the controls) or Y_a^1 (for

the treatments) but not both for either group. Thus, without further assumptions, it is not possible to form $\Delta_a = Y_a^1 - Y_a^0$ for anyone or to relate it to either Y_a^0 or Y_a^1 .

Following Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), if the ranks of Y_a^0 and Y_a^1 for any person are the same in their respective distributions, it is possible to associate a Y_a^0 with each Y_a^1 , and the association is unique if both distributions are continuous. We use this assumption to construct Δ_a as a function of Y_a^0 . Given continuity of the two marginal distributions and the perfect ranking assumption, $\Delta_a(Y_a^0)$ can be expressed as a function of Y_a^0 (or its percentile equivalent Y_a^1). Under this assumption cream skimming on Y_a^0 is equivalent to cream skimming on Y_a^1 .

The perfect ranking assumption is implied by the common effect assumption $\Delta_{a,i} = \Delta_a$ for all i but does not imply it. It generalizes the common effect assumption by allowing the impact Δ_a to vary as a function of Y_a^0 . We operationalize this idea by taking percentile differences across the treated and untreated outcome distributions.¹⁸ Let $Y_a^{0,j}$ denote the j th percentile of the Y_a^0 distribution, with $Y_a^{1,j}$ the corresponding percentile in the Y_a^1 distribution. Thus, we estimate $\Delta_a(Y_a^{0,j}) = Y_a^{1,j} - Y_a^{0,j}$.

Figures 1A and 1B present estimates of $\Delta_a(Y_a^{0,j})$ constructed using this method for adult females and males, respectively. Earnings in the 18 months after random assignment constitute the outcome. Consider first the estimates for adult women in Figure 1A, for whom the sample size is the largest. At the low end, the impact is zero through the 20th percentile. This region corresponds to persons with zero earnings in the 18 months after random assignment in both the treated and untreated states. The treatment effect is flat and positive over the interval from the

20th to the 90th percentile, after which there is a discernible increase in the estimated impact in the final decile. Figure 1A suggests that with equal costs per participant, the net gains from participation are modest and roughly constant over a broad range of untreated outcomes, and that cream skimming past the 20th percentile probably contributes little to efficiency. However, a policy of targeting services at the bottom two deciles would likely entail considerable efficiency costs. Figure 1B for adult men tells a similar tale. The curve is flat over the range from the 10th to the 50th percentile, after which it dips and then begins to rise.

B. Impact Estimates and Participant Characteristics

Another way to assess the potential for efficiency losses from cream skimming is to establish whether or not the predictors of Y_a^1 are correlated with measured impacts. Program officials are likely to use characteristics (X) to forecast the short run target outcome. The relationship between the predictors and Δ_a is of interest in its own right. We find few precise relationships between the predictors and the impacts and conclude that there are unlikely to be sizeable efficiency losses from cream skimming.

Tables 1A and 1B summarize subgroup estimates of the impact of JTPA on the earnings and employment of adult females and adult males in the JTPA experiment, respectively.¹⁹ The first column in each table lists the values of each subgroup variable. Columns two through five present impact estimates on 18- month and 30-month earnings and 18-month and 30-month employment, respectively. The tables also present p-values from tests of the null of equal impacts among subgroups for each X .

We estimated subgroup impacts conditional on labor force status (employed, unemployed and out of the labor force) and highest grade completed, both measured at random assignment.

We also estimated impacts conditional on receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)²⁰ and on the month of last employment (if any). All of these variables predict the level of the 18-month and 30-month outcomes for participants.

For adult females, we reject the null of equal impacts among subgroups in four of the sixteen possible cases. The rejections (at the five percent level) occur for employment over 18 months and earnings over 30 months conditional on AFDC receipt, and over 30 months for both earnings and employment conditional on month of last employment, with larger impacts in each case for women receiving AFDC. However, even when we do not reject the null of equal impacts, the point estimates suggest very different impacts, and hence the possibility of substantial efficiency losses from cream skimming which cannot be detected in our samples. The point estimates for the other two sets of estimates, for which the null of equality is not rejected, suggest larger impacts for AFDC recipients. As AFDC receipt is negatively related to Y_a^1 , this finding suggests that cream skimming may be (slightly) inefficient for adult women. The interpretation of the subgroup estimates for adult females conditional on month of last employment before random assignment is less clear, as the pattern of coefficient estimates is non-monotonic. This finding, combined with the general lack of statistically significant subgroup differences in impact estimates and the sometimes substantial changes in the estimated coefficients from 18 to 30 months, suggest, at most, weak evidence of modest inefficiency arising from cream skimming for adult females.

For adult males, statistically significant differences in impacts among subgroups defined by X emerge only once, for impacts on 18-month earnings conditional on labor force status. In this case, the largest impacts appear for men employed at the time of random assignment. Employment at random assignment is positively correlated with Y_a^1 . As for the adult women, the

insignificant coefficients vary substantially among subgroups, and reveal patterns that are difficult to interpret, such as non-monotonicity as a function of months since last employment or years of schooling, as well as substantial changes from 18 to 30 months. Combined with the general lack of statistically significant subgroup impacts, the pattern of estimates presents weak evidence of at most a modest efficiency gain to cream skimming for adult males. For both men and women, of course, the costs of service provision may vary among subgroups as well, so that the net impacts may differ in either direction from the gross impacts reported here.

Other results in the literature that make use of the experimental data from the NJS echo the findings in Table 1. Bloom et al. (1993, Exhibits 4.15 and 5.14) present subgroup impact estimates on earnings in the 18 months after random assignment, while Orr et al. (1996, Exhibits 5.8 and 5.9) present similar estimates for 30-month earnings, using a somewhat different earnings measure than we use here.²¹ Both consider a different set of subgroups than we do. Only a couple of significant subgroup impacts appear at 18 months. At 30 months, the only significant subgroup differences found by Orr et al. (1996) among adults are for adult men, where men with a spouse present have higher impacts.²² Overall, the absence of many statistically significant subgroup differences, combined with the pattern of point estimates, makes the findings in Bloom et al. (1993) and Orr et al. (1996) consistent with our own findings. There are unlikely to be substantial efficiency gains or losses from picking people on the basis of X .²³

VI. The Effects of Performance Incentives on Behavior

A. Cream-Skimming in JTPA?

In this section, we review the evidence on the question of whether or not cream skimming occurs in response to the incentives presented by the JTPA performance standards system. In order to do so, we first introduce some additional notation that will allow us to define precisely how we can go about identifying cream skimming empirically. We define indicators for the following stages of the JTPA participation process: E for eligibility for JTPA, W for awareness of the JTPA program, A for application to JTPA, C for acceptance into the JTPA program and T for formal enrollment in the JTPA program. These stages are largely self-explanatory except for acceptance, which means that a spot in the program has been offered. Figure 2 summarizes the stages in the JTPA participation process.

In Section II we defined cream skimming as selection of persons into the program based on Y_1^1 , and noted that empirically this is essentially the same as selection on Y_1^0 . In examining cream skimming empirically, two issues arise. The first is that we do not observe Y_1^1 for non-participants, and so we cannot directly examine the cream skimming question by comparing values of Y_1^1 for participants and non-participants or for accepted and rejected applicants. The literature typically addresses this issue by looking at observable characteristics X that predict Y_1^1 , either directly or in the form of a predicted value $\hat{Y}_1^1(X)$. Addressing the cream skimming issue in this way implicitly assumes the validity of matching on X as an estimator. If the assumptions of matching are satisfied for X , we can use $Y_1^1(X)$ for participants to validly approximate $Y_1^1(X)$ for nonparticipants.

The second issue concerns what population of non-participants against which to compare the participants. The literature adopts two approaches to this issue. The first compares participants with the eligible population as a whole. This approach implicitly assumes that in the

absence of cream skimming, eligibles would participate at random, or at least not in a way that looks like cream skimming. As a result, it potentially conflates self-selection by participants with the exercise of administrative discretion in choosing among applicants.

As discussed in Devine and Heckman (1996), the JTPA program casts a fairly wide net in terms of eligibility. Its eligible population includes persons with stable, low-wage employment. As shown in Heckman and Smith (1999), such persons have very low participation probabilities. They also have relatively high earnings within the eligible population. It is unlikely that cream skimming is the reason why such persons fail to participate in JTPA, especially since this group shows a low participation rate for other training programs without performance standards (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999). The second approach attempts to avoid this problem by comparing participants only to applicants, on the argument that program bureaucrats have substantially more control over who participates among applicants than over who participates among eligibles. A potential problem with this approach is that even among applicants, there may be self-selection out of the program into work. Further, any control that staff have over who applies, through their marketing efforts and choice of contract providers such as non-profit community agencies, is missed.

Anderson et al. (1992) use data on adult JTPA enrollees in Tennessee in 1987, combined with data on persons eligible for JTPA identified in the March 1986-1988 Current Population Surveys, to compare $f(X | E = 0)$ with $f(X | E=0, W = 0, A = 0, C = 0, T=0)$. Relative to all eligibles, they find that participants are significantly more likely to be female, high school dropouts and AFDC recipients. Within the black and AFDC recipient subgroups, JTPA participants have much lower probabilities of being high school dropouts than eligible non-participants. Using the same data, Anderson, et al. (1993) estimate a bivariate probit model of

enrollment and of placement conditional on enrollment. In this multivariate framework, less educated eligibles (particularly high school dropouts) are under-represented in the program, but blacks and AFDC participants are not. Their model predicts that if eligible persons participated at random, the placement rate would fall 9.1 percentage points, from 70.7 percent to 61.6 percent, suggesting modest evidence of cream-skimming when measured relative to all eligibles.

Heckman and Smith (1995) use data from the four training centers in the JTPA experimental study at which special data on program eligibles were collected, combined with data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), to decompose the process of JTPA participation into four stages: eligibility, awareness, application and acceptance (combined into a single stage due to data limitations), and participation. Several findings emerge from their study. First, the differential participation of certain groups among the eligible population has multiple causes. For example, among the least educated (those with fewer than 10 years of schooling), lack of awareness of JTPA plays a critical role in deterring participation. Awareness depends only very indirectly on the efforts of JTPA staff. At the same time, adults with fewer than 10 years of schooling are also less likely to reach the application and acceptance stage conditional on awareness and are less likely to enroll conditional on applying and being accepted. This evidence suggests that cream skimming may play a role in their low participation rate. Second, Heckman and Smith (1995) provide evidence of cream skimming at the enrollment stage, where program staff members have the most influence. Blacks, persons with less than a high school education, persons from poorer families and those without recent employment experience are less likely to be enrolled than others, conditional on application and acceptance.²⁴ The Heckman and Smith (1995) study demonstrates the importance of considering both self-

selection and cream skimming at each stage of the participation process. They find substantial evidence of cream skimming for some subgroups of the overall population.

In a study of an individual center, Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) use the JTPA experimental data from Corpus Christi, Texas. They examine how predicted short-term earnings levels and predicted long-term earnings impacts affect the probability that an applicant gets accepted into the program (where acceptance is defined as reaching the point of random assignment) by estimating $\Pr(T=1 | E=1, W=1, A=1, E(Y_1^1 | X), E(PV|X))$. They estimate both $E(Y_1^1 | X)$, defined as expected earnings in the 18 months after random assignment for participants, and $E(PV|X)$, defined as the expected discounted lifetime earnings gain from participating, either gross or net of costs, using the experimental data. The transition from application to acceptance should depend in large part on caseworker choices and thus provides the cleanest measure of cream skimming among the existing studies. They find strong evidence that caseworkers at Corpus Christi select *negatively* on $E(Y_1^1 | X)$. That is, they find that caseworkers indulge their preferences for helping the most disadvantaged applicants rather than responding to the incentives provided by the performance standards system. At the same time, they find only weak evidence of positive selection on expected gains, $E(PV|X)$. While the authors caution against over-generalizing from a study of only one of JTPA's more than 600 heterogeneous training centers, this study demonstrates the empirical importance of negative cream skimming by caseworkers who indulge their preferences for helping the needy.

B. Other Effects on Bureaucratic Behavior

Heinrich's (1995, 1999, 2003) analyses of the Cook County JTPA center provide additional insights into how performance standards affect bureaucratic behavior. At this site,

which had a strong technocratic focus relative to other JTPA training centers, performance incentives were passed onto service providers through performance-based contracts. Both caseworkers and program managers were keenly aware of contractually defined performance expectations, and placed a strong emphasis on achieving high placement rates at low cost (Heinrich, 1995, 2003). Heinrich's (1999) analysis of the center's decisions in awarding contracts to service providers finds that the most important factor is a service provider's past performance relative to cost-per-placement standards in their earlier contracts. In addition, training center administrators set much higher performance requirements in the contracts they concluded with vendors than they themselves faced under the state performance standards system. In essence, they insured themselves against the possibility that some providers would fail to meet their contractual standards.

VII. How Well Do the Short Run Performance Measures Predict Long Run Impacts?

This section presents evidence from our analysis of the JTPA experimental data and from the literature on the link between short-run outcome measures like those in the JTPA performance standards system (versions of Y_1^1) and the longer-term impact of the program on participants' earnings and employment. A central question is whether the short run performance measures based on outcomes predict long run impacts.

A. Methods

As discussed in Heckman (1992) and Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), without additional assumptions, experimental data cannot be used to generate individual-level impact estimates. Instead, we estimate subgroup mean impacts using covariates measured at the time of

random assignment. For adult males and females in the NJS data, we form 43 subgroups based on the following characteristics measured at the time of random assignment: race, age, education, marital status, employment status, receipt of AFDC, receipt of food stamps, and training center. Individuals with complete data belong to eight subgroups, while those with incomplete data are included in as many subgroups as their data allow. Using self-reported earnings data, we construct total earnings over 18 and over 30 months after random assignment for each sample member with sufficient data. We also compute the fraction of months employed (where being employed in a month is defined as having positive earnings in that month) in each period as our employment outcome. Using a regression framework, we construct mean-difference experimental impact estimates for each subgroup and adjust these estimates to reflect the fact that a substantial fraction of persons (41 percent of adult males and 37 percent of adult females) in the treatment group dropped out and did not participate in JTPA.^{25,26}

The JTPA performance measures we analyze are hourly wage and employment at termination from the program and weekly earnings and employment 13 weeks after termination. In practice, program bureaucrats obtain these outcomes by calling the participants and asking them. We cannot do this, and instead use program termination dates from JTPA administrative data combined with survey data on job spells to construct the performance measures. Because program administrators do not necessarily contact participants on the exact date of termination or follow-up, and to allow for some measurement error in the timing of the self-reported job spells, we use a 61-day window around each date in constructing the performance measures. We measure employment based on the presence or absence of a job spell within this window. We calculate hourly wages and weekly earnings for employed persons only, since the corresponding performance standards are defined only over this group. We use the highest hourly wage within

the window for persons holding more than one job. Earnings are averaged over the window and are summed over jobs for persons holding multiple concurrent jobs.

We then average the constructed performance measures over each subgroup, and regress the estimated subgroup impacts on the subgroup averages of the performance measures, using the inverse of the Eicker-White standard errors from the impact estimation as weights in the regression. We estimate separate regressions for each outcome (earnings and employment over 18 and 30 months) and for each performance measure.

B. Evidence from JTPA

Table 2 presents estimates of the relationship between experimental earnings and employment impact estimates and various short-term outcomes measured at selected dates after random assignment. The four columns of estimates in Table 2 correspond to cumulated earnings and employment gains over the eighteen and thirty month intervals following random assignment. Each cell in the table presents the regression coefficient associated with the column's dependent variable and the row's independent variable, the estimated (robust) standard error of the coefficient, the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the population coefficient is zero and the R^2 for the regression. The constant from the regression is omitted to reduce clutter. For example, the first row of the first column reveals that a regression of earnings over the 18 months after random assignment on the hourly wage at termination from the JTPA program yields an estimated coefficient of \$465.41 on the hourly wage, with a standard error of \$394.76, a p-value of 0.2452 and an overall R^2 of 0.0328.

Four striking findings emerge from Table 2. First, and most important, we find many negative relationships between short run performance indicators and the experimental impact

estimates. That is, in many cases, the short-term outcome measures utilized in the JTPA performance standards system are perversely related to the longer-term participant earnings and employment gains that constitute the program's goals. The only evidence supporting the efficacy of short-term outcome measures is the link between employment at follow-up and earnings, which is positive at 18 months and positive and marginally statistically significant at 30 months for adult men (but statistically insignificant in both cases for adult women, with a negative coefficient estimate at 30 months). Second, the R^2 values are quite low. The short-term performance standards measures are only weakly related to the long-term earnings and employment gains produced by the program. Third, moving from wage measures at termination to "longer-term" measures constructed from follow-up interviews at three months after termination usually weakens the relationship between the performance standard measure and the longer-run earnings or employment impacts. The R^2 values nearly always decline and the estimated coefficients sometimes become less positive or more negative. Fourth, the performance measures often do worse at predicting earnings impacts estimated over 30 months than at predicting earnings gains estimated over only the first 18 months after random assignment. This suggests that our findings are not due to the fact that the in-program period, when some participants reduce their labor supply to focus on training, may dominate the 18-month outcomes of some participants.

C. Evidence from the Literature

The findings presented in the preceding subsection do not represent an anomaly in the literature, but rather characterize the findings of almost all of the small number of existing papers that perform similar analyses. Table 3 summarizes five other studies we found in the literature

that examine the relationship between performance standards measures based on short run outcome levels and long run program impacts.²⁷ For each study, the first column of the table gives the citation, while the second indicates the particular employment and training program considered. The third column indicates the data used. The fourth and fifth columns indicate the impact measure used (for example, earnings from 18 to 36 months after leaving the program) and what impact estimator (for example random assignment) was used to generate the impact estimates, respectively. The sixth column details the particular performance measures considered (for example, employment at termination from the program). The final column summarizes the findings.

The studies range from strongly negative in their findings, as in Gay and Borus (1980), Cragg (1997), and Burghardt and Schochet (2001), to more mixed findings such as those reported in Friedlander (1988) and Zornitsky, et al. (1988). The most positive of the studies, Zornitsky, et al. (1988), examines a single treatment program treating relatively homogeneous clients, a context very different from, and perhaps not generalizable to, multi-treatment programs serving heterogeneous populations such as JTPA and WIA. This narrowly focused program focused on the skills for a particular occupation, and so did not stimulate post-program human capital investment, which, as we have already noted, would weaken the relationship between the short run performance measures and long run impacts. Taken together, these studies generally support our finding from the JTPA data that performance standards based on short-term outcome levels likely do little to encourage the provision of services to those who benefit most from them in employment and training programs.

VIII. Conclusions

Performance standards systems that attempt to motivate bureaucratic behavior by rewarding government agencies on the basis of short-run outcome measures are widely perceived to be a solution to the problem of inefficiency in government, despite the absence of any strong evidence that such standards lead bureaucrats to increase their attainment of long-run program goals. We present a model of training center behavior in the presence of performance standards, and show why these standards focus on short-term outcomes. Within the context of this model, we precisely define cream skimming and show how such systems provide an incentive for it.

Our empirical analysis reaches two important conclusions. First, whatever cream skimming occurs in JTPA produces only modest efficiency gains or losses. Opposition to cream skimming must come on equity grounds. Put differently, our results show that the efficiency cost of not cream skimming, and instead focusing on the hard to serve among the eligible population, is a modest one.

Our second important conclusion is that the JTPA performance standards do not promote efficiency because the short-term outcomes they rely on have essentially a zero correlation with long-term impacts on employment and earnings. This surprising result comports with the findings in several other studies that have estimated this relationship.

Nothing in this paper says that a successful performance standards system cannot be devised. The available evidence suggests that bureaucrats respond to performance standards, although sometimes perversely so. The available evidence also suggests that the efficiency gains or losses from cream skimming are likely to be small. However, the performance systems that have been tried in the past have generally used short run target measures that are only weakly related to long run efficiency measures. If performance standards are to be put in place that

motivate efficiency, long term studies should be conducted to determine which short run measures are strongly related to long term efficiency criteria.

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1 See Hanushek (2002) for a discussion of accountability systems in education based on performance standards at the teacher and school level. See Barnow (1992) for a discussion of performance standards in publicly provided training programs

2 Wilson (1989) and Dixit (2002) discuss conflicts in the objectives of programs as outcomes of a political process.

3 See Becker (1964), Mincer (1972), Heckman, Hohmann, Smith, and Khoo (2000) and Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2000).

4 We abstract from decisions regarding the timing of training. See Hansen, Heckman and Vytlacil (2000).

5 It can also be negative in the long run, as indeed it was for male youth in JTPA. See, for example, Bloom et al. (1993).

6 Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) present evidence on the importance of general equilibrium effects in evaluating large scale educational programs. Such effects are much less likely to be important for smaller scale job training programs.

7 Note that r may be a social discount factor.

8 We assume interior solutions. Sufficient conditions for an interior solution are concavity of (2) in e for all $Y_{a,i}^0$, convexity of $c_i(e_i)$ for each i , and Inada conditions on both cost and technology. For some S , the constraint (4) may be slack (that is, $\mathbf{I} = 1$ can be obtained).

9 There may be more than one S that qualifies. If so, we assume the training center picks the particular set chosen at random.

10 Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2001) demonstrate that most of the variation in future earnings gains is unforecastable, even for college graduates. Bell and Orr (2002) show that caseworkers do a poor job of predicting Δ_a in a program that provided job training to welfare recipients.

11 There is an additional stage to the allocation process that we do not consider, namely, the allocation of the overall budget among centers. The budget should be allocated to equate returns at the margin for all centers.

12 In this heuristic problem, we assume that the second order conditions are satisfied.

13 In thinking about cream skimming from a policy perspective, two other facts should be kept in mind. First, even if cream skimming occurs, the cream of the JTPA eligible (or applicant) population was still disadvantaged. They must have been so in order to satisfy JTPA's eligibility rules. Thus, cream skimming did not mean that JTPA resources got spent on, for example, middle class people. Second, JTPA was far from the only employment and training program available at the time (just as WIA is far from the only program available now). As documented in National Commission for Employment Policy (1995), dozens of other programs coexisted with JTPA. These other programs may well have provided services better suited to the hard to serve among JTPA's eligible population than did JTPA. Determining whether cream skimming, should it occur, is good or bad, requires more thought than the literature typically devotes to it.

14 In models with regressors, this assumption is $\Delta_{a,i}(X) = Y_{a,i}^1 - Y_{a,i}^0 = \Delta_a(X)$ for all i , yielding equal impacts for all persons with the same X .

15 See Devine and Heckman (1996) for a detailed study of JTPA program eligibility and Orr et al. (1996) or Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993) for details on the types of services provided and their relative frequency.

16 In addition, it includes measures related to skill or credential attainment (as did JTPA), a measure of before-after earnings changes, and measures based on “customer” satisfaction surveys.

17 Doolittle and Traeger (1990), Hotz (1992) and Orr et al. (1996) describe the design of the experiment. Bloom et al. (1997) summarize the experimental impact estimates.

18 See Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) for more details on this estimator, including the construction of the standard errors.

19 We omit analyses for male and female youth throughout the paper due to the small sample sizes available for these groups.

20 AFDC is now called Temporary Aid to Needy Families or TANF.

21 Their earnings measure combines self-report data with data from UI earnings records. For more details, see the discussion in Orr et al. (1996).

22 Orr et al. (1996) also present subgroup impact estimates for male and female youth (see Exhibits 5.19 and 5.20). As expected given the small sample sizes, they find no statistically significant differences in estimated impacts among the subgroups.

23 The analyses in both this section and the preceding section have the potential limitation that they condition on persons who reach random assignment. In choosing whom to serve, program staff members care about relationships conditional on application to the program, not on reaching random assignment.

24 However, even at this stage, self-selection cannot be entirely ruled out.

25 See the discussions in Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1998) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999, Section 5.2) on the origin of this estimator.

26 An alternative strategy would generate predicted individual impacts by including interaction terms between baseline covariates and the treatment group dummy in an impact regression.

27 We thank Tim Bartik of the Upjohn Institute for providing us with copies of two of the unpublished papers.

TABLE 1A
Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup
 Adult Females

Subgroup	Earnings Impacts		Employment Impacts	
	Measured over		Measured over	
	18 Months	30 Months	18 Months	30 Months
Labor Force Status				
P-value for equal impacts	0.3919	0.5745	0.4715	0.2286
Employed	1223.78 (651.64)	1487.38 (2461.08)	0.0017 (0.0135)	-0.0158 (0.0168)
Unemployed	507.42 (507.92)	428.84 (1715.10)	0.0112 (0.0112)	0.0184 (0.0128)
Out of the Labor Force	1543.72 (601.48)	3274.29 (2089.21)	0.0274 (0.0160)	0.0184 (0.0188)
Education				
P-value for equal impacts	0.6890	0.4641	0.8149	0.4646
Highest grade completed < 10	1029.22 (643.40)	-2227.56 (2577.38)	0.0135 (0.0164)	0.0175 (0.0182)
Highest grade completed 10-11	1341.37 (592.06)	3088.46 (2179.51)	0.0289 (0.0147)	0.0246 (0.0171)
Highest grade completed 12	460.29 (469.73)	1503.23 (1711.16)	0.0129 (0.0109)	-0.0053 (0.0129)
Highest grade completed > 12	971.20 (816.54)	795.14 (2997.34)	0.0115 (0.0172)	0.0209 (0.0211)
AFDC Receipt				
P-value for equal impacts	0.7224	0.0371	0.0277	0.2607
Not Receiving AFDC	712.26 (392.05)	-947.01 (1462.17)	0.0028 (0.0087)	0.0026 (0.0105)
Receiving AFDC	924.57 (451.07)	3624.35 (1631.02)	0.0343 (0.0113)	0.0211 (0.0127)
Recent Employment				
P-value for equal impacts	0.8614	0.0492	0.5708	0.0139
Currently employed	1104.08 (721.42)	396.24 (2851.27)	0.0138 (0.0151)	0.0056 (0.0197)
Last employed 0-2 months ago	594.01 (713.69)	979.22 (2485.38)	0.0099 (0.0161)	0.0060 (0.0181)
Last employed 3-5 months ago	171.44 (953.91)	-7677.17 (3485.31)	-0.0063 (0.0199)	-0.0589 (0.0220)
Last employed 6-8 months ago	1874.38 (1175.53)	975.22 (3721.12)	0.0451 (0.0263)	0.0502 (0.0305)
Last employed 9-11 months ago	1679.73 (1311.91)	5244.59 (4437.63)	0.0310 (0.0305)	0.0636 (0.0382)
Last employed \geq 12 months ago	1304.36 (587.15)	4919.73 (2020.46)	0.0341 (0.0155)	0.0347 (0.0180)
Never employed	610.59 (609.42)	-2490.44 (2736.46)	0.0335 (0.0168)	-0.0059 (0.0191)

Source: Authors' calculations using National JTPA Study data.

Notes: Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1% trimming. Estimates are adjusted for program dropouts in the treatment group. Earnings impacts are calculated using all sample members with valid observations for self-reported monthly earnings during each period. The sample includes 4886 valid observations for the 18-month period after random assignment and 1147 valid observations for the 30-month period after random assignment. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.

TABLE 1B
Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup
 Adult Males

Subgroup	Earnings Impacts Measured over		Employment Impacts Measured over	
	18 Months	30 Months	18 Months	30 Months
Labor Force Status				
P-value for equal impacts	0.0407	0.3469	0.2679	0.6517
Employed	2839.24 (1145.51)	6328.20 (4143.22)	0.0300 (0.0166)	0.0005 (0.0194)
Unemployed	718.84 (710.16)	3021.68 (2339.51)	0.0056 (0.0105)	0.0180 (0.0125)
Out of the Labor Force	-2193.85 (1658.81)	-2725.72 (4693.28)	-0.0163 (0.0262)	0.0289 (0.0281)
Education				
P-value for equal impacts	0.6077	0.7939	0.9587	0.7206
Highest grade completed < 10	680.26 (1193.62)	1713.46 (3935.62)	0.0114 (0.0203)	0.0403 (0.0225)
Highest grade completed 10-11	-64.77 (1020.79)	-270.18 (3516.67)	0.0120 (0.0163)	0.0134 (0.0188)
Highest grade completed 12	1438.13 (793.68)	552.70 (2729.26)	0.0030 (0.0119)	0.0105 (0.0141)
Highest grade completed > 12	-92.00 (1238.21)	4886.81 (4155.34)	0.0116 (0.0172)	0.0201 (0.0221)
AFDC Receipt				
P-value for equal impacts	0.5948	0.5794	0.3813	0.6678
Not Receiving AFDC	722.73 (556.43)	2933.22 (1810.58)	0.0122 (0.0085)	0.0161 (0.0099)
Receiving AFDC	-232.18 (1706.56)	-274.82 (5495.50)	-0.0132 (0.0278)	0.0306 (0.0322)
Recent Employment				
P-value for equal impacts	0.5995	0.6193	0.9112	0.7010
Currently employed	2668.20 (1230.61)	3053.96 (4174.11)	0.0176 (0.0178)	-0.0134 (0.0212)
Last employed 0-2 months ago	816.36 (1091.14)	6126.54 (3637.23)	0.0168 (0.0152)	0.0205 (0.0180)
Last employed 3-5 months ago	-425.61 (1162.99)	1248.64 (3794.83)	0.0037 (0.0176)	0.0119 (0.0209)
Last employed 6-8 months ago	-5.65 (1824.51)	-790.27 (5453.91)	-0.0135 (0.0256)	0.0312 (0.0296)
Last employed 9-11 months ago	1191.58 (2328.58)	-4914.81 (7657.02)	0.0163 (0.0384)	0.0098 (0.0478)
Last employed \geq 12 months ago	525.44 (1333.79)	3885.63 (4722.38)	0.0284 (0.0224)	0.0475 (0.0257)
Never employed	-799.52 (1606.04)	-6377.68 (6242.27)	0.0017 (0.0295)	0.0145 (0.0319)

Source: Authors' calculations using National JTPA Study data.

Notes: Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1% trimming. Estimates are adjusted for program dropouts in the treatment group. Earnings impacts are calculated using all sample members with valid observations for self-reported monthly earnings during each period. The sample includes 4886 valid observations for the 18-month period after random assignment and 1147 valid observations for the 30-month period after random assignment. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses.

Table 2*Relationship Between Δ and Y_1^1 in JTPA: Earnings and Employment Impacts*

Performance Standard Measure	Earnings Impact Measured Over:		Employment Impact Measured Over:	
	18 Months After Random Assignment	30 Months After Random Assignment	18 Months After Random Assignment	30 Months After Random Assignment
Adult Females				
Hourly wage at time of termination	-577.61 (304.00) p = 0.0645 $R^2 = 0.0809$	-1729.66 (1280.64) p = 0.1842 $R^2 = 0.0426$	-0.018 (0.008) p = 0.0202 $R^2 = 0.1246$	-0.010 (0.011) p = 0.3559 $R^2 = 0.0208$
Weekly earnings at time of follow-up	-3.74 (8.78) p = 0.6726 $R^2 = 0.0044$	-12.05 (36.54) p = 0.7432 $R^2 = 0.0026$	-0.000 (0.000) p = 0.2728 $R^2 = 0.0293$	-0.000 (0.000) p = 0.3277 $R^2 = 0.0234$
Employment at time of termination	-117.72 (941.92) p = 0.9012 $R^2 = 0.0004$	-2065.61 (3928.63) p = 0.6019 $R^2 = 0.0069$	-0.023 (0.023) p = 0.3213 $R^2 = 0.0246$	-0.029 (0.033) p = 0.3767 $R^2 = 0.0196$
Employment at time of follow-up	1513.28 (1482.04) p = 0.3132 $R^2 = 0.0248$	-1873.03 (6236.83) p = 0.7655 $R^2 = 0.0022$	-0.067 (0.037) p = 0.0767 $R^2 = 0.0745$	-0.024 (0.053) p = 0.6521 $R^2 = 0.0050$
Adult Males				
Hourly wage at time of termination	465.41 (394.76) p = 0.2452 $R^2 = 0.0328$	-1405.68 (1653.30) p = 0.4001 $R^2 = 0.0173$	0.003 (0.005) p = 0.4914 $R^2 = 0.0116$	-0.005 (0.010) p = 0.6230 $R^2 = 0.0059$
Weekly earnings at time of follow-up	6.74 (7.42) p = 0.3690 $R^2 = 0.0197$	-20.76 (31.79) p = 0.5174 $R^2 = 0.0103$	0.000 (0.000) p = 0.9921 $R^2 = 0.0000$	-0.000 (0.000) p = 0.3274 $R^2 = 0.0234$
Employment at time of termination	2542.99 (1384.72) p = 0.0737 $R^2 = 0.0778$	3673.71 (5869.08) p = 0.5349 $R^2 = 0.0097$	0.005 (0.017) p = 0.7559 $R^2 = 0.0024$	-0.059 (0.034) p = 0.0850 $R^2 = 0.0723$
Employment at time of follow-up	2579.24 (2486.91) p = 0.3058 $R^2 = 0.0256$	18716.00 (9842.28) p = 0.0643 $R^2 = 0.0810$	0.050 (0.028) p = 0.0848 $R^2 = 0.0707$	0.021 (0.061) p = 0.7338 $R^2 = 0.0029$

Source: Authors' calculations using National JTPA Study data.

Notes: The actual JTPA performance measures are defined as follows: "Hourly Wage at Placement" is the average wage at program termination for employed adults. "Weekly Earnings at Follow-up" are the average weekly wage of adults employed 13 weeks after program termination. "Employment Rate at Placement" is the fraction of adults employed at program termination. "Employment Rate at Follow-up" is the fraction of adults who were employed 13 weeks after program termination. In our analysis, employment rates were calculated based on the presence or absence of a job spell within 30 days of each reference date (termination or follow-up). Hourly wages were calculated based on the highest reported hourly wage for all job spells reported within 30 days of each reference date. Weekly earnings were calculated by averaging the product of hourly wages and hours worked per week across all reported job spells within 30 days of each reference date weighted by the fraction of the 30-day window spanned by each job spell.

Table 3*Evidence on the Correlation Between Y_1 and D from Several Studies*

Study	Program	Data	Measure of impact	Impact estimator	Performance measures	Findings
Gay and Borus (1980)	Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA), Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS), Neighborhood Youth Corps Out-of-School Program(NYC/OS) and the Job Corps.	Randomly selected program participants entering programs from December 1968 to June 1970 and matched (on age, race, city and sometimes neighborhood) comparison sample of eligible non-participants.	Impact on social security earnings in 1973 (from 18 to 36 months after program exit)	Non-experimental "kitchen sink" Tobit model	Employment in quarter after program, before-after (four quarters before to one quarter after) changes in weeks worked, weeks not in the labor force, wage rate, hours worked, income, amount of unemployment insurance received and amount of public assistance received.	No measure has a consistent, positive and statistically significant relationship to the estimated impacts across subgroups and programs. The before-after measures, particularly weeks worked and wages, do much better than employment in the quarter after the program.
Zornitsky, et al. (1988)	AFDC Homemaker-Home Health Aid Demonstration	Volunteers in the seven states in which the demonstration projects were conducted. To be eligible, volunteers had to have been on AFDC continuously for at least 90 days.	Mean monthly earnings in the 32 months after random assignment and mean monthly combined AFDC and food stamp benefits in the 29 months after random assignment.	Experimental impact estimates.	Employment and wages at termination. Employment and welfare receipt three and six months after termination. Mean weekly earnings and welfare benefits in the three and six month periods after termination. These measures are examined both adjusted and not adjusted for observable factors including trainee demographics and welfare and employment histories and local labor markets.	All measures have the correct sign on their correlation with earnings impacts, whether adjusted or not. The employment and earnings measures are all statistically significant (or close to it). The welfare measures are correctly correlated with welfare impacts but the employment measures are not unless adjusted. The measures at three and six months do better than those at termination, but there is little gain from going from three to six.

Table 3 (Continued)*Evidence on the Correlation Between Y_1 and D from Several Studies*

Study	Program	Data	Measure of impact	Impact estimator	Performance measures	Findings
Friedlander (1988)	Mandatory welfare-to-work programs in San Diego, Baltimore, Virginia, Arkansas, and Cook County.	Applicants and recipients of AFDC (varies across programs). Data collected as part of MDRC's experimental evaluations of these programs.	Post random assignment earnings (from UI earnings records) and welfare receipt (from administrative data).	Experimental impact estimates.	Employment (non-zero quarterly earnings) in quarters 2 and 3 (short-term) or quarters 4 to 6 (long term) after random assignment. Welfare receipt in quarter 3 (short-term) or quarter 6 (long-term) after random assignment.	Employment measure is positively correlated with earnings gains but not welfare savings for most programs. Welfare indicator is always positively correlated with earnings impacts, but rarely significantly so. It is not related to welfare savings. Long-term performance measures do little better (and sometimes worse) than short-term measures.
Cragg (1997)	JTPA (1983-87)	NLSY	Before-after change in participant earnings	Generalized bivariate Tobit model of pre-program and post-program annual earnings.	Fraction of time spent working since leaving school in the pre-program period. This variable is strongly correlated with post-program employment levels.	Negative relationship between work experience and before-after earnings changes.
Burghardt and Schochet (2001)	Job Corps	Experimental data from the National Job Corps Study	The outcome measures include receipt of education or training, weeks of education or training, hours per week of education or training, receipt of a high school diploma or GED, receipt of a vocational certificate, earnings and being arrested. All are measured over the 48 months following random assignment.	Experimental impact estimates.	Job Corps centers divided into three groups: high-performers, medium-performers and low-performers based on their overall performance rankings in Program Years 1994, 1995 and 1996. High and low centers were in the top and bottom third nationally in all three years, respectively.	No systematic relationship between the performance groups and the experimental impact estimates.




Figure 1A

Treatment - Control Differences at Percentiles of the 18 Month Earnings Distribution: Adult Females.

Source: Authors' calculations using National JTPA Study data.

Notes: Earnings variables are those used in Bloom, et al. (1993).

Standard errors are obtained using methods described in Csörgő (1983).




Figure 1B

T treatment - Control Differences at Percentiles of the 18 Month Earnings Distribution: Adult Males, Full Sample.

Source: Authors' calculations using National JTPA Study data.

Notes: Earnings variables are those used in Bloom, et al. (1993).

Standard errors are obtained using methods described in Csörgő (1983).




FIGURE 2
THE JTPA SELECTION PROCESS

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