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ABSTRACT

Gender Differences in Peer Recognition by Economists*

We study the selection of Fellows of the Econometric Society, using a new data set of publications and citations for over 40,000 actively publishing economists since the early 1900s. Conditional on achievement, we document a large negative gap in the probability that women were selected as Fellows in the 1933-1979 period. This gap became positive (though not statistically significant) from 1980 to 2010, and in the past decade has become large and highly significant, with over a 100% increase in the probability of selection for female authors relative to males with similar publications and citations. The positive boost affects highly qualified female candidates (in the top 10% of authors) with no effect for the bottom 90%. Using nomination data for the past 30 years, we find a key proximate role for the Society's Nominating Committee in this shift. Since 2012 the Committee has had an explicit mandate to nominate highly qualified women, and its nominees enjoy above-average election success (controlling for achievement). Looking beyond gender, we document similar shifts in the premium for geographic diversity: in the mid-2000s, both the Fellows and the Nominating Committee became significantly more likely to nominate and elect candidates from outside the US. Finally, we examine gender gaps in several other major awards for US economists. We show that the gaps in the probability of selection of new fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences closely parallel those of the Econometric Society, with historically negative penalties for women turning to positive premiums in recent years.

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1 Introduction

The Econometric Society (ES) is one of the oldest and most prestigious societies in economics. Its Fellows have a remarkable track record: over 90% of Nobel Memorial prize winners have been ES Fellows. As in the upper echelons of business and government (Bertrand, 2018), women make up only a small share of these Fellows. Figure I shows that the fraction of women among the newly elected Fellows was near 0 until 1970, and remained under 5% until the 1990s, but has recently risen to 20%. Similar trends are evident among newly elected fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the American Economic Association (AEA), and among Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Fellows. The patterns in Figure I raise two important questions. To what extent did the historically low share of female Fellows reflect a lack of qualified women, versus a lack of recognition for female scholars? And how can we account for recent increases in the representation of women?

In this paper we develop a simple framework for answering these questions and for analyzing gender differences in peer recognition in academia. Specifically, we study the gender gap in the probability of selection as an ES Fellow from the underlying population of active scholars. Our framework, which incorporates both the *nomination* and *election* phases of a multi-stage process like the one used by the ES, is motivated by three factors. First, the low rate of selection as a Fellow of the ES is largely driven by the low probability of nomination. In 2015, for example, there were over 1,500 economists with at least three "top 5" publications who were not yet ES Fellows. Of these, only 57 were nominated; ultimately 12 were elected. It is therefore crucial to study gender gaps in both the nomination and election processes.[1] Second, an advantage of studying the relative recognition of women in an academic setting is that we can measure the population at risk for receiving an honor, and quantify the accomplishments of different candidates. Parallel analyses for CEO's or political office holders are infeasible, making it virtually impossible to assess whether there is a shortage of qualified women for top posts, or a preference for males among the set of qualified candidates. Third, our models could be used to identify candidates for nomination who have been overlooked.

We begin by constructing a data base of economists who have authored at least one paper in a set of 36 high-impact journals, yielding a list of over 40,000 scholars from the early 1900s to 2019. After assigning gender using methods developed in Card et al. (2020), we construct dynamically evolving CVs for each economist that incorporates their cumulative publications (in any of the 36 journals) and cumulative citations (for papers in the "top 5" economics journals) up to the current year. We then estimate hazard-style models for the probability that someone who is not yet a Fellow is elected in a given year, conditional on publications and citations up to that point, allowing people to remain at risk for selection for up to 18 years after their last publication.

Our sample includes nearly a century of data, from 1933 to 2019. Recognizing the Society's emphasis on "economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics" (Roos, 1933), we allow

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[1] An earlier study by Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003) focuses only on election conditional on nomination.

for differing effects of publications and citations in each of the top-5 journals. We also allow separate effects for publications in the other 31 journals (e.g., *Journal of Econometrics* v. *Journal of Labor Economics*), implicitly controlling for field and methodological focus. We fit separate models for three broad periods – 1933-79, 1980-99, and 2000-19 – allowing the effects of gender to vary by decade within each period.

Across all three periods we find that publications and citations are strong predictors of election to Fellow. Cumulative *Econometrica (EMA)* publications play an especially large role, with those in the *Review of Economic Studies (REStud)* matter slightly less. Publications in the other top 5 journals and in the field journals also matter, as do citations.

While the effects of publications and citations are relatively consistent over time, the impact of author gender shifts dramatically. For the period up to 1979 we estimate a large *negative* impact of female gender on the probability of selection as a Fellow (145 log points – a penalty equivalent to about 1.5 extra *EMA's* in models that control only for top 5 publications). For the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s we estimate positive but more modest effects (all statistically insignificant). We then estimate a larger and highly significant effect (93 log points) in 2010-2019, equivalent to an additional *EMA* publication

These changing gender gaps are readily apparent in the raw data. Figure II shows the female share of newly elected ES Fellows, along with the share of females among all active publishers, the share with at least one *EMA* or *REStud*, the share with at least one *Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE)*, and those with at least 3 top-5's. Prior to 1980 the share of female Fellows was clearly below the share of female economists with 3+ top-5 publications. By the early 1980s, however, the female share of Fellows had caught up, and the two shares trend upward together until about 2010. Thereafter, the female share of newly elected ES Fellows rises sharply, and is now approaching the female share of active publishers.

An important question is whether the recent boost for female candidates applies to all authors, to highly-qualified authors, or only to super-star candidates. Our basic logistic regression models assume that the female effect is proportional to the probability of selection ignoring gender. We evaluate this assumption and find a fairly consistent boost of around 100 log points for female authors ranked in the top 10% of potential candidates. We find no evidence of a boost for candidates in the bottom 90% of authors (for whom the probability of selection is extremely low).

A concern with our analysis is that we may be more likely to undercount publications for women than men, due to name changes at marriage. We conduct a detailed audit of our constructed CV's for 150 scholars and find an error rate of <2% in the attribution of published papers for both men and women. A second concern is that the publication bar in economics is higher for women (Hengel, 2018; Card et al., 2020), or that citation rates are lower for female-authored papers, leading us to undercount the true productivity of women. While acknowledging these possibilities, we emphasize that they cannot account for the dramatic changes in the gender gap in the probability of selection as an ES Fellow. We also note that the estimated selection *premium* for women tends to get larger when we control for broader measures of past productivity - the opposite of what might be expected

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under a mismeasurement concern.

Fellows of the Econometric Society can be nominated by either existing Fellows or by the Society's Nominating Committee. Nominees who receive a minimum share of votes cast in the annual election are then elected. To gain additional insights into the drivers of the gender gap in selection rates, we use confidential ES data on the nominees – available (with some gaps) from 1990 onward – to analyze gender effects on nomination and election.

Considering the probability of nomination, conditional on publications and citations, we find an inconsistent gender gap for the period 1995-2011, but a clear 61 log point gap advantage for women (s.e.=23 points) for the period 2012-2019. An important component of this effect arises through a shift in choices of the Nominating Committee, which since 2012 has had an explicit mandate to put forward the names of highly qualified female economists.

Turning to the probability of election, conditional on nomination and controlling for publications and citations, we find an inconsistent pattern for the period 1995-2011, and a positive election premium for females in the period 2012-2019. We also find that over the past 15 years Committee nominees have had a higher probability of election, irrespective of gender. The emergence of this preference for Committee nominees coincides with a switch from paper to electronic voting in 2006, and a new procedure for explicitly designating Committee nominees on the ballot.[2] The high fraction of female candidates nominated by the Committee since 2012, together with voters' preferences for Committee-nominated candidates, imply that the choices of the Nominating Committee have played an important proximate role in the rising recognition of female scholars.

Next, we focus on three mechanisms that potentially mediate gender differences in the probability of selection. First, female economists may be differentially visible to members of the ES. To measure visibility we use appointments to editorial roles at *EMA*. Second, female economists may be less connected to existing Fellows (e.g., Nielson, 2015). We therefore control for coauthorships with current Fellows, and with members of the Nominating Committee. Third, Sarsons et al. (2021) show that women receive less credit for coauthored work than men in tenure decisions. We thus test whether coauthored papers by women receive a lower weight.

We find that visibility and connections both matter. Serving as Associate Editor of *EMA* leads to a large increase in the probability of selection as a Fellow. Coauthorships with ES Fellows increase the probability of nomination as an ES Fellow, while coauthorships with members of the Nominating Committee matter for the probability of being nominated by the Committee. Nevertheless, adding these controls has almost no effect on the estimated gender gaps. With respect to coauthorships, we do not find that women receive less recognition for coauthored work. Thus the gender gaps in selection as an ES Fellow are largely unaffected by differences in coauthorship patterns.

Having documented the impact of gender, we go on to consider geographic diversity. Although we do not observe the locations of all actively-publishing economists, we see affiliations of the nominees. In the period up to 2005 we find an election premium for nominees based in top US

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[2]We also identify a second impact of the design of the ballot, which until 2020 listed candidates alphabetically: candidates with last names earlier in the alphabet are more likely to be elected (but no more likely to be nominated).

schools and in Europe (relative to those in lower-ranked US schools), but no such premium for those based in Asia, Australia, Latin America, or Africa. Starting in 2006, however, we see a large boost in the probability of election for nominees from these under-represented areas – a boost that is 2-3 times as large as the boost for female candidates post-2012.

Similar to the case for gender, we document a role for the Nominating Committee, which since the mid-1990s has made an effort to expand geographic diversity in the Society. Interestingly, prior to the mid-2000s these efforts had minimal impact. After the ballot started to identify Committee nominees, however, Committee nominees from under-represented areas became much more likely to be elected, holding constant prior publications and citations.

Finally, we examine whether the changing pattern of gender gaps in fellowship selection are specific to the Econometric Society, or reflect more general patterns in the profession. We consider the selection as a Fellow of the AAAS (438 Fellows elected since 1933), the NAS (146 Fellows since 1968), the AEA (172 Fellows elected since 1965), and as a winner of an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Fellowship (305 awards since 1981). We fit hazard-style models similar to the ones for the ES.

We show that the pattern of gender gaps in selection as a Fellow of the AAAS and NAS, who have similar selection processes as the ES, are remarkably similar to the pattern for the ES. Before 1980, women appear to have faced a higher bar for selection as a Fellow of both Societies. In the 1980s and 1990s the gender gap became positive, if statistically insignificant, and in the most recent decade we estimate large positive selection premiums for female scholars at both Societies (larger in magnitude than for the ES). We also document positive female selection premiums as AEA Fellows and (with smaller margintudes) as Sloan Fellows. The parallel pattern of gender gaps at the three Societies suggests to us that similar forces may have been at work, and leads us to emphasize that the Nominating Committee's role at the ES is only a *proximate* cause of the changes there. External forces may have worked through different channels at the AAAS and NAS, but appear to have had the same overall effect as at the ES.

Our findings make three main contributions. First, we contribute to an emerging literature within economics on gender-related differences in the evaluation of scientific work, including studies by Chari and Goldsmith-Pinkham (2017) and Hospido and Sanz (2019) on conference submissions, Card et al. (2020) on journal submissions, and Sarsons et al. (2021) on coauthorship and promotions. In contrast to these papers, we focus on recognition for the highest levels of achievement. This difference may be important if, for example, evaluators hold stereotyped priors on women at entry to the field that lead them to under-value the work of female researchers, resulting in a paucity of women at higher levels. Under such circumstances, Fryer (2007) showed that beliefs may "flip," leading to a presumption that successful females are actually better-qualified than men, consistent with the findings by Bohren et al. (2019) and Kahn (2012).

Second, we contribute to the literature originating with Rossiter (1993) on the recognition of female scientists. Recent studies document the under-representation of women in the American Academy of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (Silver et al., 2017), the American Academy of Neurology (Silver et al., 2018), and as winners of top prizes in the biomedical sciences (Uzzi, 2019),

anesthesiology (Ellinas et al., 2019), and STEM fields as a whole (Lincoln et al., 2012). Relative to these studies, we measure not only the number of females in a field who are at risk to win an award, but also their scientific contributions as measured by publications and citations.

Finally, we also contribute to the small literature on honors in Economics, including the studies of elections for ES Fellows by Hamermesh and Schmidt (2003) and for members of the AEA Executive Committee by Donald and Hamermesh (2006). Our innovations are to consider the joint process of nomination and election, which is particularly important given the low probability of nomination, and to broaden the set of honors under consideration.

2   Data and Summary Statistics

Our analysis combines data from public sources and confidential records of the Econometric Society. In this section we briefly describe our data sets of actively publishing economists and of scholars nominated and elected as Fellows. Online Appendix A presents additional details on the data set and discusses changes from our pre-registered analysis plan.

2.1   Data Set of Actively Publishing Economists

Sample of Journals and Articles. We constructed a sample of actively publishing economists from information on articles in the 36 journals listed in Appendix Table AI. These include the top-5 journals, 8 other general interest journals (counting *AER/AEA Papers and Proceedings* as a separate journal), and 23 field journals (many of which only started publishing in the 1970s or later). Given the focus of the ES on contributions in theory and econometrics, we oversample field journals in these fields and include the *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. We downloaded all articles in each journal from its earliest publication date, eliminating notes and comments. The final data set contains 103,563 separate articles.

From this data set we construct an annual CV for each author, containing the cumulative set of papers published by a given scholar in the 36 journals up to that year. We consider an economist to be an active publisher from the year of his or her first paper (in the set of 36 journals) to 18 years after his or her last publication (unless he or she died before). We supplement publication counts with cumulative citations to a scholar's prior publications in each of the top 5 journals up to that year, extracted from SSCI/Web of Science. (Citations are set to zero for individuals with no publications in the relevant top-5 journal up to that year).

Disambiguating Names. To construct accurate CV's we need to disambiguate author names. Appendix A contains a detailed description of our process, which included using undergraduate assistants to look up first names for authors with only a first initial. After merging and correcting records, our database of actively publishing economists includes over 40,000 unique names.

Fellowships. Information on the Fellows of the ES, the AAAS, the NAS, the AEA, and the Sloan Foundation was obtained from webpages of these institutions. All but 30 of the 1,021 ES Fellows selected from 1933 to 2019 are included in our data base of active publishers. The excluded

group consists mainly of statisticians and methodologists from other fields (see Appendix A).

Gender Coding. We identify gender using the protocol laid out in Appendix Figure 1 of Card et al. (2020). We were able to identify gender for about 94% of actively publishing economists, leaving 2,631 names (6.1% of ever-active scholars) with unknown gender.

Wiki Profiles. We identify all available Wikipedia pages for authors in the sample and use it to identify gender (from the pronouns used) and year of death (if available). We use the gender information to validate the gender coding and resolve some cases of unknown gender. We exclude individuals from the sample after their year of death.

Accuracy Check. Despite our best efforts, our measures of gender and our CV's have some measurement errors. A particular concern for our analysis arises if the error rate in disambiguating names is higher for female candidates, for example because some women change their name at marriage. To assess the error rate we conducted an audit of 150 economist names, 100 classified as male and 50 as female. The names were randomly drawn from the subset of authors with a first publication after 1979 and at least 2 top-5 publications by 2019. As shown in Appendix Table AII, an extensive hand checking revealed that our gender coding was correct in 100% of the cases. Among the 145 economists for whom we could find an actual CV, we measure two types of errors in our constructed CV's: missing publications; and incorrectly attributed publications. Reassuringly, the error rate in our constructed CV's is low. Only 4 publications were incorrectly attributed, and only 13 (out of 2,305) were missing: 2 due to a name change at marriage; 8 due to use of different first names, and 3 due to erroneous or missing meta data. While the error rate is higher for females (11/629=1.8%) than for males (6/1,676=0.4%), the difference is substantively small.

Measure of Connection. We define "connection to an ES Fellow as of year t" as the event of having coauthored at least one paper with that Fellow in years up to and including t in our data set of 36 journals.[3] Similarly we define connection to a member of the Nominating Committee. Unlike the measure of connections to ES Fellows (which can only increase over time), this variable reverts to 0 when the Committee member to whom a person is connected rotates off the Committee.

2.2 Confidential Nomination Data and Nomination Process

Nomination Data. We obtained confidential data on nominations and votes for ES Fellows from the ES and other sources. We use the same data as Hamermesh and Schmidt, 2003 for 1990-2000, supplemented with parallel information for 2001-2002. These data include a list of nominees, whether the person was nominated by the committee (available starting in 1995), and the institution of affiliation (coded in 7 categories). The data for 2006-2019 include additional information on the number of votes received by each nominee, the number of Fellows endorsing the nomination, and the nomination statement. For the years 2003-05 we obtained the list of nominees from copies of the paper ballots. We were also able to identify the nominees by the committee (which are not listed separately on the ballot) for the years 2004 and 2005, but not for the year 2003. We thus

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[3]This variable increments by 1 when an economist publishes a new paper coauthored with an existing Fellow (to whom the economist is not yet connected), or when a coauthor of a previously published paper is elected as a Fellow.

omit 2003 from most of the nomination analysis.

Nomination and Election Process. Appendix Table AIII describes the nomination and election process from 1933 on, drawing on documents in *EMA*. In the years 1990-2019, the process involved two main steps. First, scholars were nominated, either by at least 3 current Fellows, or by the Nominating Committee. Second, the list of nominees was circulated to the current Fellows, who voted; nominees with the support of at least 30% of the ballots cast were elected.

Within this framework there were a few important changes to the election process over time. From 1990 to 2005 the ballot was a paper form and nominees (typically around 50) were listed alphabetically, with no indication of whether the nomination came from the committee or other Fellows. In addition, a separate document with the nominating statement for each candidate was provided to voters, including information on the source of the nomination.

Starting in 2006 the ES used an online ballot (with the nominees still listed alphabetically) that provided access to the nominating statement by clicking on a nominee's name. From 2007 to 2010, a single-click feature allowed Fellows to vote for all the candidates nominated by the Committee. This feature was discontinued in 2011 out of concern that it provided an excessive advantage to Committee nominees. Thereafter, Committee nominees were still identified on the ballot by an "(N)" next to their name. Starting in 2009, the ballot listed nominees by region, starting from the regions with the lowest representation in the Society, in alphabetical order within a region.

There have also been changes in the mandate of the Nominating Committee. Anecdotal sources suggest that in the early 1990s the Committee was tasked with bringing forward names of candidates in under-represented regions (e.g., Asia and Latin America). Starting in 2012 a parallel mandate was issued to nominate female candidates. Specifically, the Executive Vice-President noted: "The committee is expected to nominate candidates who might have been overlooked, with special consideration to geographical and field diversity. Gender was recently added to the list and it is now in the mandate of the 2012 Fellows Nominating Committee."[4]

In light of the changes in 2006 (ballot format) and 2012 (mandate for the Nominating Committee), in our analysis of the nomination process we split the years 1990-2005, 2006-11, and 2012-19.

2.3   Summary Statistics

Tables I and II show summary statistics for our author×year data base of actively publishing economists and for the newly elected ES Fellows, respectively. We present data for the 1933-79 period (Columns 1-3), for 1980-99 (Columns 4-6) and for 2000-19 (Columns 7-9). Within each period, we present characteristics of all authors/Fellows and for males and females separately.

The female share of actively publishing economists was only 5.2% in the 1933-79 period but has risen to 17.2% in the latest period.[5] Among newly elected ES Fellows the female share is even smaller. Indeed, between 1933 and 1979 only 3 women were selected: Dorothy Brady in 1950, Irma Adelman in 1968, and Anne Carter in 1973. As shown in Figure I, however, the female share of

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[4]This is from a 2012 note from the Executive Vice-President, posted on a Fellows forum.

[5]See Bayer and Rouse, 2016 and Lundberg, 2017 for a discussion of the low female share in economics today.

new Fellows has risen, averaging just over 12% in the 2000-2019 period. Among actively publishing economists, the share with unknown gender is 11% in the earlier years, but is just 3% in 2000-19. The genders of all the ES Fellows and nominees are known. For simplicity, in the remainder of the paper we drop all authors with unknown gender from our analysis.

The second panel of Table I gives the percent of active publishers who have been selected as Fellows of the ES, AAAS, NAS, AEA, and as Sloan Foundation Fellows. ES Fellows are most numerous, reflecting the longer history of the ES Fellows program and the low numbers of economists selected by the AAAS and NAS. The corresponding panel in Table II shows that only a small share of new ES Fellows are already AAAS or NAS Fellows. Sloan Fellowships (which are awarded relatively early in a career) are more common among new ES Fellows. Indeed, a remarkable 44% of newly elected female Fellows in the 2000+ period had received a Sloan award.

The remaining rows of Tables I and II summarize the publication and citation records of active publishers and newly elected Fellows. Focusing first on top-5 publications, publishing in these journals is relatively rare, with fairly stable cumulative averages of about 0.2 *EMA* papers, 0.1 *REStud* papers, and 0.3 *AER* papers per active economist. Among newly elected Fellows the averages are much higher, with around 1.9 *EMA* papers, 1.1 *REStud* papers, and 1.6 *AER* papers per new Fellow in the most recent decade. Citations to papers in the top-5 journals tell the same story. In the most recent decades, newly elected Fellows have on average about 425 cumulative citations to their top-5 publications, compared to an average of 75 among all actively publishing economists. Newly elected Fellows also have more publications in the non-top-5 journals.

Finally, we report the average number of years since first publication. In the earlier years newly elected ES Fellows were "younger" than a typical active economist (9.9 years since first publication versus 11.2 years) but more recently the new Fellows are further along in their careers (17.6 years since first publication versus 12.7), consistent with increasing competition for Fellows slots.

Table III shows summary statistics on nominees (Columns 1-4) and newly elected ES Fellows (Columns 5-8) based on confidential data from the ES, with additional detail in Appendix Table AIV. There are 771 nominations for 460 economists in the years 1990-2005 and 1,017 nominations of 494 economists in the years 2006-19. On average one quarter of nominees were put forward by the Nominating Committee, though this share is higher for female nominees in recent years, as we discuss below. The share nominated by the Committee is larger among elected Fellows, reflecting the higher election success of Committee nominees, especially in the later period. The number of votes is around 80-90 for an average nominee and 120 for an elected Fellow.

The publication and citation data in Table III show a number of interesting differences between male and female nominees and new Fellows. In the 2006+ period nominated and elected female scholars tend to have relatively fewer publications in *EMA* and *REStud* than males but relatively more papers in the *AER* and *QJE.* Elected females also stand out for the relatively high numbers of citations for their past work, particularly for their *QJE* papers.

There are also some relatively large gender differences in institutional affiliation. Female nominees and new Fellows are particularly concentrated in top-5 US departments, are less likely to be

from Asia or Australia, and are virtually absent from Latin America and Africa. The lack of female economists from under-represented regions suggests that gender diversity and regional diversity are potentially conflicting goals for the ES, a point to which we return below.

3 Gender Differences in Selection of Econometric Society Fellows

In this section we present our main results on gender differences in the selection of ES Fellows. We begin with simple logistic regression models that describe the probability of being selected as a new Fellow in year t, conditional on cumulative publications and citations up to t.[6] The risk set in each year includes actively publishing fellows who are not yet Fellows (allowing a scholar to remain at risk for 18 years after his or her last publication in the 36 journals in our sample, or until death). We then turn to an analysis of the nomination and election data, decomposing the gender gaps in selection as a Fellow into gaps in the probability of nomination and probability of election, conditional on nomination. Lastly, we analyze several possible mechanisms.

3.1 Selection of New Fellows

Table IV summarizes the key coefficients from our new Fellow selection models. To account for changes in publication and citation practices and the entry of new journals, we estimate the models separately for the periods 1933-79, 1980-99 and 2000-2019. All the models include year fixed effects that adjust for year-to-year differences in the numbers of Fellows selected relative to the population at risk.[7] Our main focus is the female coefficients, which measure the difference in log-odds of selection for females versus males, conditional on publications and citations. Since the probability of selection is low, this is approximately the gender gap in the log of the probability of selection. Given the small number of women selected as Fellows before 1980 we assume a constant gender effect in the first period. For the two later periods, we allow the gender gap to vary by decade.

In our first specification (Columns 1, 4, and 7) we control for an authors' cumulative count of papers in each of the top-5 journals. In all three time periods the strongest determinant of selection is the number of *Econometricas*: each *EMA* article increases the probability of selection by about 100 log points (s.e.=7) in the earliest decades and by 100 log points (s.e.=6) in the most recent period. A publication in the *REStud* has the next largest impact, with an impact of 64 log points (s.e.=7) early on and 52 log points (s.e.=8) more recently. Publications in the other top-5 journals have smaller coefficients, especially in the earlier decades.

In our next set of models (columns 2, 5, and 8), we add controls for the inverse hyperbolic sine of total cumulative citations to the author's prior publications in each of the top-5 journals.[8] Citations have a relative large effect on the probability of selection and their addition leads to

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[6]As noted by Efron (1988), this specification closely approximates a standard discrete time hazard model.

[7]Years in which no individuals are elected as Fellows, such as 1934 or 1969, are automatically dropped in the logit specification given the presence of year fixed effects.

[8]We use the *asinh* transformation to approximate the natural logarithm but accommodate zero citations. We note that for $x > 2$, $asinh(x) \approx log(2x)$.

some diminution in the effect of counts of papers. In the most recent period, for example, the elasticity of the probability of selection with respect to cumulative *EMA* citations is 0.25, with smaller elasticities in the other top-5 journals. We also add controls for the cumulative numbers of publications in each of the other 31 journals we consider, with the coefficients on these variables reported in Appendix Table AV. We find sizable impacts of publications in some field journals (e.g., the *Journal of Econometrics*) particularly in the early period. In the latest period, we also find relatively large effects of publications in several newer journals (e.g., *AEJ: Applied*). Articles in the *AEA Papers and Proceedings* are strong predictors since 1980.

In our most comprehensive specifications (columns 3, 6, and 9) we add four additional groups of controls: (i) indicators for the number of top-5 publications, 1, 2, 3,..., up to 7+, to estimate the importance of such publications; (ii) indicators for 1, 2, and 3+ cumulative publications for EMA and similarly for each of the other top-5 journals, to allow for a non-linear effect of such publications; (iii) indicators for percentiles of cumulative citations in top-5 journals (50-60, 60-70, 70-80, 80-90, 90-95, 95-97.5, 97.5-99, 99+) to allow for effects not captured by the asinh functional form; (iv) a proxy for academic age, with fixed effects for 10-19, 20-29, and 30+ years since first publication. The additional controls raise the R^2 significantly, in the most recent period from 0.361 to 0.424. Among the control variables (reported in Appendix Table AV), in the last 4 decades the presence of at least 1 or 2 top-5s is a very strong predictor: 121 log points for 1 top-5 and 289 log points for 2 top-5s in the last 2 decades. The first or second EMA publication also has a disproportionate effect, and there is a negative impact of 30+ years since first publication.

Focusing on the most comprehensive specification, the estimated female coefficients in Table IV parallel the patterns in Figure II. In the 1933-79 period there was a large negative gender gap (-144 log points) suggesting that female economists faced a significantly higher bar for selection as a Fellow (equivalent to about 1.5 extra *EMA* publications in models that only use top-5 publications). In the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the gender gap turns positive though not statistically significant: 63 log points (s.e.=47 points) for the 1980s, 3 log points (s.e.=48 points) for the 1990s and 54 log points (s.e.=34) for the 2000s. Finally, in the 2010s we detect a larger and statistically significant positive effect of 93 log points (s.e.=24 points) for 2010-2019.

We note that the estimated gender gaps across all periods tend to become *larger* as we add additional controls. Such a pattern suggests that the unobserved determinants of Fellow selection may be negatively correlated with female gender (e.g., Altonji et al. (2005)). If so, then we may be *under-estimating* the causal effect of female gender on selection i.e., the boost for females is larger than we estimate in the specification in column 9. We stress though that the qualitative patterns for the gender coefficients are not sensitive to having a more parsimonious set of controls (as in Columns 1, 4, and 7) or an extensive set (as in Columns 3, 6, and 9). Further, a very parsimonious specification which only includes counts for the number of top-5 publications and the quantiles for top-5 citations (Appendix Table AVI) yields very similar coefficients to our benchmark model.

To put the estimated female coefficients from our richest specifications in perspective, we calculated the number of female Fellows that would have been selected in the absence of a female

disadvantage in the 1933-79 period, or a female advantage in the 2010-2019 period. This analysis shows that the number of female Fellows selected up to 1979 would have risen from 3 to about 13 – an addition of 10 extra female Fellows – while the number of female Fellows selected from 2010-2019 would have fallen from 28 to about 12 – a loss of 16.

Graphical Evidence. Figures IIIa-b display the average probability of election for male and female candidates, within each bin of the probability of election, for the years 1960-79 and 1980-99 (Figure IIIa) and 2000-09 and 2010-19 (Figure IIIb). Specifically, we re-estimate the models in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV just for male authors. We then generate the predicted probability of election for each active scholar and form percentile bins based on these probabilities. Finally, for each gender group and percentile bin we calculate the average probability of selection as a fellow.

The figures show that, irrespective of gender, almost no one is elected as a Fellow in bins below the 90th percentile, and the probability is still very low in the 95th to 97.5th percentile. It rises in the next percentile, and reaches 5-10% in the 99th percentile. Within a given percentile, the probability of election is lower in the most recent years, reflecting the rise in the number of actively publishing economists and a fairly constant number of elected Fellows.

Turning to the gender differences, Figure IIIa shows that in the 1960-79 period the election probability for females was clearly lower than for males in the same percentile bucket, consistent with the estimates in columns 1-3 of Table IV. The selection rates for females and males are more comparable in the 1980-99 period. In the last 20 years (Figure IIIb) female candidates have approximately a 2 times higher probability of election than similarly qualified males, again consistent with the estimates in columns 7-9 of Table IV.

An important question is whether our logistic regression models, with a single coefficient for female authors, are able to replicate the patterns of election probabilities shown in Figures IIIa-b. To assess this visually, we used the models in columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table IV to estimate the predicted probabilities of election for economists in each of the percentile bins. As shown in Appendix Figure AI, the logit models do a good job of capturing the patterns of actual selection probabilities for both male and female economists in the various percentile bins.

As a further check, we estimated a logit model for the years 2000-19, including the index used for the percentile bins in Figure IIIb (estimated using only the data for males) and a set of indicators for females in each percentile bin.[9] This specification allows the effect of gender to vary across the percentile bins in an unrestricted manner. We also estimated specifications that include the estimated index and dummies for each of the percentile bins, to test whether the logit model provides a good fit to the election probabilities of highly qualified men (see Appendix Table AVII).

The estimated female effects by percentile bin are plotted in Figure IIIc. For reference, we show the pooled female effect for the two decades, which is 0.63 – about half way between the estimated effects for 2000-2009 and for 2010-2019 reported in column 9 of Table IV. Reassuringly, the female effects for each of the four highest bins (covering the top decile of authors) are close to the pooled

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[9]To increase the statistical power of these models we pooled the 2000-2009 and 2010-2019 decades. However, specifications that allow separate female effects for each percentile bin and decade suggest relatively small differences between the decades for females in each percentile bin (Appendix Figure AII).

estimate. The point estimate of the female effect for authors in the bottom 90% is actually negative, but very imprecise, reflecting the fact that almost no authors (of either gender) are elected as fellows from this group. Thus a simple logit model with a single coefficient for female economists provides a remarkably good description of the gender gap in election probabilities. Moreover, as shown by the additional specifications in Appendix Table AVII, the logit model also provides a relatively good fit for the election probabilities of highly qualified men.[10]

3.2 Decomposing Differences in Election Probabilities

Framework and Basic Summary Statistics

In this section we attempt to shed light on the sources of the remarkable changes in the fraction of females selected as new Fellows documented in Section 3.1. We ask how much of the change is due to changes in the probability that women are nominated versus changes in the probability of election conditional on nomination. To set the stage, let F denote female gender, let E denote the event of election, and let N denote the event of nomination. Using Bayes law,

$$P[F|E] = \frac{P[E|N,F]}{P[E|N]} \times P[F|N] \tag{1}$$

Thus the fraction of females among newly elected Fellows can be decomposed into two factors: (1) the relative election success of female candidates compared to all candidates who are nominated, and (2) the fraction of females who are nominated. If, for example, female nominees have the same election probability as male nominees, then changes over time in the fraction of females among newly elected Fellows will be entirely driven by changes in the fraction of female nominees.

We can further distinguish between nomination by the Nominating Committee (denoted by N_c) and nomination by a group of Fellows (N_f). Specifically:

$$P[F|N] = P[F|N_c] \times P[N_c|N] + P[F|N_f] \times P[N_f|N]. \tag{2}$$

Combining (1) and (2) we can write:

$$\begin{aligned} P[F|E] &= \frac{P[E|N_c,F]}{P[E|N]} \times P[F|N_c] \times P[N_c|N] \\ &+ \frac{P[E|N_f,F]}{P[E|N]} \times P[F|N_f] \times P[N_f|N] \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

This decomposes the overall fraction of females among newly elected Fellows into shares attributable to the nominees of the committee and the nominees of the Fellows. For each subset of nominees, the contribution to the overall share of female Fellows depends on the relative election success of the female nominees in that group, and the fraction who are female.

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[10]In contrast, Column 8 of Table AVII shows that the specification with fewer controls used in Column 2, 5, and 8 of Table IV does not pass the test, as the percentile indicators for men are highly significant and we confidently reject a coefficient of 1 on the index.

Table V presents the mean values of the probabilities in equations (1)-(3) using data from 1995 forward. Based on the timing of key institutional changes in 2006 and 2012 discussed above, we consider 3 intervals: 1995-2005, 2006-2011, and 2012-2019, with year-by-year evidence in Appendix Table AVIII. The first row shows that the average fraction of females among newly elected Fellows (i.e., $P[F|E]$) was 6.2% in the 1995-2005 period and 5.6% in the 2006-2011 period, but then rose to 19.3% in the 2012+ period. Next, we show the fractions of female nominees ($P[F|N]$), and the fractions of females nominated by the Committee ($P[F|N_c]$) and by the Fellows ($P[F|N_f]$). The fraction of female nominees rises from 5.4% in the first interval, to 5.7% in the second and 12.6% in the third, driven by a large increase in the share of female Committee nominees. If the relative election success of females and males had remained constant, equation (1) suggests that this 2.3× increase in $P[F|N]$ would have increased $P[F|E]$ from 6.2% to 14.2% in the latest interval – a little over one-half of the actual rise. Thus, the total increase in $P[F|E]$ can be attributed approximately equally to a rise in the fraction of female nominees and a rise in their election success.

The Nominating Committee has put forward about one-quarter of nominees, with a slight decline from the first interval (26.8%) to the last (22.5%). This modest share means that despite the rapid rise in the female share of the Committee's nominees, the share of female nominees attributable to the committee rose only modestly, from 29.6% in 1995-2005 to 40.5% in 2012-2019.

The election success ($P[E|N]$) has declined from about 29% in the late 1990s to just over 21% recently. The election success of Committee nominees, however, actually rose from 39% in 1995-2005 to 51% most recently, offset by a steady decline in the success of the Fellow's nominees. Below we suggest that the increase in success of Committee nominees was at least partly due to an endorsement effect: starting in 2006, with the switch to online voting, Committee nominees were identified on the ballot and this shift led to an immediate rise in their election success rate.

The election success rate of the Committee's female nominees closely followed the trend for all their nominees, rising from 38% to around 53% most recently. The females nominated by the Fellows experienced a decline in selection success quite similar to that for all Fellow nominees.

Figure IV presents year-by-year data on the female shares of Committee and Fellows' nominees and newly elected Fellows. From 1995 to 2011 the four series track each other with about 5% females in each group. In 2012, however, the female share among the Committee nominees increased to over 20 percent, and has remained at that level in most years since. Correspondingly, there is an increase in the female share among the overall nominees and among the elected Fellows. This shift in the gender composition of Committee nominees appears to reflect the new mandate for the Nominating Committee to seek out female nominees – a policy that seems to have largely worked.

Models of Nominations and Election Outcomes

The data in Table V suggest that the rise in the female share of newly elected Econometric Society Fellows can be traced to three main *proximate causes:* (i) a sharp rise in the share of females nominated by the Nominating Committee; (ii) a more modest but still important rise in the share of females nominated by the Fellows; (iii) the relatively high and rising election success rate of

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nominees put forward by the Nominating Committee. Of course the probabilities reported in the table take no account of changes in the relative qualifications of actively publishing female economists, or of the potential selectivity of the (relatively small number of) nominees of either gender put forward by the Nominating Committee. To address these factors we turn to a series of simple models that adjust for the detailed publication and citation data.

Panel A of Table VI presents a set of nomination and election models, fit to pooled data for the period from 1995 to 2019 but allowing a separate coefficient on female gender for each the three time periods. These models use the same controls as those in columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table IV; the other coefficient estimates are reported in Appendix Tables AIX and AX.

The first model is a logistic regression for the probability of election as a Fellow, fit to the sample of actively publishing economists who are not yet Fellows. The estimates for the first two periods fluctuate, with a positive and sizable female coefficient in 1999-2005 and a smaller, negative coefficient for the 2006-2011 period, consistent with the fluctuations in Figure II for this period. In the more recent period, 2012-2019, we detect a large positive coefficient, consistent with Table IV.

Next we present a model for the probability of nomination as a Fellow. The female coefficients for 1995-2005 and 2006-11 are relatively similar to the female coefficients in the model for selection as a Fellow in that interval, implying that, conditional on the controls, there was relatively little gender difference in the probability of election given nomination in these periods. In the third interval, however, we estimate a +0.61 boost in the log odds of nomination for female candidates – about half as big as the boost in the log odds of selection as a Fellow. Thus, about half of the large boost in the probability of selection as a new Fellow for women in the 2012+ period is attributable to a boost in their log probability of being nominated, and half to their higher election success.[11]

Next we present separate models for the probability of nomination by the Committee or by one or more Fellows. In the first two time intervals neither of these has a large or statistically significant female gap. In the most recent interval, however, we see a large positive female effect for nomination by the Committee, consistent with the patterns in Figure IV and Table V. These patterns point to two conclusions. First, as noted above, the Nominating Committee appears to have shifted toward a strong positive preference for female candidates in the 2012+ period. Second, while the fraction of female candidates proposed by the Fellows also rose between the second and third intervals (from 5.6% to 9.7% – see Table V), this increase reflected a relative rise in the fraction of qualified female economists, rather than a change in preferences of the Fellows.[12]

Panel B of the table presents a series of models for election outcomes, conditional on nomination. We begin with a logit model for the probability of election that includes controls for the candidate's publications and citations, and for the year of election. The results are consistent with the patterns for selection as a Fellow (row 1 of the table) and for nomination (row 2).

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[11]Since $P(E) = P(N) \times P(E|N)$, the male-female gap in the log of the probability of selection as a Fellow is equal to the sum of the gender gaps in the log probabilities of nomination and election conditional on nomination. And since $P(E)$ and $P(N)$ are both small, the male female gaps $\ln P(E)$ and $\ln P(N)$ are approximately equal to the female coefficients in the logit models for these outcomes. For $P(E|N) \approx 0.21$, the gender gap in $\ln P(E|N)$ is approximately 0.8 times the female coefficient in the logit model for election conditional on nomination.

[12]Appendix Figure AIII presents parallel graphical evidence on nominations along similar lines to Figure III.

The next model adds a control for whether the candidate was nominated by the Committee, and an interaction between female gender and nomination by Committee. Prior to the ballot change in 2006, Committee nominees had only a slightly higher probability of election. After the change explicitly identifying Committee nominees, the boost became very large (around 300 log points) and highly significant, implying a strong endorsement effect on Fellow voting. The interaction effects between Committee nominees and female gender are insignificant, suggesting a similar endorsement effect for men and women, though we cannot rule out small or moderately large interactions. In the most recent interval we also estimate a sizable, if not statistically significant effect for female gender, suggesting that the ES voters shifted to exhibit a preference towards female candidates, even controlling for the source of the nomination.

The next three models in Table VI are Poisson regressions for the number of votes received. We estimate them over the last two time periods (since vote counts are only available after 2006), allowing the effects of the key variables to vary by interval. Consistent with the results above, we find that votes received by female candidates rose substantially in the latest period (by 15%), that Committee nominees receive many more votes, and that even controlling for Committee nominee status, there was some evidence of a rise in the votes received by female candidates (by 9%).

In the last row we estimate Poisson models for the number of endorsements for nominations by Fellows. We find no gender differences in either period; we do not study endorsements any further.

3.3   Nomination Statements

A part of the election process that we have neglected so far is the nomination statement. Each nomination is accompanied by a short statement from either the Fellows submitting the nomination or the Nominating Committee. In light especially of the analysis of Wu (2018), we consider if the nomination statements show any differences between male and female nominees, or between successful and unsuccessful nominations.

We analyze 1,017 nominations from 2006 to 2019 (earlier statements are unavailable), identifying all word lemmas used in at least 20 statements. This process yielded 567 words. Panels A-D of Appendix Figure AIV show all words with an odds ratio above 2 for predicting gender (Panels A and B), and a successful nomination (Panels C and D). Comparing the words most predictive of gender, we see that female words like "measurement" and "experiment" reflect a more applied orientation, while male words like "bayesian" and "strategy" reflect a more theoretical orientation. We do not find any systematic evidence of the differential use of words characterizing the quality or impact of the work in female nomination statements. Similarly, the words most predictive of election success or failure seem to largely reflect the substantive orientation of a nominee's work.

We also examined the correlation between the effects of different words in identifying gender versus election success (see Appendix Figure AV). There does not appear to be any systematic correlation (positive or negative) in the effect of a given word across these two domains. Appendix Table AXI presents further evidence on words that are predictive of the various outcomes, controlling for publications and citations, yielding similar results. Overall, we do not find any obvious

evidence of gender stereotyping in the nominating statements.

3.4 Mechanisms: Visibility, Networks and Credit for Collaboration

In this section we examine three potential mechanisms for the gender differences in recognition in Economics. First, we consider the visibility of a scholar to other members of the ES. One obvious indicator of visibility is being named to the editorial board of *EMA* (though admittedly it is also a signal of quality).[13] Motivated by Einav and Yariv (2006), who find that ES Fellows are more likely to have last names earlier in the alphabet and attribute this to visibility of their work, we control for the quantile of the first letter of the last name within the sample of active publishers.

Next we consider the potential role of personal connections. Specifically, we examine the effect of having previously coauthored with existing ES Fellows, as well as coauthorships with members of the Nominating Committee in a particular year. We also examine the impact of the share of female economists serving on the Nominating Committee.

Table VII presents our models for the effects of these two channels on the probabilities of selection and of nomination as an ES Fellow for the years 1990 on. The specification in Column 1 mirrors the one in Table IV, except that for parsimony the coefficients on the control variables are kept constant from 1990 on; the estimated gender coefficients are very close to those in Table IV. Similarly, in Columns 3, 5, and 7 we replicate the specifications on nomination as Fellow from Table VI, presenting the gender effects by decade (1990-99, 2000-09, 2010-19).

In Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 we add the visibility and connection controls. We find that having served as Associate Editor at *EMA* has a large positive effect on both selection as an ES Fellow and on nomination. In Column 2 we also replicate the finding of Einav and Yariv (2006) that economists with names later in the alphabet are less likely to be elected Fellows. Contrary to a visibility explanation for this finding, however, we do not find a statistically significant effect on nominations either by Fellows or the Nominating Committee. This suggests a different interpretation, based on ballot design: the nominees are listed in alphabetical order, and candidates near the top of the (long) ballot likely capture more votes. If true, a reform in 2020 to randomize the order of candidates is a valuable innovation.

We also find that previous coauthorships with ES Fellows have a significant effect on the probability of selection as a Fellow, nomination as a Fellow, and nomination by existing Fellows or the Nominating Committee. Interestingly, connections with members of the Nominating Committee also matter a lot for the probability of being a Committee nominee, but not for nomination by other Fellows, with thus a muted impact on ultimate selection as Fellow. We also find suggestive evidence that a higher share of women on the Nominating Committee increases the likelihood that female candidates are nominated by the Committee.

Overall, visibility and connections matter for election as Fellow of the ES. Nevertheless, the estimated gender gaps are largely unchanged when we control for these features, suggesting that

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[13]We also considered the impact of being named co-editor or editor at *EMA*. Since virtually all editors and co-editors are already Fellows at the start of their term, however, this measure is not very useful.

male-female differences in connections or visibility cannot account for the gender gaps.

In Appendix Table AXII we examine whether females receive different credit for their coauthored works than males, as suggested by Sarsons et al. (2021) in the context of tenure decisions. We create an index of publications in the 36 journals and citations taking as weights the coefficients from the ES selection regression as in Table IV, Column 9 (except that we run it over the years 1990-2019 and just for male authors). We then create an additional index which uses the same coefficients as the main indexes but counts only single-authored papers. The coefficient on this index would be positive if authors (of either gender) get less credit for joint papers. Finally, we create an index capturing the remaining controls ('Remaining Index') used in Table IV, Column 9, to match our benchmark specification. All indices are re-centered around their mean for newly elected fellows.

In Column 1 we estimate a specification with these indices, not splitting by the gender of the economist. The coefficient on the single-authored index is not significantly different from zero: we cannot reject point estimates of zero discounting for joint work – consistent with the finding by Ellison (2013) that job placements of recently tenured economists are best explained by a model of academic credit that barely discounts co-authored work.

Next we examine whether these findings differ for female authors. For the coauthored papers (captured by the overall index), we cannot reject that women get the same credit as men. Turning to the index for single-authored papers, we find suggestive evidence of more weight on such papers for the selection of females as ES fellows, but no such difference for either source of nomination as ES fellows, or for selection as AAAS or NAS fellow. Furthermore, allowing for these index variables does not affect much the estimates of the key female coefficients. We conclude that differing credit for coauthored work does not appear to account for the pattern of gender gaps we document.

4 Geographic and Institution Differences in Election to ES Fellows

While gender differences in the selection of ES Fellows are the focus of this paper, the ES Nominating Committee has had a mandate to expand the geographic diversity of Fellows for many years, and the ballot in recent years lists nominees by region to draw attention to the issue. In this section we explore the gaps associated with geography and institutional prominence in elections for ES Fellows, using information drawn from the nomination forms. Unfortunately, such information is not readily available for the overall population of actively publishing scholars.

In Table VIII we estimate a logit model of selection as ES Fellow conditional on nomination, equivalent to the model in Table VI but adding characteristics of the institution of affiliation (with non-top-17 US departments as the omitted category). As with gender gaps, we find a very different pattern of effects associated with affiliation in earlier and later years. In the 1995-2005 period, economists in top-5 or top-6-to-17 US Departments had the highest likelihood of election, conditional on publications and citations, while those in Asia, Australia, and Latin America appear to have faced a higher bar for election. Since 2006, however, we observe very large election premiums for economists from Asia or Australia and from Africa and Latin America in the order of 200 to

400 log points, 2-4 times larger than the parallel estimated premiums for gender.

Thus, within the short span of a decade, the group with the highest chance of election (conditional on publication and citations) changed from economists at top US universities to economists in under-represented regions of the world.

In the second panel of Table VIII, we pool all the under-represented regions and add a control for the source of nomination. As in Table VI, we find that Committee nominees have received significantly more support in the years since 2006.[14] Even controlling for this factor, though, nominees from underrepresented regions are significantly more likely to be elected.

Importantly, adding information on institutional affiliation leads to an *increase* in the magnitude of the gender effects in Fellow elections. Comparing the specifications in Table VI to those in Table VIII, we find a female effect on the log odds of election in the 2012-2019 period of 1.16 (s.e.=26) without controls for institutional affiliation and 1.28 (s.e.=39) with such controls. Female scholars are less likely than males to come from under-represented areas (i.e., female and under-represented region are negatively correlated). To the extent that the ES desires both to have gender diversity and geographic diversity, the two objectives are therefore in conflict.

In Figure V we present year-by-year evidence on the share of nominees and elected Fellows from underrepresented regions. The figure shows a spike in such nominations from the Committee starting in 2007-08, and a concomitant rise in the share of elected Fellows from under-represented regions. This pattern parallels the one for the nomination and election of female economists, except that it occurs a few years earlier. In addition, the figure shows that in the 1995-2001 period there had been a relatively high share of Committee nominees from underrepresented regions, but few were ultimately elected. It seems that the change in the ballot to explicitly identify Committee nominees was crucial in raising their electoral success.

5 Peer Recognition in Other Societies: AAAS, NAS, AEA, Sloan

In this section we consider four other salient honorific Fellowships awarded to economists: AAAS, NAS, AEA and the Sloan Foundation. Lacking data on nominees for these honors, we focus on hazard-style models for the probabilities of selection as a Fellow, similar to the models in Table IV.

The processes for selecting Fellows of the AAAS and NAS are broadly similar to that of the ES: nominations are received from one or more existing Fellows, and then the Fellows vote for names on the nominee list. The AAAS considers nominees from groups of at least two Fellows, one of whom must be from the U.S. The NAS also collects nominations from existing Fellows: NAS Fellows must be U.S. citizens, although a small number of "Foreign Associates" is also selected.

In contrast to ES, AAAS, and NAS, the AEA Distinguished Fellows are nominated by a Nominating Committee and voted on by a combination of the Nominating Committee and the AEA Executive Committee. Past presidents of the AEA are automatically recognized as Distinguished Fellows; up to four additional scholars are recognized each year for "lifetime research contributions."

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[14]In Appendix Table AXI we replicate the other specifications in Table VI, controlling for institutional affiliation.

The Sloan Foundation Fellowships are limited to economists up to 6 years from the PhD (up to 2019) or untenured (but tenure-track) scholars (since 2019) at U.S. and Canadian universities. Nominations are submitted by department chairs, with a maximum of 3 nominees per department. Fellows are selected by a committee of 3 senior scholars.

Appendix Table AXIII(a)-(b) present summary statistics for the Fellows in the year of election. The publications and citations for the AAAS, NAS, and AEA new Fellows are on average even higher than for new ES Fellows, a gap that is unsurprising since these awards are typically given later in life. The opposite is true of Sloan awards which are given to more junior scholars.

Table IX presents parallel specifications to Table IV for these honors.[15] Instead of estimating separate models for each time period, we estimate a single model but fully interact the controls with indicators for the time periods (pre-1980, 1980-1999, and 2000-2019), yielding identical estimates to the approach in Table IV. (The coefficients are reported in Appendix Tables AXIV-AXV).

Compared to their importance in predicting ES Fellows, *EMA* and *REStud* papers are less predictive of selection as AAAS or NAS Fellows, with more weight on citations to papers in the other top-5 journals. This could reflect different methological and field weights, or a larger US focus, compared to the ES. Publications in some applied journals, such as the *Journal of Economic History* and the *Journal of Labor Economics* carry higher weight for the AAAS and NAS models.

Interestingly, the gender gaps in the models for selection into the AAAS and NAS (Columns 3-6) are quite similar to those we estimated for the ES. In all three cases we find evidence of a higher bar for female candidates in the earlier period, conditional on publications and citations. Indeed, in the case of NAS Fellows the female coefficient cannot be estimated since no women were elected to the NAS until 1989. In the 1980s and 1990s the estimated gender gaps are positive, if statistically insignificant, for both Societies, similar to the pattern for the ES. Finally, in the most recent decades we estimate large positive effects of female gender on the probability of selection as an AAAS or NAS Fellow, with a magnitude even larger than the one for the ES (+214 log points for the AAAS in 2010-19, s.e.=39; +183 log points for NAS in 2010-19, s.e.=57).

Turning to the selection as a Fellow of the AEA in Columns 7 and 8, the pattern is somewhat different, with no evidence of a higher bar for female candidates prior to 1980. Similarly to the other fellowship, we detect a large positive effect (+197 log points, s.e.=58 points) in the most recent decade. Finally, the results for selection as an Alfred P. Sloan Fellow (which only started in 1981) display a modest and consistent positive effect (around 50-70 log points) for female candidates.

It is interesting that the three fellowships with a similar selection model — nominations by other Fellows and then voting by the full body of Fellows — yield a similar pattern of gender gaps over time, with a higher bar for female candidates in the pre-1980 period and a significantly lower bar in the most recent decade. The two fellowships that rely on a committee for selecting new

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[15]We estimate in the odd-numbered columns a more parsimonious specification paralleling Column 8 of Table IX and in the even-numbered columns a specification similar to Column 9 of Table IX, except that we omit some of the control variables to avoid over-specifying the model, in light of the significantly smaller number of awardees, especially for the NAS and AEA Fellows. See the list of variables in Appendix Tables AXIV-AXV. For the Sloan Fellows, to mimic the eligibility restrictions, we limit the sample to individuals up to 8 years since their first publication, a proxy for time of PhD. The results are insensitive to varying this time window.

Fellows display a more stable pattern of moderately positive female advantage over time.

In Appendix Table AXVI we present models for the probability of election as President or Vice-President of the American Economic Association (see Donald and Hamermesh (2006) for an earlier analysis of these outcomes). The President is chosen by the Executive Committee of the AEA and runs unopposed, while the two Vice-Presidents are chosen via ballot out of 4 candidates.[16]

In the years 1933-79, selection to president or vice president of the AEA appears to have been approximately gender-neutral, with a relatively small and statistically insignificant female effect. Since 1980, however, there appears to have been a substantial premium for female candidates, ranging from 270 log points (s.e.=59 points) in 1980-89 to 637 log points (s.e.=95 log points) in the most recent decade. This substantial positive preference for female candidates predates the preferences exhibited in the selection of ES, AAAS and NAS Fellows by at least two decades.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

How does gender affect peer recognition in economics? We take a comprehensive approach studying not only the probability of election to the Econometric Society but also the two stages of the process —nomination and election conditional on nomination. We compare the findings for gender to the findings for geographic diversity, another relevant consideration for the Society. We then extend the study of the role of gender to other important societies: AAAS, NAS, AEA and Sloan Foundation.

Controlling for the effects of prior publications and citations, we find that gender exerts an effect on selection rates that varies substantially over time, suggesting that the recognition given to female scholars, *conditional on their publications and citations,* has changed over the last century. In the first five decades of the Society (1933-79), we estimate a large *negative* coefficient of female gender on the probability of selection. For the 1980s and 1990s, by comparison, we estimate a smaller, positive, if statistically insignificant, effect of female gender on the probability of selection as a Fellow. Finally, we estimate a modest positive effect for the 2000-2009 period, and a larger, statistically significant positive effect for the 2010-2019 period. Thus, in the most recent decade, the effect of female gender has switched from the historically negative pattern to a positive benefit. We document an important role for the Nominating Committee which in the most recent period has put forward a number of highly-qualified female candidates, and whose nominees tend to receive more votes when they are easily identified on the ballot.

We find some parallel patterns for geographic diversity. While in the 1990s the candidates most likely to be elected (conditional on publications and citations) were economists in top US universities, since 2006 nominees from underrepresented regions have a substantially higher probability of election, conditional on their contributions. We again find an important role for the Nominating Committee in this shift, aided by changes in ballot design to emphasize regional diversity.

Similar evolving patterns of gender are present in AAAS and NAS, the two institutions with a similar election system, where existing Fellows vote for the new Fellows. In contrast, the Sloan

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[16]We do not analyze the election to ES President, a position that up until 2020 has been held only by men.

and AEA fellowships that rely on a committee mechanism for selecting new Fellows display a more stable pattern of positive female advantages over time.

Methodologically, we view these estimates as illustrating the benefit of our approach of estimating the selection of Fellows out of the underlying population of active economists while controlling for a rich set of publication and citation measures. This allows us to obtain relatively precise estimates of gender differences in peer recognition, and benchmark their magnitudes against the effects of publications and citations, which are highly predictive of peer honors. In addition, our approach has the benefit that it could help identify highly deserving candidates who are not currently Fellows.

Our findings raise the question of what factors account for the changing gender gaps in peer recognition in economics. Although an answer is beyond the scope of this paper, we believe that the findings for the 1933-1980 period will not be too surprising to most readers. The "Matilda Effect" hypothesized by Rossiter (1993) was in fact present in the election of Fellows to the ES (to the AAAS and NAS) until the 1970s. In this era we estimate that women were about 4 times less likely to be selected as ES Fellows as men with comparable records.

More surprising is our finding that from 1980 to 2000 there were relatively small gender differences in the probability of selection as a Fellow of the ES, AAAS, and NAS, conditional on academic achievements as measured by publications and citations. We caution that this finding has to be interpreted carefully in light of evidence that female scholars may face somewhat higher barriers to publishing. Specifically, recent studies by Ginther and Kahn (2004), Hengel (2018), Sarsons et al. (2021), and Card et al. (2020) all point in this direction. If so, then women who succeed in publishing in top journals may in fact be better scholars than males with the same record.

Finally, our most surprising finding is that in the past two decades, and especially after 2010, female economists are more likely to be selected as Fellows of ES, AAAS, and NAS than males with similar publication records and citations. Such a positive preference for females was also found by Donald and Hamermesh (2006) in their study of AEA officer elections. Holding constant publications and citations, women were more than twice as likely as men to be selected as a Fellow of the ES, AAAS or NAS in the last decade.

There are at least three possible explanations for this positive preference for female candidates. The first is that as economists have become more aware of the higher bar for publishing and career success faced by female economists, they have lowered the bar for subsequent honors (consistent with the "belief flipping" hypothesized by Fryer, 2007). A second possibility is that Fellows of these Societies may have decided to try to redress the past under-recognition of female scholars. If so, then we might expect the positive female effects in the selection process for new Fellows to eventually disappear – though even after a decade or more of positive preferences, the fraction of female Fellows in the ES is still relatively low at over 6 percent. A third possibility is that Fellows may believe there is value in admitting a share of females that is approximately equal to the share of females in the broader population of active publishers. Such a choice could have the benefit of demonstrating that successful economists value the contributions of female scholars.

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Figure I. Female Share of Newly Elected Fellows, for Five Fellowships

Notes. The figure presents a 10-year moving average of the fraction of female economists among the newly elected Fellows to 5 distinguished fellowships. In the calculations we include also the small number of new Fellows that do not appear in our sample of actively-publishing economists (see online appendix for detail).

Figure II. Female Share of Active Scholars, Nominees, and Newly Elected Fellows to the Econometric Society

Notes. The figure presents the fraction of female economists among the sample of active publishers (Table I), among a sample of economists with at least 1 *Econometrica* or *Review of Economic Studies* publications, among economists with at least 1 *Quarterly Journal of Economics* publication, among economists with at least 3 "top-5" publications, among the Econometric Society nominees, and among the newly elected Econometric Society Fellows. The female shares of nominees and elected Fellows are smoothed using a centered 9-year moving average. The fraction female is computed excluding from the denominator economists with unknown gender. The information on nominees is only available from the year 1990.

Figure III. Election as ES Fellow by Gender, Decade, and Predicted Probability

a. 1960-1979 and 1980-1999

b. 2000-2009 and 2010+

c. 2000-2019

Notes. We create an index of predicted probability of election as ES fellows running a logit model as in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV except on the male sample only. Active scholars who are not yet Fellows are then ranked based on the percentiles of this predicted probability into the bottom 90 percentile, the 90-95th percentile, the 95-97.5 percentile, the 97.5-99 percentile and the top 99 percentile. For reference, in Figures IIIa-b we indicate the average number of top-5 publications for economists in these groups. In Figures IIIa-b we then plot within each group the average probability of selection for male authors and female authors, by year group. For Figure IIIc, we report the coefficients from Columns 1 and 2 of Table AVII.

Figure IV. Female Shares Among New Fellows and Nominees, by Year

Notes. The plot presents the female share by year among newly elected Fellows, among nominees, and separately for nominees by source of nomination. The information on source of nomination is not available for 2003.

Figure V. Share from Underrepresented Regions among Nominees and New Fellows, by Year and by Source of Nomination

Notes. The plot presents the share from underrepresented regions (Asia, Australia, Latin America, Africa) by year among newly elected Fellows, among nominees, and separately for nominees by source of nomination. The information on source of nomination is not available for 2003.

	Economists with at Least One Paper Published in Set of Leading Journals								
	1933-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Percent Female	5.23	0	100	8.31	0	100	17.23	0	100
Percent Unknown Gender	11.09	0	0	6.63	0	0	3.05	0	0
Percent Fellows (as of current year)									
Current Fellow of ES Society (1933+)	3.46	4.1	0.62	3.73	4.3	0.8	3.1	3.72	0.74
Current Fellow of AAAS (1933+)	1.11	1.32	0.08	1.49	1.72	0.33	1.27	1.52	0.35
Current Fellow of NAS (1968+)	0.11	0.14	0	0.43	0.5	0.06	0.38	0.45	0.13
Current Fellow of AEA (1965+)	0.16	0.19	0.01	0.38	0.44	0.14	0.32	0.38	0.11
Recipient of Sloan Fellowship (1981+)	0	0	0	0.67	0.73	0.58	1.19	1.29	0.96
Cumulative publications in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	0.21	0.23	0.06	0.28	0.31	0.07	0.22	0.26	0.05
REStud	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.16	0.18	0.06	0.14	0.16	0.05
AER	0.36	0.39	0.28	0.29	0.32	0.13	0.26	0.30	0.14
QJE	0.35	0.38	0.23	0.17	0.19	0.08	0.14	0.16	0.07
JPE	0.38	0.42	0.26	0.24	0.27	0.09	0.16	0.19	0.06
Cumulative citations in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	1.20	1.36	0.29	6.67	7.66	0.99	18.03	21.88	3.21
REStud	0.32	0.35	0.17	2.26	2.58	0.44	6.50	7.72	1.91
AER	1.05	1.21	0.57	6.69	7.58	2.31	19.34	22.06	9.93
QJE	0.53	0.60	0.35	2.36	2.64	1.04	13.11	15.10	6.17
JPE	0.85	0.98	0.31	5.85	6.68	1.62	14.73	17.62	3.91
Cum. publ. in gen. interest journals									
JEP+JEL	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.11	0.12	0.07
AEA Papers&Proceedings	0.30	0.34	0.17	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.21
JEEA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.04
EJ	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.17	0.18	0.08	0.20	0.23	0.12
REStat	0.29	0.32	0.24	0.30	0.32	0.24	0.22	0.25	0.15
Economica+IER	0.20	0.20	0.13	0.27	0.29	0.13	0.24	0.27	0.12
Cum. publications in field journals									
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMaE+TE)	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.31	0.33	0.15	0.71	0.81	0.33
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	0.21	0.23	0.18	0.31	0.34	0.13	0.45	0.51	0.18
Micro (AEJMicro)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01
Macro (AEJMacro+JME)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.15	0.17	0.08
AEJ Applied	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03
Quantitative Economics	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00
Development (JDE)	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.15	0.15	0.14
Finance (JF)	0.21	0.23	0.11	0.29	0.33	0.11	0.23	0.27	0.11
Health (JHE)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.13	0.12	0.16
History (JEH)	0.10	0.10	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.07	0.07	0.05
International (JIE)	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.15	0.11
Industrial Organization (RAND)	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.12	0.08	0.11	0.12	0.07
Labor (JoLE)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.07
Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy)	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.12	0.14	0.08	0.23	0.25	0.17
Number of years since first publication	11.26	11.45	10.57	11.36	11.73	8.13	12.70	13.53	9.15
Number of Author-Year Observations	145,079	121,408	7,588	210,440	178,997	17,491	378,167	301,486	65,144
Number of Authors	10,654	8,870	588	18,102	15,048	1,844	33,594	25,980	6,334

Notes. Data set contains author-year observations on "actively publishing" economists. An economist becomes active upon publishing a paper in one of the journals listed in Appendix Table 1, and remains active for 18 years after the last publication except if death is recorded in the Wiki pages. Gender is based on name or internet search -- see text. Citations in top-5 journals are measured from Web of Science SSCI and are cumulative up to that year.

	Newly Elected Fellows in Year of Election								
	1933-1979			1980-1999			2000-2019		
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Percent Female	0.85	0	100	3.14	0	100	12.23	0	100
Percent Unknown Gender	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Percent Fellows (as of current year)									
Current Fellow of ES Society (1933+)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Current Fellow of AAAS (1933+)	1.99	2.01	0	1.26	1.3	0	6.9	5.36	17.95
Current Fellow of NAS (1968+)	0	0	0	0.31	0.32	0	0.63	0.71	0
Current Fellow of AEA (1965+)	0.57	0.57	0	0	0	0	0.63	0.36	2.56
Recipient of Sloan Fellowship (1981+)	0	0	0	15.09	15.26	10	26.65	24.29	43.59
Cum. publications in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	1.29	1.30	0.33	2.23	2.25	1.50	1.94	2.04	1.21
REStud	0.76	0.77	0.00	1.11	1.13	0.60	1.12	1.18	0.64
AER	0.65	0.65	1.33	1.03	1.06	0.30	1.55	1.56	1.46
QJE	0.69	0.69	0.67	0.80	0.80	0.80	1.11	1.03	1.67
JPE	0.79	0.80	0.00	0.98	0.98	0.80	0.96	1.01	0.59
Cum. citations in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	6.59	6.60	4.67	51.58	52.80	14.00	102.87	102.08	108.59
REStud	2.85	2.87	0.00	13.87	14.19	4.00	39.98	37.39	58.56
AER	4.70	4.70	4.67	23.75	24.36	5.10	101.22	97.59	127.26
QJE	2.40	2.41	2.33	12.20	12.38	6.90	114.86	94.43	261.56
JPE	3.75	3.78	0.00	27.04	27.64	8.80	67.26	69.11	53.92
Cum. publ. in gen. interest journals									
JEP+JEL	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.19	0.19	0.10	0.50	0.47	0.72
AEA Papers&Proceedings	0.45	0.46	0.00	0.62	0.62	0.50	1.05	0.94	1.82
JEEA	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.45	0.43	0.62
EJ	0.63	0.63	0.33	0.41	0.42	0.10	0.54	0.52	0.69
REStat	0.57	0.55	2.00	0.34	0.35	0.00	0.45	0.44	0.59
Economica+IER	0.64	0.64	0.00	1.03	1.05	0.60	0.71	0.71	0.64
Cum. publications in field journals									
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMaE+TE)	0.45	0.46	0.00	2.13	2.13	2.20	3.22	3.46	1.51
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	0.58	0.57	1.00	1.18	1.21	0.10	1.46	1.48	1.36
Micro (AEJMicro)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.08	0.15
Macro (AEJMacro+JME)	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.31	0.31	0.10	0.61	0.61	0.54
AEJ Applied	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.09	0.31
Quantitative Economics (QE)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.10
Development (JDE)	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.19	0.18	0.26
Finance (JF)	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.27	0.28	0.00	0.25	0.26	0.21
Health (JHE)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.11	0.08	0.33
History (JEH)	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.30	0.04	0.04	0.05
International (JIE)	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.29	0.30	0.00	0.24	0.24	0.28
Industrial Organization (RAND)	0.06	0.06	0.00	0.46	0.45	0.50	0.51	0.52	0.44
Labor (JoLE)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.18	0.23
Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy)	0.07	0.07	0.00	0.47	0.48	0.10	0.69	0.64	1.08
Number of years since first publication	9.89	9.86	12.33	12.55	12.63	10.20	17.67	17.81	16.72
Number of Authors	351	348	3	318	308	10	319	280	39

Notes: Table presents characteristics of economists who were elected as Fellows of the Econometric Society, as of the year of their election. See notes to Table I.

TABLE III
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR NOMINEES AND ELECTED FELLOWS

	Nominated Fellows				Elected Fellows			
	1990-2005		2006-2019		1990-2005		2006-2019	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Nomination								
Percent Nominated by Fellows (1995-)	73.36	70.37	78.86	62.50	63.70	66.67	45.69	34.38
Percent Nominated by Committee (1995-)	26.64	29.63	21.14	37.50	36.30	33.33	54.31	65.62
Number of Votes (2006-)			80.55	92.12			120.14	127.91
Number of Endorsements (if nom. By Fellows)	13.72	13.06	10.89	10.51	19.55	18.5	12.36	18.08
Institutional Affiliation								
Percent Top-5 US University	7.09	18.42	17.42	29.81	14.86	25.00	22.84	34.38
Percent Top-6-17 US University	21.56	21.05	20.81	20.19	28.51	25.00	20.30	21.88
Percent non-Top17 US University	33.97	23.68	24.53	29.81	26.91	8.33	14.72	18.75
Percent Europe	28.24	26.32	26.73	17.31	23.69	33.33	22.34	21.88
Percent Asia or Australia	7.64	*	7.34	*	4.02	0.00	11.68	3.12
Percent Latin America or Africa	1.50	*	3.18	*	0.00	8.33	8.12	0.00
Cum. publications in top-5 journals								
Econometrica	1.94	1.24	1.96	0.98	2.10	2.00	2.05	1.03
REStud	1.11	0.55	0.93	0.54	1.37	0.58	1.05	0.62
AER	0.92	0.26	1.35	1.72	1.33	0.17	1.59	1.72
QJE	0.62	0.42	0.70	1.30	0.98	0.42	1.06	2.00
JPE	0.73	0.50	0.81	0.59	1.08	0.58	0.95	0.59
Cum. citations in top-5 journals								
Econometrica	48.80	27.68	120.08	73.51	67.98	38.17	118.86	120.94
REStud	15.92	5.45	38.05	37.97	22.01	9.25	40.32	68.53
AER	29.47	10.11	127.24	150.48	40.69	1.92	112.65	154.38
QJE	16.02	5.47	83.65	190.42	25.53	2.25	117.41	318.53
JPE	22.22	7.47	64.97	55.09	34.39	7.92	80.15	62.88
Cum. publications in field journals								
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMaE)	3.03	2.82	3.98	1.03	2.90	4.17	3.37	0.66
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	2.07	0.45	2.16	1.57	1.45	0.08	1.41	1.66
Empirical Micro (AEJApplied/Policy+JoLE+JEH+JHE+JPube+JDE)	0.72	0.79	1.11	1.94	0.97	0.67	1.35	2.66
Number of years since first publication	15.61	13.79	19.59	16.36	14.59	13.58	18.60	16.97
Number of Year-Author Observations	733	38	913	104	249	12	197	32
Number of Authors	434	26	437	57	249	12	197	32

Notes: Table presents characteristics of economists who were nominated (Columns 1-4) or elected (Columns 5-8) as Fellows of the Econometric Society, as of the year of their nomination/election. The percent with unknown gender is 0 in these samples. See notes to Table I. We do not report the percent Asia or Australia or Latin America or Africa in Column 2 and 4 for confidentiality reasons.

TABLE IV
PREDICTORS OF SELECTION AS ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY FELLOW

| | Logit Regression for Selection as Econometric Society Fellow in Year t: | | | | | | | | |
| | 1933-79 | | | 1980-99 | | | 2000-19 | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Female × (pre-1980)	-2.220	-1.972	-1.457	--	--	--	--	--	--
	(0.734)	(0.733)	(0.606)						
Female × (1980-89)	--	--	--	-0.139	-0.062	0.628	--	--	--
				(0.529)	(0.523)	(0.473)			
Female × (1990-99)	--	--	--	-0.595	0.048	0.028	--	--	--
				(0.455)	(0.472)	(0.483)			
Female × (2000-09)	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.342	0.408	0.544
							(0.326)	(0.320)	(0.341)
Female × (2010-19)	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.801	1.127	0.932
							(0.219)	(0.227)	(0.239)
# Papers in *Econometrica*	1.006	0.570	0.259	0.827	0.384	0.236	0.998	0.693	0.317
	(0.069)	(0.101)	(0.177)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.056)	(0.077)	(0.119)
Asinh citations in *Econometrica*		0.491	0.026		0.483	0.110		0.255	-0.090
		(0.084)	(0.094)		(0.053)	(0.086)		(0.051)	(0.070)
# Papers in *Rev. of Econ. Studies*	0.644	0.400	-0.382	0.453	0.060	-0.054	0.524	0.278	0.311
	(0.070)	(0.113)	(0.242)	(0.079)	(0.108)	(0.180)	(0.083)	(0.107)	(0.178)
Asinh citations in *REStud*		0.196	0.007		0.172	0.032		0.120	-0.000
		(0.133)	(0.104)		(0.078)	(0.077)		(0.062)	(0.072)
# Papers in *Am. Econ. Review*	0.114	-0.149	0.022	0.153	0.056	0.115	0.291	0.061	0.042
	(0.054)	(0.096)	(0.161)	(0.079)	(0.106)	(0.134)	(0.063)	(0.091)	(0.129)
Asinh citations in *AER*		0.175	0.060		0.011	-0.083		0.154	-0.047
		(0.109)	(0.102)		(0.070)	(0.081)		(0.052)	(0.064)
# Papers in *Quarterly J. of Econ.*	0.053	-0.013	-0.063	0.342	0.156	0.053	0.479	0.255	0.225
	(0.020)	(0.049)	(0.167)	(0.087)	(0.139)	(0.182)	(0.065)	(0.110)	(0.118)
Asinh citations in *QJE*		0.302	0.133		0.108	0.059		0.015	0.015
		(0.101)	(0.113)		(0.084)	(0.093)		(0.060)	(0.088)
# Papers in *J. of Political Economy*	0.055	-0.017	-0.000	0.133	-0.172	-0.179	0.215	0.090	-0.029
	(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.082)	(0.068)	(0.098)	(0.120)	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.169)
Asinh citations in *JPE*		0.240	0.012		0.265	0.157		0.162	0.047
		(0.106)	(0.110)		(0.062)	(0.085)		(0.051)	(0.074)
Indicator for 1 top-5 publication			-0.075			1.960			1.213
			(0.274)			(0.593)			(0.681)
Indicator for 2 top-5 publications			0.605			3.340			2.889
			(0.336)			(0.589)			(0.649)
Controls for publications in general interest/field journals	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Additional controls for levels of top-5 publications, citations, and years since first publication	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
N	112,369	112,369	112,369	188,966	188,966	188,966	355,238	355,238	355,238
Pseudo R-squared	0.188	0.238	0.290	0.249	0.345	0.407	0.295	0.361	0.424

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients: models are fit to set of active economists in a given year who are not yet Fellows of the Econometric Society. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample. Measures of publications and citations represent numbers of papers published, and citations received, up to current year. All models include year fixed effects. The full list of controls is in Appendix Table AV.

TABLE V

SUMMARY STATISTICS ON NOMINATION AND ELECTION RATES, BY GENDER

	Time Interval:		
	1995-2005 (except 2003)	2006-2011	2012-2019
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Fraction of Females Among New Fellows: P[F|E] (x100)	6.21	5.62	19.29
Characteristics of Nominees			
Fraction of Females Among Nominees: P[F|N] (x100)	5.40	6.00	12.59
Fraction of Females Among Committee Nominees: P[F|N$_c$] (x100)	5.97	6.10	22.67
Fraction of Females Among Fellow's Nominees: P[F|N$_f$] (x100)	5.19	5.97	9.67
Fraction of All Nominees from Committee: P[N$_c$|N] (x100)	26.80	23.43	22.49
Fraction of All Female Nominees from Committee: P[N$_c$|N,F] (x100)	29.63	23.81	40.48
Measures of Election Success, Conditional on Nomination			
Fraction of All Nominees Elected: P[E|N] (x100)	28.80	25.43	20.99
Fraction of All Committee Nominees Elected: P[E|N$_c$] (x100)	38.81	63.41	50.67
Fraction of All Fellow's Nominees Elected: P[E|N$_f$] (x100)	25.14	13.81	12.38
Fraction of All Female Nominees Elected: P[E|N,F] (x100)	28.66	28.03	29.39
Fraction of All Female Committee Nominees Elected: P[E|N$_c$,F] (x100)	37.50	60.00	52.94
Fraction of All Female Fellow's Nominees Elected: P[E|N$_f$,F] (x100)	31.58	12.50	18.00

Notes: Table presents means for years indicated by column heading of fractions indicated by row heading. In the probability statements, E denotes the event of election as a new Fellow, N denotes the event of nomination as a Fellow, N$_c$ denotes nomination by the Nominating Commmittee, N$_f$ denotes nomination by existing Fellows, and F denotes female gender.

TABLE VI

GENDER DIFFERENCES IN NOMINATION AND ELECTION AS ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY FELLOW

	Various Models on ES Nomination/Election		
	1995-2005 (except 2003)	2006-2011	2012-2019
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Sample of Actively Publishing Economists			
Logit Model for Selection as Fellow (N=400,235)			
Female Economist	0.873	-0.309	1.160
	(0.352)	(0.489)	(0.257)
Logit Model for Nomination as Fellow (N=400,235)			
Female Economist	0.482	-0.112	0.605
	(0.260)	(0.259)	(0.228)
Logit Model for Nomination by Committee (N=400,235)			
Female Economist	0.597	-0.053	1.219
	(0.387)	(0.551)	(0.252)
Logit Model for Nomination by Fellows (N=400,235)			
Female Economist	0.412	-0.131	0.290
	(0.289)	(0.312)	(0.286)
Panel B: Sample of Nominees for Econometric Society Fellowship			
Logit Model for Selection as Fellow, Cond. On Nom. (N=1,517)			
Female Economist	0.744	-0.409	0.796
	(0.374)	(0.591)	(0.370)
Logit Model for Selection as Fellow, Cond. On Nom. (N=1,517)			
Female Economist	0.927	-0.274	0.594
	(0.499)	(0.694)	(0.482)
Committee Nominee	0.423	3.304	2.703
	(0.252)	(0.444)	(0.294)
Committee Nominee × Female	-0.402	-0.402	-0.294
	(0.919)	(1.339)	(0.678)
Poisson Model for Number of Votes (N=1,017)			
Female Economist	--	-0.026	0.154
		(0.092)	(0.044)
Poisson Model for Number of Votes (N=1,017)			
Female Economist	--	-0.077	0.094
		(0.074)	(0.052)
Committee Nominee	--	0.437	0.346
		(0.037)	(0.031)
Committee Nominee × Female	--	0.174	0.010
		(0.096)	(0.069)
Poisson Model for No. of Endorsements (if Nom. By Fellows) (N=1,057)			
Female Economist	0.001	-0.274	0.120
	(0.139)	(0.180)	(0.143)

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are either logistic or poisson regression coefficients. Models are estimated over all observations of actively publishing economists (Panel A) and economists nominated for Econometric Society Fellow (Panel B). The estimates in Columns 1, 2, and 3 come from one regression covering the time period 1995-2019 (except for year 2003), allowing the coefficient reported (e.g., the female economist coefficient) to differ for the 1995-2005 (except 2003) period, the 2006-2011 period and the 2012-2019 period. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report those respective coefficients. The models include the full set of controls as in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV --top-5 publication/citations, publications in field journals, citation percentiles, years from first publication, and year fixed effects-- which are assumed to have the same coefficient over the time period 1995-2019. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.

TABLE VII
EFFECT OF VISIBILITY AND CONNECTIONS ON PROBABILITY OF SELECTION AND NOMINATION AS FELLOW

	Logit Regression for Selection/Nomination as Econometric Society Fellow in Year *t*							
	Selection as Fellow		Nomination as Fellow		Nomination by Fellows		Nomination by Committee	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Authors' Gender (Omitted: Male Author)								
Female × (1990-99)	0.391	0.417	0.503	0.472	0.495	0.442	0.788	0.786
	(0.466)	(0.482)	(0.278)	(0.267)	(0.393)	(0.381)	(0.609)	(0.605)
Female × (2000-09)	0.380	0.428	0.200	0.158	0.099	0.186	0.369	-0.149
	(0.345)	(0.409)	(0.236)	(0.269)	(0.262)	(0.320)	(0.472)	(0.600)
Female × (2010-19)	0.873	0.937	0.479	0.448	0.236	0.299	1.058	0.775
	(0.233)	(0.343)	(0.213)	(0.230)	(0.266)	(0.304)	(0.243)	(0.299)
Measure of Academic Visibility:								
Associate Editor at *Econometrica*		1.049		1.257		1.246		0.796
		(0.232)		(0.205)		(0.219)		(0.340)
Measure of Ballot Visibility:								
Quantile of First Letter of Last Name		-0.582		-0.157		-0.205		-0.145
(A=0, Z=1)		(0.188)		(0.155)		(0.191)		(0.225)
Measures of Connections:								
# Connections with ES Fellows		0.242		0.204		0.209		0.115
		(0.034)		(0.030)		(0.034)		(0.039)
Impact of Nominating Committee:								
# Connections with ES Nominating Committee		0.269		0.557		0.090		1.221
		(0.252)		(0.160)		(0.215)		(0.247)
Share Women in Nominating Committee		-0.122		0.201		-0.527		2.059
×Female		(1.566)		(0.846)		(1.333)		(1.362)
Years Included	1990-2019				1995-2019 (except 2003)			
N	465,081	465,081	465,081	465,081	400,235	400,235	400,235	400,235
Pseudo R-squared	0.419	0.433	0.428	0.439	0.418	0.429	0.390	0.400

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients in models for selection as a Fellow of the Econometric Society (columns 1-2) and as nominee for Fellow (columns 3-4), also separately by nomination source (columns 5-8). See notes to Table IV. The models include the full set of controls as in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV --top-5 publication/citations, publications in field journals, citation percentiles, years from first publication, and year fixed effects. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.

TABLE VIII
GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY AND ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY ELECTION AND NOMINATION

	Models for Selection as Econometric Society Fellow in Year t		
	1995-2005 (except 2003)	2006-2011	2012-2019
	(1)	(2)	(3)

Sample of Nominees for Econometric Society Fellowship

Logit Model for Selection as Fellow, Cond. On Nomin. (N=1,506)

Female	0.958	-0.216	1.285
	(0.391)	(0.583)	(0.390)
Top-5 US University	0.731	2.057	0.653
	(0.484)	(0.649)	(0.420)
Top-6-17 US University	0.868	0.666	0.384
	(0.282)	(0.463)	(0.401)
University in Europe	0.442	0.958	0.985
	(0.301)	(0.502)	(0.398)
University in Asia or Australia	-0.410	3.890	2.599
	(0.549)	(0.643)	(0.555)
University in Latin America or Africa	0.000	3.854	4.633
	(.)	(0.644)	(0.890)

Logit Model for Selection as Fellow, Cond. On Nomin. (N=1,517)

Female	0.967	-0.362	0.879
	(0.404)	(0.560)	(0.401)
University in Underrepresented Regions (Asia, Australia, Latin America, Africa)	-1.032	2.336	3.150
	(0.685)	(0.702)	(0.549)
Committee Nominee	0.367	3.091	2.564
	(0.259)	(0.487)	(0.273)

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients. Models are estimated for economists nominated for Econometric Society Fellow. The estimates in Columns 1, 2, and 3 come from one regression covering the time period 1995-2019 (except for year 2003), allowing the coefficient reported (e.g., the female economist coefficient) to differ for the 1995-2005 (except 2003) period, the 2006-2011 period and the 2012-2019 period. Columns 1, 2, and 3 report those respective coefficients. The omitted category for institutional affiliation is non-top-17 US university. The models include the full set of controls as in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV, which are assumed to have the same coefficient over the whole time period. The percent with unknown gender is 0 in the sample.

TABLE IX
MODELS FOR ELECTION TO OTHER FELLOWSHIPS

| | Logit Regression for Selection as Fellow in Year t: | | | | | | | | | |
| | Econ. Society | | AAAS | | NAS | | AEA | | Alfred P. Sloan | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Authors' Gender (Omitted: Male Author)										
Female × (pre-1980)	-1.972	-1.457	-1.567	-1.376	--	--	1.065	1.763	--	--
	(0.733)	(0.606)	(0.987)	(0.968)			(1.047)	(1.074)		
Female × (1980-89)	-0.062	0.628	-0.206	0.195	0.449	1.036	0.233	1.409	0.282	0.426
	(0.523)	(0.473)	(0.991)	(1.083)	(1.118)	(1.295)	(1.096)	(1.113)	(0.537)	(0.560)
Female × (1990-99)	0.048	0.028	0.538	1.115	0.208	0.801	0.677	1.378	0.634	0.741
	(0.472)	(0.483)	(0.704)	(0.672)	(1.073)	(0.704)	(0.704)	(0.836)	(0.323)	(0.335)
Female × (2000-09)	0.408	0.544	0.897	1.282	1.148	1.940	-0.116	1.640	0.398	0.447
	(0.320)	(0.341)	(0.441)	(0.459)	(0.666)	(0.762)	(1.060)	(1.004)	(0.335)	(0.335)
Female × (2010-19)	1.127	0.932	2.021	2.043	1.388	1.774	1.050	2.167	0.545	0.534
	(0.227)	(0.239)	(0.338)	(0.347)	(0.492)	(0.549)	(0.508)	(0.541)	(0.311)	(0.288)
Restrict to ≤8 yrs. since 1st pub.	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for publications in 36 journals and citation in top-5 Jrls. x 3 Time Periods	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for levels of top 5 and top 5 citations x 3 Time Periods	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	656,573	656,573	658,477	658,477	601,000	598,795	612,011	608,850	234,903	234,903
Pseudo R-squared	0.328	0.386	0.355	0.394	0.355	0.398	0.357	0.466	0.306	0.366

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients: see note to Table IV. The sample excludes economists with unknown gender. All models include controls for the number of publications in each of the top-5 journals, interacted with indicators for the periods (pre-1980), (1980-99) and (2000-19), and year fixed effects. The controls in the odd-numbered columns are as in Columns 2, 5, and 8 of Table IV, while the controls in even-numbered columns are similar to the ones in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV (except that the indicators for top-5s span a longer number of publications for NAS, AAAS, and AEAF, and that we drop some controls to avoid over-specifying these models). See Table AXIV and AXV for the exact list of controls. Sample periods vary by fellowship: see text. Models for Sloan Fellowships are restricted to up to 8 years from the first publication in the sample.

A Online appendix

A.1 Additional Data Details

Journal Selection. To help identify the set of journals most relevant in the Fellow selection process, we collected information from an annual article in *EMA* listing the most important contributions of each newly elected Fellow, selecting a maximum of six publications for each Fellow. Out of this pool of 6,086 publications, more than 20% were published in *EMA*. We consider a journal relevant to the Fellow selection process if papers in that journal account for more than 1% of the 6,086 mentioned contributions (i.e. 61 publications) over the whole sample period, or more than 2% of the mentioned contributions for Fellows selected in any of 4 sub-samples (1933-59, 1960-79, 1980-99, 2000-2019). We complemented this list with any remaining general interest or top field journals, resulting in the list in Appendix Table AI.

Article Selection. In a first step, we downloaded all articles in each journal from its earliest publication date until 2019. In a second step, we eliminated notes and comments by filtering out articles containing specific words such as "note on" and "review" and "comment" in their title.

Fellows. The 30 unmatched ES Fellows are: Abel Gesevich Aganbegyan, Oskar N. Anderson, Maria Augustinovics, Albert Aupetit, Pasquale Boninsegni, Constantino Bresciani-Turroni, Bernard Chait, Clement Colson, Harold T. Davis, Nikolay P. Fedorenko, Bruno De Finetti, Eraldo Fossati, Robert Gibrat, Georges-Theodule Guilbaud, Arthur Hanau, William C. Hood, Heinz Konig, Wilhelm E. Krelle, Sten Malmquist, Kazuo Midutani, Egon S. Pearson, Hans Peter, Krysztof Porwit, Howard Raiffa, Calyampudi R. Rao, Wieslaw Sadowski, Leonid Tornqvist, Witold Trzeciakowski, Gustavo Del Vecchio, and Sewall Wright. Most of these Fellows were elected in the early years of the Society and published books or articles in their native country, rather than in the English language economics journals (e.g., Leonid Tornqvist). Only one unmatched Fellow was elected since 1980 (Heinz Konig, elected in 1986). A few others, including Sewall Wright (sociology) and Bruno De Finetti (statistics), worked in other fields. We also dropped 4 Fellows who published in the *Journal of the American Statistical Association* but never in any economic journals in our dataset: Egon S. Pearson, Howard Raiffa, Calyampudi R. Rao, and Sewall Wright. Finally, only 2 Fellows are elected to ES more than 18 years after their last publication—Alexander A. Konus (elected in 1975) and Giorgio Mortara (elected in 1937).

Nominees. There are 3 nominees as ES Fellows that do not match to the database of actively publishing economists and 3 nominees who are nominated more than 18 years after their last publication. We do not name them to protect this confidential information.

Other Fellowships. We extract all members of NAS and AAAS from their online membership directories. For AAAS, we proceed to identify 434 fellows listed under the field of Social and Behavioral Sciences and the subfield of Economics since 1942. For NAS, we include 119 fellows with a primary field in Economic Sciences, and 27 fellows who list the subject as a secondary field. Most of the fellows with a secondary field in economics have a related primary field such as Human Environmental Sciences (e.g., William D. Nordhaus) or Social and Political Sciences (e.g., Greg J. Duncan), and publish in the set of journals in our dataset. There are 6 unmatched AAAS Fellows in the database: Lloyd D. Brace (elected in 1949), Harold A. Freeman (elected in 1956), Edgar C. Brown (elected in 1966), Hans H. Landsberg (elected in 1974), Carlo M. Cipolla (elected in 1978), and Harold G. Lewis (elected in 1986), and 4 Fellows elected more than 18 years after their last publication: William Draper Lewis (elected in 1962), Emery N. Castle and Eli Ginzberg (both elected in 1977), and Robert J. Lampman (elected in 1991). Amogn the NAS Fellows, 7 are unmatched: Brian Berry (elected in 1975), Calestous Juma (elected in 2005), Prabhu Pingali (elected in 2007), Yu Xie (elected in 2009), Kathleen Harris (elected in 2014), Helen Milner (elected

in 2019), and Rashid Hassan (elected in 2019). Among them, all but Brian Berry list economics as a secondary field. Among the NAS Fellows, 3 are elected more than 18 years after their last publication – Allan Gibbard (elected in 2009), Walter Isard (elected in 1985) and Hirofumi Uzawa (elected in 1995).

Among the AEA Fellows, only 1 Fellow is umatched – P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan (elected in 1986), and 7 Fellows are elected more than 18 years after their last publication: Ludwig E. Mises (elected in 1969), William Draper Lewis (elected in 1970), Solomon Fabricant (elected in 1980), Geoffrey H. Moore (elected in 1995), Armen A. Alchian (elected in 1996), William C. Brainard (elected in 2011), and Isabel V. Sawhill (elected in 2016).

Disambiguating Names. A note on the procedure that we use to uniform the author names is that some of the changes introduce a spelling that is *not* the person's correct name; for example, we transform "N. Gregory Mankiw" into "Gregory N. Mankiw". This change is necessary to create a unique record for a person, as author names that do not follow the typical naming – first name, middle initial, last name – often appear with multiple spellings across their publications, which would introduce errors in the data set without the disambiguation procedure.[17]

We had to deal with two main complications: 1. *(alternate spelling and name formats)* an author's name may appear in slightly different ways in different articles (e.g., "Ted Bergstrom" versus "Theodore Bergstrom"); 2. *(incomplete names)* some journals, especially before 1980, identify authors only by their first initial(s) and last name (e.g., "K. Binmore" versus "Kenneth G. Binmore"). Both issues create multiple "names" for the same economist, leading to duplicate, and thus incomplete, publication records. They also complicate our gender coding procedure (described below) which relies in part on first names.

We assume that the combination of first, middle, and last names uniquely identifies an economist. We then follow three approaches to link all the records for the same person. First, if there are two records with the *same last name* and a *matching first initial*, and no other names in the list with the same surname, we assume the two names are the same person. Thus, "S. Afriat" and "Sydney Afriat" are assumed to be the same person. Similarly, we assume that two records with the same first and last name are the same person regardless of middle initial if there is only one name with that combination of first and last names. Thus "Henry Aaron" and "Henry J. Aaron" are assumed to be the same person if there is no other name "Henry x. Aaron" with $x \neq J$ in our data base.[18]

Second, a team of undergraduate research assistants checked the list of author names, looking for common short forms of names (e.g., "Larry" versus "Lawrence") and likely spelling mistakes or errors in the journal metadata.

Third, the research assistants looked up online all names that could not be assigned a gender based on the first name. This provided a full first name for many listed authors with only a first initial, and allowed us to correct many misspelled first names. After merging and correcting records, the database of actively publishing economists includes over 40,000 unique names.

Further checks on gender coding and death using Wikidata. We query all records on Wikidata with "economist" or "econometrician" as a descriptor, and collect the year of death and gender if said properties exist. We match the records to authors in the dataset using a process

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[17]In particular, we began by replacing all non-English characters and accented characters with corresponding English characters. (For example, "á" is replaced with "a" and "ñ" is replaced with "n"). We then translated all names into a standardized format, capitalizing the first letter of first, middle, and last names, adding a dot after first or middle initials, and dropping all suffixes (including "Jr."). For example, "Trent W Appelbe" is changed to "Trent W. Appelbe". We also interchange the middle name and a leading first initial if the middle name is not an initial, e.g., "J. Bradford DeLong" is converted to "Bradford J. DeLong".

[18]There are some rare cases where there are multiple researchers with the same last name and different first names (e.g. Masahiko Aoki and Masanao Aoki), *and* there are articles written by a combination of a first initial and last name (e.g. M. Aoki). These latter articles are assigned to one of the authors by a random procedure.

identical to that of author publication matching. Matched records are further reviewed by hand, and misassociated records cleaned. For the remaining matches, results from the gendering process are verified against genders provided by Wikidata, and year of death is added to the author's profile in the dataset. Since not every author is matched to a Wikidata page, an additional round of year of death lookups is done manually to fill in potential gaps. We identified 1498 authors who died within the sample period, and exclude 6652 author-year observations from the sample (i.e. years after death).

Citations. We measure citations using SSCI citations for the papers published in the traditional top-5 jorunals. Ideally we would have liked to have citations to *all* published papers by a researcher, not just those the top-5 journals. This proved infeasible, however, for two reasons: (i) the citation record on SSCI for the years before 1998 are stored with first initial only; (ii) even in cases in which the full name is used, there often are non-economists sharing the same first and last name, conflating the citations of separate researchers. Thus, we elected to create a citation record for each paper in the top-5 journals and link each author to papers he or she has published on these journals. Since this is very time-consuming, we do it only for the top-5 journals. For around 80% of the top-5 papers we are able to download the citation records of a paper from SSCI using the *doi* number. The remaining papers, however, use a different format of *doi* number from SSCI. We thus downloaded citations to these papers using their journal, volume, issue and pages information.

Measure of Connection. We measure the number of connections with any ES Fellow in year t, defined as having coauthored with that Fellow at least one paper (up to year t) in our data set of 36 journals. This variable will increment when an economist publishes a new paper coauthored with an existing Fellow (to whom the economist is not yet connected), or when a coauthor of a previously published paper is elected as a Fellow. For example, suppose that author A becomes "active" by publishing her first paper in 2001, then publishes a paper in 2003 coauthored with B (who had been made a Fellow in 1990) and a third in 2005 with coauthor C, who is made a Fellow in 2007. Then A's connections with ES Fellows will be 0 in 2001 to 2002, rising to 1 in 2003 when her paper with B is published, and then rising to 2 in 2007 when C is made a Fellow.

Nomination Process. A possibility which can occur in the nomination process is that a candidate is nominate by both the nominating committee and by a group of fellows. In this case, "If one or more members and the FNC independently nominate a candidate, the nomination statement of the members will prevail but the ballot form will also explicitly include "Nominated by the FNC"." (from the official ES rules: https://www.econometricsociety.org/society/organization-and-governance/rules-and-procedures#50).

A.2 Changes from Analysis Plan

This paper largely follows the proposed analysis in a plan (PAP) submitted to *Econometrica* in January 2020. The plan contained analysis on the election of ES Fellows using publicly-available data, as well as analysis of the election to other Fellowships. In addition, the plan specified intended analyses for the confidential nomination data, in case we were approved to receive it (as we did). We detail here the main sources of deviation from the plan.

First, some of the analyses in the ultimate paper focus on variables which at the PAP stage we did not focus on. The main example is the analysis of geographic diversity (Figure V and Table VIII); we did not appreciate that university affiliation was systematically recorded in the nomination data, and that geographic diversity was an important component for the ES, and thus worth analyzing. Second, we had not planned to study the wording of the nomination statements, but turned to it following an editorial suggestion (Appendix Figure AIV-AV). The analyses of these two dimensions are important additions to the plan in the PAP.

Second, when we wrote the PAP we were unsure whether we would receive nomination data

for the years before 2006, and if so with what level of detail. Since ultimately we were able to piece together most of the nomination data back to 1990, the analysis of the nomination results differs from the planned one due to the longer time span.

Third, for our main analysis we envisioned and pre-specified using as benchmark set of controls the variables used, for example, in Columns 2, 5, and 8 of Table IV, including counts of publications in the 36 journals, as well as asinh of citations in each of the top-5 journals (and year fixed effects). As we examined this specification more, we realized though that this relatively sparse specification led to a mis-specification in the logit model. This is most clear in Appendix Table AVII in Column 8, in which we run a logit regression using the index built based on this specification (estimated on the sample of men). We also add in the specification indicators for the different quantiles of the index. If the model were well-specified, the coefficient in the index should be close to 1 and the coefficients on the quantile indicators should be zero. Instead, we estimate the coefficient on the index to be 0.571 (s.e.=0.075), and the coefficients on the quantiles are highly significant, both statistically and economically. Intuitively, the under-specified model is not able to reproduce enough of the correct slope of the probability of honors with respect to publications and citations. Importantly, this bias was also introducing potential bias in the estimates of the female coefficient, for example suggesting that the estimated female coefficient was different at the very top of the index distribution than in other parts of the distribution, whereas this was just a result of a mis-specified model for men (the "control" group).

To solve this issue, it turned out that it was enough to include additional controls that were in fact suggested to us by both audience members and referees. It made sense to have more non-parametric controls for the impact of some of the publications, e.g., allowing the first or second EMA paper to have a larger effect than the fourth EMA paper, or allowing a discrete impact of the first, second, or third top-5 publication. Further, we wanted to allow for an impact of citations which did not follow the asinh form which we imposed. Finally, we wanted to allow for some role for the the "academic age" of the authors, which is measured with years since first publication. When we add all these variables, not only do we get a sizable improvement in predictive power, as measured by the R squared, but now we pass the test of correct specification as apparent in Column 3 of Table AVII which shows that for this specification we get a coefficient on the index of 0.895 (s.e.=0.073) and we thus cannot reject the value of 1. Also, the coefficients on the index quantiles are not far from 0 (and not statistically significant from 0). This is also visible comparing the empirical patters in Figure IIIa-b to the predicted ones under the model in Appendix Figure AI, which shows are very good fit.

In light of this, we use the expanded specification as the new benchmark model. We do however still show the old benchmark for all of the key results, such as Table IV and Table IX. We added footnote 10 to the table to stress the limitation of the "old benchmark": "In contrast, Column 8 of Table AVII shows that the specification with fewer controls used in Column 2, 5, and 8 of Table IV does not pass the test, as the percentile indicators for men are highly significant and we confidently reject a coefficient of 1 on the index."

The other changes to the figures are as follows: (i) we envisioned a graphical way to display the results of the logit specifications in Figure III which we had not thought of before hand; (ii) Figures IV and V are raw year-by-year graphs of the gender and geographic diversity break-down of the data.

The other changes to the tables are as follows: (i) (*Summary statistics*) The changes to the summary statistics Tables I-III are minor; the main addition is in Table III on nominations, given the (unexpected) fact that we received data going back to 1990, we break down the summary statistics for the first 15 years, versus the next ones, and thus structure the table differently than envisioned initially (when the table was structured around the 2006-19 data); (ii) (*ES Election*)

41

the main table on the ES election results, Table IV, follows the specification in the first two out of 3 columns for each time period, with column 3 presenting a new benchmark (see above), with just slight improvements in the underlying data; (iii) *(ES nomination and election)* The results in Table V and Table VI which use the confidential nomination and election data are closely related to the initial proposal, but with some changes – most importantly, the fact that with a longer 30-year data sample it becomes especially important to allow the gender effect to differs by sub-periods; the mostly descriptive Table V, which we had not envisioned, aims to illustrate the raw findings in the data, motivating the logit analysis in Table VI; (iv) *(Channels)* The table on channels, Table VII, has some of the same material as in the proposed Table VIII (e.g., the control for associate editor and for connection with Fellows), but it also adds additional variables which we had not thought of, such as the alphabetical order and the connections to the committee, in addition to the Fellows; also, the connection variables are defined in terms of whether there is a connection to a particular economist, not in terms of number of papers co-written; ex post, the former strikes us as a better way to capture connections, given that writing 15 papers with one coauthor is unlikely to have 15 times the impact as writing one paper with a coauthor; (v) *(Coauthorship)* The table on connections is very similar to the proposed one, except that, to build more closely on Sarsons et al. (2020) we add a measure of publications in non-top-5, as well as a measure of publications in top-5 journals (formerly publications in *EMA* and *REStud*).

Appendix Figure AI. Selection as ES Fellow by Gender, Decade, and Predicted Probability --
Model Fit

a. 1960-1979 and 1980-1999

b. 2000-2009 and 2010+

Notes. For the x axis, we create an index of predicted probability of election as ES fellows running a logit model as in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV except on the male sample only. Active scholars who are not yet Fellows are then ranked based on the percentiles of this predicted probability. We then plot the average within each percentile of the predicted probability of selection, as implied by the benchmark model (Table IV, columns 3, 6, and 9).

Appendix Figure AII. Election as ES Fellow (Log of Probability) by Gender, Decade, and Predicted Probability

a. 2000-2009

b. 2010+

Notes. For the x axis, we create an index of predicted probability of election as ES fellows running a logit model as in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV except on the male sample only. Active scholars who are not yet Fellows are then ranked based on the percentiles of this predicted probability. We then run logistic regressions as in Columns 4 and 5 of Table AVII.

Appendix Figure AIII. Nomination as ES Fellow by Gender, Decade, and Predicted Probability

a. Nomination by Fellows

b. Nomination by Committee

Notes. We create an index of predicted probability of nomination as ES fellows by running a logit model of nomination as Fellow as in Table VI except on the male sample only. Active scholars who are not yet nominees are then ranked based on the percentiles of this predicted probability into the bottom 90 percentile, the 90-95th percentile, the 95-97.5 percentile, the 97.5-99 percentile and the top 99 percentile. We then plot within each group the average probability of nomination for male authors and female authors, by year group.

Appendix Figure AIV. Words in Nomination Statements Most predictive of Outlined Outcome

Panel A. Female Economist

expect pattern experiment institution forecasting household education useful especially exchange factor addition innovation fluctuation future find leader health combine empirically center joint network science relevance multiple bias present consumption nature measurement help capital scholar evidence housing error corporate basic play random approach rate country predict write experimental broad span technology correlation president investment child article intersection european

Panel B. Male economist

university fix mathematical support strategic informational city theoretic solution paradox private treatment trading applied game discrete society gain government original significant rule rationality endogenous information characterize system cooperative type small particular monitoring sharing efficiency heterogenous constraint offer property point reduce learning spectrum evolution dependent associate search job aggregate classical concept externality relative linear editor multi reputation profession highly relevant decade quantile crisis exist choose conditional possibility publish implementation entry repeat expectation security prediction order agent potential matching core foundation assess environment dynamic proof industry friction bayesian contracting taxation analyzing hold pioneer minimum law sectional prolific alternative competitive derived second local problem characterization continuous deep strategy testing generalize financial contract major procedure analyze far marginal serial rationalize methodology selection conflict auction prove light notion comparative parametric rich fiscal optimal importance return incomplete particularly statistic main bargaining powerful history microeconometric interesting form evaluation efficient macro imperfect econometrica

Panel C. Election, conditional on Nomination

source quantitative control job condition income knowledge consumption imperfect competition restriction forecasting central instrumental efficient bound repeat expectation context numerous figure derive concern fluctuation contracting

Panel D. Not elected, conditional on Nomination

pathbreaking asymptotic panel institution depth applied continue characterization sectional theorem conflict finally procedure extensive trading statistic multi comparative understand serial potential powerful second paradox spectrum deep theoretically nonlinear set sharing methodological cover minimum robust institutional theoretic far alternative algorithm evaluation money reduce history unit linear elegant

Notes: The sample used is all 1,017 nominations from 2006 to 2019, as the nominating statements are not available for earlier years. We identify all word lemmas used in at least 20 nominating statements, resulting in 567 words after dropping stop words (such as "she" and "the"). For each outcome variable (e.g., female economist in Panel A) we plot all words with an odds ratio above 2 for predicting the outcome. The words are scaled proportionally to the magnitude of their log odds ratio, capping the value at 3 for those that are perfectly predictive. The variables predicted are female gender (Panel A), male gender (Panel B), election (Panel C), not election (Panel D).

Appendix Figure AV. Scatterplot of Words in Nomination Statement predictive of Female Gender versus of Election

Female Logit Coefficient (y-axis, from -2.0 to 2.0)
Election Logit Coefficient (x-axis, from -2.0 to 2.0)

forecasting
especially
experimental asymptotic
institution
public instrumental
condition
control
theoretically
set
change
combine
macroeconomic
quantitative
restriction
bound
nonlinear
context
understand
pathbreaking test
central
panel
analysis
competition
income numerous
unique
deep
theory
evaluation statistic
influential derive
knowledge
international
efficient
paradox
trading
imperfect
source
history
foundation
climate set education comparative
repeat

Notes: The sample used is all 1,017 nominations from 2006 to 2019, as the nominating statements are not available for earlier years. We identify all word lemmas used in at least 20 nominating statements, resulting in 567 words after dropping stop words (such as "she" and "the"). For each of these 567 words, we run a logit regression of the relevant dependent variable (election or female gender) on an indicator for whether the word is used in the nomination, as well as controls for cumulative number of publications in each of the top-5 journals, asinh of cumulative citations in each of the top-5 journals, and year fixed effects. We keep the 50 words that are most predictive of election, ranking by the pseudo R-squared values, including words that are perfectly predictive of the outcome. We plot the logit coefficient for the election logit, as well as the logit coefficient on a parallel logit with the same controls but predicting female gender as an outcome. The words in red represent words whose original coordinates were outside the (-2, 2) x (-2, 2) region and are displayed with values capped at the relevant boundary value.

47

TABLE AI

JOURNALS USED FOR PUBLICATION COUNTS

American Economic Journal: Applied Economics	Journal of Econometrics
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics	Journal of Economic History
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics	Journal of Economic Literature
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy	Journal of Economic Perspectives
American Economic Review	Journal of Economic Theory
AER (AEA) Papers and Proceedings	Journal of Finance
Econometrica	Journal of Health Economics
Econometric Theory	Journal of International Economics
Economica	Journal of Labor Economics
Economic Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Economic Theory	Journal of Monetary Economics
Games and Economic Behavior	**Journal of Political Economy**
International Economic Review	Journal of Public Economics
International Journal of Game Theory	**Quarterly Journal of Economics**
Journal of American Statistical Association	Review of Economics and Statistics
Journal of Development Economics	**Review of Economic Studies**
Journal of the European Economic Association	The RAND Journal of Economics
Quantitative Economics	Theoretical Economics

Notes: Top 5 journals are shown in bold.

CHECK OF ACCURACY OF CODING OF GENDER AND PUBLICATIONS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Gender Coding Correct	CVs found	Number of Papers in our Data	Actual No. of Papers	Error Rate	Paper Missing in Database	Papers Incorrectly Attributed to Author in Database
Coded as Female (n=50)	100%	48	620	629	1.8%	10 (from 4 different authors) name change: 2 (from 2 authors) different first names used: 8 (from 2 authors)	1 two authors with same name
Coded as Male (n=100)	100%	97	1676	1676	0.4%	3 (from 3 different authors) 1 (from 1 author) name spelling error 2 (from 2 authors) missing issue/paper	3 1 (two authors with same name) 1 (not a research paper) 1 (wrong disambiguation of a name)

Notes: the sample consists of 50 female and 100 male economists, randomly selected from our actively publishing economists database, who had their first publication after 1979, and had accumulated at least 2 top-5 until the end of the sample period (2019).

Table AIII: Timeline of Rules and Procedures regarding Nomination and Elections of Econometric Fellows (Part 1)

Nomination Stage	Election Stage
1933	First round of fellows elected by council (*EMA, 1933, 1 (4), p. 445*)
1935 Fellows and members propose candidates and the council selects the nominees (*EMA, 1934, 2 (2), p. 204*).	Fellows vote by mail (*EMA, 1934, 2,(2), p. 204*)
1947 The council determines the number of fellows to be elected N (N is the median number voted by the council). Fellows (and members) then propose candidates for nominees (among members of the Econometric society). The secretary sends the list of nominees to the council and also includes the names of candidates nominated by the council in the previous year but not elected to Fellowship. The members of the council shall vote to nominate candidates: Given N, each council member in voting should assign to the candidate whom he most favors 2N marks, to the second most favored 2N-1 marks, and so on down to 1 mark; to a candidate who is not approved, 0 marks. The total of marks thus assigned by the voters to a candidate shall determine his order. Absence of marks or negative marks shall be treated as zero. The 2N candidates receiving the highest totals shall be declared nominated. In case of a tie for last place all the candidates so tied shall be declared nominated (EMA, 1948, 16 (1), p. 116).	The number of newly elected Fellows shall not exceed 12 (or 15 percent of the number of members). Each Fellow shall give N marks to the candidate whom he most favors, N-1 marks to the second most favored candidate, and so on. The N nominees receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared elected. In case of a tie for last place, all the candidates so tied shall be declared elected if that does not increase the total beyond N+1; otherwise none of the tied candidates shall be declared elected (*EMA, 1948, 16 (1), p. 116*).
1951 Fellows and members propose candidates for nominees (among members of the Econometric society). The Presentation-of-Candidacy form shall require the following information: (a) a list of the candidate's publications; (b) indication as to whether the candidate is an economist, whether he is a statistician, and whether he has some knowledge of higher, mathematics; (c) indication as to the nature of the candidate's original contribution "to economic theory or to such statistical, mathematical, or accounting analyses as have a definite bearing on problems in economic theory" (a requirement of Fellows contained in the Constitution), including references to the passages in the candidate's listed publications wherein this contribution appears. Since the Constitution does not require that a candidate possess all of the qualifications referred to in (b) above, space shall be provided on the form for a statement of other qualifications of the candidate. The form shall in addition provide space for a summary of the candidate's scientific and professional curriculum vitae. The council selects the nominees through voting. If the number of candidates C is not greater than 12, all such candidates shall be declared nominated. If the number is greater than 12, each member of the committee shall vote to nominate candidates by assigning to the candidate whom he most favors C marks, to the second most favored C - 1 marks, and so one, down to 1 mark. With N fellows to be elected, the 2N candidates receiving the highest totals shall be nominated (*EMA; 1952, 20(1), p. 124*).	The number of newly elected Fellows shall not exceed 6 (or 10 percent of the number of members). Each Fellow shall vote to elect new Fellows by assigning N marks to the nominee whom he most favors, N - 1 marks to the second most favored, and so on, down to 1 mark. Absence of marks or negative marks shall be treated as zero. Then the N nominees receiving the highest totals shall be declared elected. In case of a tie for last place, all the nominees so tied shall be declared elected if that does not increase the total beyond the lesser of N + 1 and 6; otherwise none of the tied candidates shall be declared elected (*EMA; 1952, 20(1), p. 125*).
1960 Fellows nomination committee (FNC) mentioned for the first time (*EMA, 1963 31 (1/2), p. 290*). The nominating committee shall examine the Presentation-of-Candidacy forms submitted and vote as to the number of Fellows to be elected in the given year. The number to be elected shall be the median number voted by the committee (or the next smaller number in case the median is a fraction). If the number of candidates C is not greater than 12, all such candidates shall be declared nominated. If the number is greater than 12, each member of the committee shall vote to nominate candidates by assigning to the candidate whom he most favors C marks, to the second most favored C - 1 marks, and so one, down to 1 mark. Absence of marks or negative marks shall be treated as zero. With N fellows to be elected, the 2N candidates receiving the highest totals shall be nominated.	
1975 The nominating committee has been encouraged to propose more names of applied economists. Up to 60 names were proposed (*EMA, 1976, 44(1), p. 208*).	
1978 Information on the nomination form: no more than six bibliographical entries, and a nomination statement not exceeding 10 lines (*EMA*, 1978, 46(2), p. 484)	

Table AIII: Timeline of Rules and Procedures regarding Nomination and Elections of Econometric Fellows (Part 2)

	Nomination Stage	Election Stage
1979	The nominating committee for Fellows will conduct a ranking of all nominees in order to determine the candidates to appear on the ballot. Longer nominating statements of several pages will be accepted for nominees whose principal scientific writing has been in languages other than English. Nominating committee has been asked to propose no more than 40 candidates (*EMA,* 1979, 47(1), p.213 and p.220). In contrast to previous years, where the FNC proposed the number of fellows to be elected, voting fellows were free to chose the number of candidates to be elected (*EMA,* 1981, 49 (1), p. 232).	New voting system: Each voter will vote "yes" for candidates up to the number she wants to be elected (the number of "yes" votes can be smaller than this but not larger), and blanks left for the remaining candidates. Threshold for election: the median vote of the electorate (*EMA, 1980, 48(1), p.255)* .
1982	If three or more Fellows endorse a candidate, then the candidate's name will automatically appear on the ballot (*EMA* , 1982, 50 (1), p. 235).	
1983	Call Nomination for Fellows: "Members or Fellows supplying completed nomination forms should also include written evidence supporting any endorsements of each nomination by additional Fellows" (*EMA* , 1982, 50(6), p. 1591)	
1984		Introduction of an automatic election threshold (instead of a separate vote on the fellow-number to be elected): newly, a candidate is elected if his/her number of approval votes equals at least one-third the number of all eligible ballots received. Furthermore, a voter may give "double approval" to one candidate (*EMA* , 1986, 54(1), p. 235).
1989	Number of nominees capped at around 50 and candidates who failed to win in an election are no longer carried over to the next year (*EMA* , 1990, 58 (1), p. 195). The Fellows also approved a recommendation that the nominating committee have the optional right to recommend selected candidates as specially worthy of nomination, and to indicate this recommendation on individual nominating statements (*EMA* , 1990, 58 (1), p. 214).	Elimination of "double-yes" vote. Threshold for election lowered to 30% of votes (*EMA* , 1990, 58 (1), p. 211).
1994	The FNC should normally nominate at least 10 members itself over and above whatever number of candidates is endorsed by three or more Fellows (*EMA* ; 1994, 62(3), p. 717). Nomination statement was limited to 125 words (*EMA* , 1993, 61(6), p.	
2001	It was agreed that no more than 10 endorsements will be listed on the nomination form (*EMA* , 2001, 69(3), p. 800).	
2006		Electronic voting introduced (*EMA* , 2006, 74 (6), p.1736).
2007		Single-click button for candidates who are nominated by the FNC (*EMA* , 2009, 77(1), p. 328).
2009	Awareness for regional diversity: (1) the ballot should list the candidates by region in reverse order of the number of existing Fellows, quoting the number of Fellows in each region and (2) the ballot should remind voters to carefully consider candidates outside of North America, and 3) the FNC should normally try to include at least one person from each region in the list of candidates (*EMA* , 2011, 79(1), p. 314).	
2011		Single-click buttom disappears but all the candidates from the FNC appear with an "N" next to their names (*EMA* , 2013, 81(1), p. 416) .
2016	The FNC is suggested by the chair to nominate at least six women, and at least six members from outside Europe and North America (with information from the regional committees; *EMA* , 2018, 87 (1), 356).	"Rollover Rule": any candidate nominated in one of the previous three elections receiving at last 20% of the vote in that year will automatically appear on the ballot (*EMA* , 2016, 84(1), 379-380). These candidate will be listed as "nominated by X in year Y" if the last nomination (s)he received was from X in year Y (*EMA* 2018, 86(1), p.361).
2017	The FNC is instructed by the chair to nominate at least six women, and at least six members from outside Europe and North America (with information from the regional committees; *EMA* , 2018, 87 (1), 356).	

Notes: This table builds on documentation found in the EMA issues (mostly reports of the presidents, reports of the secretary and announcements of fellow elections). The year refers to the election year of the fellows. We observe that in starting in the year 1965, more than 6 fellows got elected - without any documentation on changing rules in the Econometrica issues.

TABLE AIV (a)
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR NOMINEES AND ELECTED FELLOWS, 1990-2005

	Characteristics of Nominated/Elected Fellows in Year of Election											
	Nominated			Elected			Nomin. by Committee			Nominated by Fellow		
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Percent Female	4.93	0	100	4.6	0	100	5.97	0	100	5.19	0	100
Percent Fellows (as of current year)												
Current Fellow of AAAS (1933+)	0.13	0.14	0	0.38	0.4	0	0.75	0.79	0	0	0	0
Current Fellow of NAS (1968+)	0.13	0.14	0	0.38	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Current Fellow of AEA (1965+)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Recipient of Sloan Fellowship (1981+)	10.77	10.37	18.42	20.31	19.68	33.33	16.42	15.87	25	10.11	9.22	26.32
Cum. publications in top-5 journals												
Econometrica	1.90	1.94	1.24	2.10	2.10	2.00	2.11	2.14	1.63	1.74	1.76	1.26
REStud	1.08	1.11	0.55	1.33	1.37	0.58	1.13	1.14	0.88	1.08	1.11	0.53
AER	0.89	0.92	0.26	1.27	1.33	0.17	1.10	1.17	0.00	0.88	0.91	0.42
QJE	0.61	0.62	0.42	0.96	0.98	0.42	0.76	0.79	0.38	0.60	0.61	0.53
JPE	0.72	0.73	0.50	1.06	1.08	0.58	0.84	0.87	0.38	0.71	0.72	0.53
Cum. citations in top-5 journals												
Econometrica	47.76	48.80	27.68	66.61	67.98	38.17	49.56	50.40	36.25	43.58	43.97	36.42
REStud	15.41	15.92	5.45	21.42	22.01	9.25	15.66	15.59	16.75	15.29	16.03	1.79
AER	28.51	29.47	10.11	38.91	40.69	1.92	44.17	46.98	0.00	29.78	30.73	12.42
QJE	15.50	16.02	5.47	24.46	25.53	2.25	31.19	33.10	1.25	13.75	13.98	9.47
JPE	21.49	22.22	7.47	33.17	34.39	7.92	24.72	25.84	7.00	19.42	20.00	8.79
Cum. publ. in general interest journals												
JEP+JEL	0.19	0.20	0.13	0.30	0.31	0.08	0.28	0.29	0.00	0.23	0.23	0.21
AEA Papers&Proceedings	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.56	0.57	0.25	0.38	0.40	0.13	0.33	0.31	0.53
JEEA	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.00
EJ	0.45	0.45	0.32	0.48	0.50	0.00	0.34	0.34	0.38	0.46	0.47	0.32
REStat	0.37	0.38	0.24	0.41	0.43	0.00	0.31	0.32	0.25	0.38	0.39	0.11
Economica+IER	1.02	1.04	0.53	0.96	0.99	0.33	0.63	0.66	0.25	0.96	0.98	0.68
Cum. publications in field journals												
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMaE)	3.02	3.03	2.82	2.96	2.90	4.17	4.05	4.10	3.38	3.02	3.04	2.74
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	1.99	2.07	0.45	1.38	1.45	0.08	1.37	1.41	0.75	2.17	2.27	0.42
Micro (AEJMicro)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Macro (AEJMacro+JME)	0.42	0.44	0.21	0.46	0.48	0.00	0.67	0.69	0.38	0.42	0.44	0.00
AEJApplied	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Quantitative Economics (QE)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Development (JDE)	0.13	0.12	0.21	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.09	0.10	0.00	0.12	0.12	0.21
Finance (JF)	0.23	0.21	0.45	0.25	0.25	0.17	0.15	0.14	0.25	0.22	0.23	0.00
Health (JHE)	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.11
History (JEH)	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.03	0.02	0.25	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00
International (JIE)	0.21	0.22	0.05	0.32	0.33	0.08	0.14	0.15	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.11
Industrial Organization (RAND)	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.55	0.55	0.50	0.46	0.48	0.13	0.40	0.39	0.58
Labor (JoLE)	0.16	0.15	0.21	0.24	0.24	0.17	0.13	0.14	0.00	0.20	0.20	0.16
Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy)	0.41	0.42	0.21	0.52	0.54	0.08	0.30	0.32	0.00	0.47	0.48	0.26
Number of years since first publication	15.52	15.61	13.79	14.54	14.59	13.58	15.63	15.75	13.75	15.60	15.73	13.32
Number of Year-Author Observations	771	733	38	261	249	12	134	126	8	366	347	19

	Characteristics of Nominated/Elected Fellows in Year of Election											
	Nominated			Elected			Nomin. by Committee			Nominated by Fellow		
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Percent Female	10.23	0	100	13.97	0	100	16.81	0	100	8.28	0	100
Percent Fellows (as of current year)												
Current Fellow of AAAS (1933+)	2.26	1.75	6.73	9.17	7.11	21.88	4.31	3.11	10.26	1.66	1.39	4.62
Current Fellow of NAS (1968+)	0.29	0.33	0	0.87	1.02	0	0.43	0.52	0	0.25	0.28	0
Current Fellow of AEA (1965+)	0.29	0.11	1.92	0.87	0.51	3.13	0.43	0	2.56	0.25	0.14	1.54
Recipient of Sloan Fellowship (1981+)	19.76	18.4	31.73	27.51	25.38	40.63	22.41	19.69	35.9	18.98	18.06	29.23
Cum. publications in top-5 journals												
Econometrica	1.86	1.96	0.98	1.90	2.05	1.03	1.74	1.93	0.82	1.90	1.97	1.08
REStud	0.89	0.93	0.54	0.99	1.05	0.63	0.78	0.85	0.41	0.93	0.96	0.62
AER	1.39	1.35	1.72	1.61	1.59	1.72	1.38	1.33	1.64	1.39	1.36	1.77
QJE	0.76	0.70	1.30	1.19	1.06	2.00	0.94	0.85	1.33	0.71	0.66	1.28
JPE	0.79	0.81	0.59	0.90	0.95	0.59	0.87	0.95	0.44	0.77	0.78	0.68
Cum. citations in top-5 journals												
Econometrica	115.32	120.08	73.51	119.15	118.86	120.94	95.00	108.03	30.49	121.32	123.31	99.32
REStud	38.04	38.05	37.97	44.27	40.32	68.53	28.88	30.47	21.03	40.75	40.09	48.14
AER	129.62	127.24	150.48	118.48	112.65	154.38	134.07	137.34	117.90	128.30	124.53	170.03
QJE	94.56	83.65	190.42	145.51	117.41	318.53	129.21	105.87	244.69	84.33	77.69	157.86
JPE	63.96	64.97	55.09	77.73	80.15	62.88	65.84	70.35	43.51	63.40	63.53	62.03
Cum. publ. in general interest journals												
JEP+JEL	0.36	0.33	0.65	0.57	0.52	0.84	0.38	0.35	0.56	0.36	0.32	0.71
AEA Papers&Proceedings	0.82	0.76	1.30	1.24	1.10	2.16	0.97	0.88	1.44	0.77	0.73	1.22
JEEA	0.44	0.42	0.57	0.57	0.54	0.75	0.47	0.39	0.90	0.43	0.43	0.37
EJ	0.53	0.53	0.47	0.54	0.49	0.84	0.34	0.31	0.51	0.58	0.59	0.45
REStat	0.45	0.44	0.54	0.46	0.42	0.72	0.38	0.39	0.31	0.47	0.46	0.68
Economica+IER	0.74	0.77	0.49	0.69	0.70	0.66	0.61	0.60	0.64	0.78	0.82	0.40
Cum. publications in field journals												
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMaE)	3.68	3.98	1.03	2.99	3.37	0.66	2.98	3.47	0.56	3.88	4.11	1.31
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	2.10	2.16	1.57	1.45	1.41	1.66	1.35	1.38	1.21	2.32	2.37	1.78
Micro (AEJMicro)	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.12	0.11	0.19	0.06	0.08	0.00	0.18	0.17	0.29
Macro (AEJMacro+JME)	0.48	0.48	0.50	0.64	0.64	0.66	0.66	0.73	0.36	0.43	0.41	0.58
AEJApplied	0.11	0.09	0.25	0.17	0.13	0.38	0.23	0.18	0.46	0.07	0.07	0.12
Quantitative Economics (QE)	0.05	0.04	0.13	0.07	0.06	0.13	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.04	0.03	0.12
Development (JDE)	0.21	0.20	0.32	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.33	0.30	0.51	0.17	0.17	0.20
Finance (JF)	0.25	0.25	0.26	0.27	0.28	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.23	0.27	0.27	0.28
Health (JHE)	0.09	0.09	0.13	0.14	0.10	0.41	0.07	0.09	0.00	0.10	0.09	0.20
History (JEH)	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03
International (JIE)	0.22	0.23	0.15	0.25	0.24	0.31	0.33	0.34	0.28	0.19	0.20	0.08
Industrial Organization (RAND)	0.41	0.43	0.20	0.48	0.49	0.38	0.29	0.28	0.31	0.44	0.47	0.14
Labor (JoLE)	0.21	0.22	0.16	0.19	0.18	0.28	0.13	0.12	0.18	0.24	0.24	0.15
Public (JPubE+AEJPolicy)	0.54	0.48	1.07	0.76	0.67	1.28	0.69	0.57	1.31	0.50	0.46	0.92
Number of years since first publication	19.26	19.59	16.36	18.37	18.60	16.97	17.41	17.68	16.08	19.80	20.10	16.52
Number of Year-Author Observations	1,017	913	104	229	197	32	232	193	39	785	720	65

Notes: Table presents characteristics of economists who were nominated (Columns 1-3), elected (Columns 4-6), and nominated by different sources (Columns 7-12) as Fellows of the Econometric Society, as of the year of their nomination/election. We do not have information on the source of nomination for the year 2003. The percent with unknown gender is 0 in these samples. See notes to Table I.

	Logit Regression for Selection as Fellow in Year t:					
	Econometric Society					
	1933-79		1980-99		2000-19	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Authors' genders (Omitted: Male Author)						
Female × (pre-1980)	-1.972	-1.457				
	(0.733)	(0.606)				
Female × (1980-89)			-0.062	0.628		
			(0.523)	(0.473)		
Female × (1990-99)			0.048	0.028		
			(0.472)	(0.483)		
Female × (2000-09)					0.408	0.544
					(0.320)	(0.341)
Female × (2010-19)					1.127	0.932
					(0.227)	(0.239)
Cum. publ. and cites in top-5 journals						
# Papers in *Econometrica*	0.570	0.259	0.384	0.236	0.693	0.317
	(0.101)	(0.177)	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.119)
Asinh citations in *Econometrica*	0.491	0.026	0.483	0.110	0.255	-0.090
	(0.084)	(0.094)	(0.053)	(0.086)	(0.051)	(0.070)
# Papers in *Rev. of Econ. Studies*	0.400	-0.382	0.060	-0.054	0.278	0.311
	(0.113)	(0.242)	(0.108)	(0.180)	(0.107)	(0.178)
Asinh citations in *REStud*	0.196	0.007	0.172	0.032	0.120	-0.000
	(0.133)	(0.104)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.072)
# Papers in *Am. Econ. Review*	-0.149	0.022	0.056	0.115	0.061	0.042
	(0.096)	(0.161)	(0.106)	(0.134)	(0.091)	(0.129)
Asinh citations in *AER*	0.175	0.060	0.011	-0.083	0.154	-0.047
	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.070)	(0.081)	(0.052)	(0.064)
# Papers in *Quarterly J. of Econ.*	-0.013	-0.063	0.156	0.053	0.255	0.225
	(0.049)	(0.167)	(0.139)	(0.182)	(0.110)	(0.118)
Asinh citations in *QJE*	0.302	0.133	0.108	0.059	0.015	0.015
	(0.101)	(0.113)	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.060)	(0.088)
# Papers in *J. of Political Economy*	-0.017	-0.000	-0.172	-0.179	0.090	-0.029
	(0.068)	(0.082)	(0.098)	(0.120)	(0.107)	(0.169)
Asinh citations in *JPE*	0.240	0.012	0.265	0.157	0.162	0.047
	(0.106)	(0.110)	(0.062)	(0.085)	(0.051)	(0.074)
Cumulative Publications in other Journals						
Papers in *AEA/AER P&P*	0.051	0.226	0.389	0.424	0.161	0.099
	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.058)
Papers in *Economic Theory*	0.000	0.000	0.112	0.068	0.022	-0.042
	(.)	(.)	(0.211)	(0.187)	(0.089)	(0.075)
Papers in *Econometric Theory*	0.000	0.000	0.228	0.236	0.145	0.132
	(.)	(.)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.050)	(0.054)
Papers in *J. of Econometrics*	0.192	0.166	0.188	0.108	0.102	0.054
	(0.307)	(0.237)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.037)
Papers in *J. of Econ. Theory*	0.609	0.518	0.180	0.160	0.150	0.103
	(0.149)	(0.100)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.043)
Papers in *J. of Math. Econ.*	0.771	0.490	0.269	0.195	-0.052	0.082
	(0.199)	(0.213)	(0.105)	(0.097)	(0.130)	(0.116)
Papers in *Rand J. of Econ.*	0.522	0.412	0.242	0.123	0.079	0.105
	(0.365)	(0.291)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.049)
Papers in *Int. J. of Game Theory*	-0.193	-0.134	0.221	0.223	0.104	0.156
	(0.443)	(0.393)	(0.077)	(0.105)	(0.143)	(0.139)
Papers in *AEJ: Applied Econ.*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.630	0.391
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.189)	(0.143)
Papers in *AEJ: Econ. Policy*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.117	-0.201
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.295)	(0.238)
Papers in *AEJ: Micro*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.077	-0.096
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.348)	(0.245)
Papers in *AEJ: Macro*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.714	0.244
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.182)	(0.172)
Papers in *J. of Econ. Perspectives*	0.000	0.000	0.179	0.044	-0.018	0.068
	(.)	(.)	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.207)	(0.137)
Papers in *J. of Econ. Literature*	-0.762	0.053	-0.154	0.106	-0.085	0.093
	(0.426)	(0.377)	(0.327)	(0.226)	(0.255)	(0.209)
Papers in *Games and Econ. Behavior*	0.000	0.000	0.310	0.228	0.053	0.014
	(.)	(.)	(0.132)	(0.119)	(0.064)	(0.056)
Papers in *Int. Econ. Review*	0.063	0.080	0.021	0.050	-0.229	-0.064
	(0.134)	(0.098)	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.063)
Papers in *Review of Econ. and Stat.*	0.045	0.089	-0.472	-0.280	-0.232	-0.099
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.110)	(0.083)	(0.100)	(0.081)
Papers in *Economica*	0.005	-0.029	-0.037	-0.013	-0.110	0.028
	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.223)	(0.203)
Papers in *Economic J.*	0.018	0.099	0.121	0.177	-0.023	0.007
	(0.041)	(0.028)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.087)	(0.067)
Papers in *J. of Development Econ.*	1.225	1.058	-0.006	-0.037	-0.039	0.006
	(0.323)	(0.277)	(0.152)	(0.134)	(0.157)	(0.133)
Papers in *J. of European Econ. Assoc*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.546	0.342
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.091)	(0.080)
Papers in *J. of Finance*	-0.299	-0.242	0.013	0.037	-0.134	-0.107
	(0.232)	(0.183)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.078)
Papers in *J. of Health Econ.*	0.000	0.000	-0.625	-0.514	-0.089	-0.090
	(.)	(.)	(0.471)	(0.516)	(0.112)	(0.105)
Papers in *J. of Inter. Econ.*	0.255	0.327	0.200	0.118	0.097	0.052
	(0.394)	(0.285)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.084)
Papers in *J. of Monetary Econ.*	0.639	0.442	0.146	0.066	0.072	0.074
	(0.329)	(0.298)	(0.080)	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.056)

NOTE: table continues

			Logit Regression for Selection as Fellow in Year t:			
			Econometric Society			
	1933-79		1980-99		2000-19	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Papers in *J. of Labor Econ.*	0.000	0.000	0.669	0.567	-0.124	-0.018
	(.)	(.)	(0.170)	(0.101)	(0.150)	(0.109)
Papers in *J. of Public Econ.*	-0.091	0.043	0.154	0.131	0.001	-0.013
	(0.459)	(0.245)	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.054)
Papers in *J. of Econ. History*	-0.269	-0.072	0.061	0.146	0.012	0.006
	(0.281)	(0.286)	(0.126)	(0.120)	(0.166)	(0.186)
Papers in *J. of Am. Stat. Assoc.*	0.129	0.181	-0.058	0.060	-0.209	-0.030
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.088)	(0.059)	(0.133)	(0.078)
Papers in *Quantitative Economics.*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.179	0.596
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.201)	(0.216)
Papers in *Theoretical Economics.*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.259	0.002
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.210)	(0.164)
Levels of Top 5s						
1 Top 5		-0.075		1.960		1.213
		(0.274)		(0.593)		(0.681)
2 Top 5s		0.605		3.340		2.889
		(0.336)		(0.589)		(0.649)
3 Top 5s		0.814		3.857		3.079
		(0.398)		(0.612)		(0.674)
4 Top 5s		1.035		3.845		3.721
		(0.469)		(0.655)		(0.709)
5 Top 5s		1.151		4.162		3.792
		(0.530)		(0.677)		(0.724)
6 Top 5s		1.608		4.302		3.863
		(0.573)		(0.712)		(0.770)
7 or More Top 5s		0.838		4.104		4.275
		(0.712)		(0.784)		(0.815)
1 Cumulative *Econometricas*		1.237		0.471		1.073
		(0.248)		(0.299)		(0.329)
2 Cumulative *Econometricas*		1.203		0.856		1.761
		(0.419)		(0.368)		(0.413)
3+ Cumulative *Econometricas*		0.972		0.884		1.586
		(0.680)		(0.474)		(0.567)
1 Cumulative *REStuds*		0.755		0.492		-0.146
		(0.307)		(0.303)		(0.329)
2 Cumulative *REStuds*		1.858		0.500		-0.198
		(0.542)		(0.452)		(0.491)
3+ Cumulative *REStuds*		2.841		0.575		-0.429
		(0.890)		(0.710)		(0.754)
1 Cumulative *AER*		-0.603		-0.002		0.027
		(0.279)		(0.292)		(0.301)
2 Cumulative *AERs*		-0.945		-0.635		0.105
		(0.499)		(0.439)		(0.447)
3+ Cumulative *AERs*		-1.034		-0.273		0.157
		(0.718)		(0.619)		(0.616)
1 Cumulative *QJE*		0.006		-0.284		-0.491
		(0.275)		(0.325)		(0.373)
2 Cumulative *QJEs*		0.047		0.298		-0.966
		(0.494)		(0.479)		(0.543)
3+ Cumulative *QJEs*		-0.029		0.121		-1.022
		(0.792)		(0.731)		(0.677)
1 Cumulative *JPE*		-0.297		-0.478		0.048
		(0.231)		(0.337)		(0.352)
2 Cumulative *JPEs*		-0.395		-0.094		0.080
		(0.383)		(0.456)		(0.550)
3+ Cumulative *JPEs*		-0.023		0.125		0.647
		(0.535)		(0.639)		(0.786)
Levels of Top 5 Citations (Omitted: < 50 Percentile)						
50-70 Percentile		0.342		-0.267		1.118
		(0.295)		(0.291)		(0.367)
70-80 Percentile		0.735		0.387		1.657
		(0.348)		(0.326)		(0.389)
80-90 Percentile		1.235		0.696		1.833
		(0.377)		(0.339)		(0.426)
90-95 Percentile		1.616		0.793		1.948
		(0.447)		(0.400)		(0.479)
95-97.5 Percentile		1.929		1.209		2.243
		(0.516)		(0.454)		(0.536)
97.5-99 Percentile		2.408		1.523		2.425
		(0.549)		(0.530)		(0.582)
99+ Percentile		2.677		1.932		1.951
		(0.610)		(0.585)		(0.678)
Years since first publication (Omitted: 0-9 Years)						
10-19		-0.760		-0.814		0.019
		(0.142)		(0.159)		(0.221)
20-29		-1.338		-1.998		-0.854
		(0.251)		(0.257)		(0.265)
30+		-2.451		-3.513		-2.058
		(0.467)		(0.678)		(0.326)
N	112,369	112,369	188,966	188,966	355,238	355,238
Pseudo R-squared	0.238	0.290	0.345	0.407	0.361	0.424

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. See notes to Table IV. The table entries are coefficients from the models summarized in columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 of that Table. All models include year fixed effects. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.

TABLE AVI
ROBUSTNESS TABLE FOR SELECTION AS FELLOWS, PARSIMONIOUS SPECIFICATION

	Logit Regression for Selection as Fellow in Year t:					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Authors' Gender (Omitted: Male Author)						
Female × (pre-1980)	-1.457	-1.648				
	(0.606)	(0.585)				
Female × (1980-89)			0.628	0.564		
			(0.473)	(0.463)		
Female × (1990-99)			0.028	0.101		
			(0.483)	(0.467)		
Female × (2000-09)					0.544	0.568
					(0.341)	(0.329)
Female × (2010-19)					0.932	0.956
					(0.239)	(0.204)
Full set of Controls	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Parsimonious set of controls (Top 5 Publications and Top-5 Citations)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	112,369	112,369	188,966	188,966	355,238	355,238
Pseudo R-squared	0.290	0.161	0.407	0.272	0.424	0.323

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients -- see note to Table VI. Models are estimated over all observations in the sample of actively-publishing economists eligible for selection as a Fellow. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include the full set of controls as in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV. Columns 2, 4, and 6 contain a parsimonious specification including only indicators for 1, 2, 3,,... 7+ top 5, number of top-5s, and citations percentiles. All models include year fixed effects. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.

TABLE AVII

ELECTION AS FELLOW, GENDER DIFFERENCES BY PERCENTILE OF THE CITATION-PUBLICATION INDEX

	Logit Regression for Selection as Econometric Society Fellow in Year *t*							
	2000-2019 Pooled			2000-2009	2010-2019	2000-2019 Pooled (Pre-specified Specification)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Predicted log odds of index	0.996	0.994	0.895	1.076	0.928	1.034	0.996	0.571
(Index from full set of controls)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.073)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.075)
Authors' genders (Omitted: Male Author)								
Female	0.689					0.827		
	(0.191)					(0.176)		
Female × Levels of Percentiles of Index								
Female × (0-90 Percentile of Index)		-0.733	-0.664	0.000	-0.599		-0.456	0.704
		(1.001)	(1.051)	(.)	(1.002)		(0.419)	(0.493)
Female × (90-95 Percentile of Index)		1.195	0.995	1.309	0.811		-0.552	-0.483
		(0.428)	(0.476)	(0.736)	(0.598)		(1.001)	(1.036)
Female × (95-97.5 Percentile of Index)		0.853	1.066	0.787	0.924		1.536	1.143
		(0.414)	(0.459)	(0.725)	(0.508)		(0.385)	(0.424)
Female × (97.5-99 Percentile of Index)		1.121	1.230	0.435	1.203		1.437	0.856
		(0.314)	(0.342)	(0.696)	(0.392)		(0.367)	(0.385)
Female × (99+ Percentile of Index)		0.443	0.391	0.427	0.684		1.567	1.353
		(0.301)	(0.292)	(0.544)	(0.365)		(0.306)	(0.274)
Levels of Percentiles of Index								
90-95 Percentile			0.560					1.793
			(0.464)					(0.418)
95-97.5 Percentile			0.271					2.663
			(0.504)					(0.398)
97.5-99 Percentile			0.480					3.311
			(0.533)					(0.422)
99+ Percentile			0.840					3.689
			(0.632)					(0.538)
Index formed using full set of controls, estimated only on males	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Index formed using shortened set of controls estimated only on males	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	355,238	355,238	355,238	125,934	207,656	355,238	355,238	355,238
Pseudo R-squared	0.420	0.422	0.423	0.441	0.398	0.357	0.363	0.380

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients. The index is obtained from a full regression as in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV run only on males (and thus excluding the female coefficient). We then use this index to form percentiles of this publication-citation index by placing people in the 0-90th percentile, 90-95th percentile, 95-97.5, 97.5-99, and 99th percentile. The regression in Columns 1 and 6 include just the index and the female coefficient dummy. The regressions in Columns 2, 4, 5, and 7 include also the female indicator interact with the various percentile indicators, so as to estimate the impact by gender for the various percentiles. Columns 3 and 8 include also the percentiles themselves as a test of correct specification, as the percentile indicators should not be significant if the index is well specified. This is the case in Column 3 using the full set of controls, but not in Column 8 which uses the shorter set of controls used in Columns 2, 5, and 8 of Table IV. Models are estimated over all observations in the sample of actively-publishing economists eligible for selection as a Fellow. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.

TABLE AVIII: Annual Nomination and Election Success Data, 1990-2019

	Female Share			New Fellows		All Nominees		Committee Nominees		Fellow Nominees		Election Success Rate of Nominees			
	Active Scholars	w/ ECA/RES	3+ Top 5	Number	Share Female	Number	Share Female	Number	Share Female	Number	Share Female	Male	Female	Female by Committee	Female by Fellows
1990	0.087	0.047	0.021	22	0.000	42	0.024					0.537	0.000		
1991	0.091	0.048	0.022	23	0.087	49	0.061					0.457	0.667		
1992	0.095	0.050	0.023	15	0.000	39	0.026					0.395	0.000		
1993	0.099	0.050	0.028	18	0.000	47	0.043					0.400	0.000		
1994	0.101	0.052	0.032	18	0.000	42	0.000					0.429	--		
1995	0.106	0.050	0.031	16	0.063	52	0.038	10	0.000	42	0.048	0.300	0.500		0.500
1996	0.110	0.055	0.033	16	0.000	50	0.060	12	0.083	38	0.053	0.340	0.000	0.000	0.000
1997	0.114	0.057	0.034	14	0.071	51	0.059	10	0.100	41	0.049	0.271	0.333	1.000	0.000
1998	0.122	0.059	0.037	16	0.063	39	0.077	9	0.111	30	0.067	0.417	0.333	1.000	0.000
1999	0.127	0.061	0.039	13	0.000	48	0.021	13	0.000	35	0.029	0.277	0.000		0.000
2000	0.131	0.064	0.041	14	0.071	59	0.068	11	0.091	48	0.063	0.236	0.250	0.000	0.333
2001	0.136	0.067	0.046	10	0.100	55	0.073	12	0.083	43	0.070	0.176	0.250	0.000	0.333
2002	0.139	0.067	0.048	17	0.059	45	0.022	19	0.000	26	0.038	0.364	1.000		1.000
2003	0.144	0.071	0.049	20	0.050	52	0.077	0		0		0.396	0.250		
2004	0.151	0.073	0.050	15	0.200	51	0.098	24	0.125	27	0.074	0.261	0.600	0.333	1.000
2005	0.156	0.073	0.053	14	0.000	50	0.020	14	0.000	36	0.028	0.286	0.000		0.000
2006	0.160	0.077	0.057	5	0.000	55	0.055	13	0.077	42	0.048	0.096	0.000	0.000	0.000
2007	0.165	0.081	0.061	16	0.063	50	0.040	10	0.100	40	0.025	0.313	0.500	1.000	0.000
2008	0.171	0.088	0.063	15	0.067	61	0.098	18	0.111	43	0.093	0.255	0.167	0.500	0.000
2009	0.177	0.092	0.071	21	0.095	56	0.036	15	0.000	41	0.049	0.352	1.000		1.000
2010	0.181	0.098	0.075	16	0.063	54	0.056	15	0.067	39	0.051	0.294	0.333	1.000	0.000
2011	0.184	0.102	0.079	16	0.000	74	0.054	11	0.000	63	0.063	0.229	0.000		0.000
2012	0.190	0.103	0.082	22	0.182	77	0.130	18	0.222	59	0.102	0.269	0.400	0.500	0.333
2013	0.196	0.107	0.082	19	0.211	60	0.150	13	0.308	47	0.106	0.294	0.444	0.750	0.200
2014	0.200	0.112	0.083	14	0.143	50	0.080	10	0.300	40	0.025	0.261	0.500	0.667	0.000
2015	0.204	0.118	0.085	13	0.077	69	0.087	10	0.000	59	0.102	0.190	0.167		0.167
2016	0.208	0.118	0.090	16	0.313	74	0.149	18	0.444	56	0.054	0.175	0.455	0.500	0.333
2017	0.211	0.121	0.087	20	0.200	78	0.090	13	0.231	65	0.062	0.225	0.571	0.667	0.500
2018	0.216	0.123	0.088	22	0.182	103	0.146	21	0.238	82	0.122	0.205	0.267	0.400	0.200
2019	0.219	0.128	0.092	14	0.214	156	0.141	47	0.149	109	0.138	0.082	0.136	0.429	0.000

58

NOMINATION AND ELECTION AS FELLOW

	Logit Regression for Selection/Nomination as Econometric Society Fellow in Year t			
	Selection as Fellow	Nomination as Fellow	Nomination by Committee	Nomination by Fellows
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Authors' genders (Omitted: Male Author)				
Female × (1995-2005, except 2003)	0.873	0.482	0.597	0.412
	(0.352)	(0.260)	(0.387)	(0.289)
Female × (2006-11)	-0.309	-0.112	-0.053	-0.131
	(0.489)	(0.259)	(0.551)	(0.312)
Female × (2012-19)	1.160	0.605	1.219	0.290
	(0.257)	(0.228)	(0.252)	(0.286)
Cum. publ. and citations in top-5 journals				
# Papers in *Econometrica*	0.363	0.322	0.401	0.219
	(0.110)	(0.105)	(0.114)	(0.119)
Asinh citations in *Econometrica*	-0.048	0.053	-0.031	0.084
	(0.069)	(0.052)	(0.075)	(0.059)
# Papers in *Rev. of Econ. Studies*	0.525	0.124	0.390	0.036
	(0.163)	(0.146)	(0.186)	(0.172)
Asinh citations in *REStud*	-0.044	0.032	-0.098	0.079
	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.055)
# Papers in *Am. Econ. Review*	-0.022	0.067	-0.131	0.122
	(0.121)	(0.077)	(0.124)	(0.079)
Asinh citations in *AER*	0.005	0.139	0.089	0.152
	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.064)
# Papers in *Quarterly J. of Econ.*	0.233	0.109	0.241	0.037
	(0.113)	(0.103)	(0.126)	(0.118)
Asinh citations in *QJE*	-0.020	0.049	0.174	0.008
	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.117)	(0.080)
# Papers in *J. of Pol. Economy*	-0.148	-0.235	-0.117	-0.260
	(0.167)	(0.146)	(0.167)	(0.169)
Asinh citations in *JPE*	0.016	0.059	0.022	0.076
	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.077)	(0.061)
Controls for publications in general interest/field journals	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for levels of Top 5 and Top 5 Citations	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for years since first publication	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	400,235	400,235	400,235	400,235
Pseudo R-squared	0.433	0.439	0.391	0.418

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients -- see note to Table VI. Models are estimated over all observations in the sample of actively-publishing economists eligible for nomination/selection as a Fellow. All models include year fixed effects. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.

TABLE AX
NOMINATION AND ELECTION TO FELLOWS, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

	Logit Model		Poisson Model		Poisson Model	
	Selection as Fellow, Cond. on Nomination		Number of Votes for Nominees		Number of Endorsements	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Authors' gender (Omitted: Male Author)						
Female × (1995-2005, except 2003)	0.742	0.869	--	--	0.001	0.007
	(0.372)	(0.427)			(0.139)	(0.143)
Female × (2006-11)	-0.395	-0.134	-0.029	0.047	-0.274	-0.256
	(0.592)	(0.587)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.180)	(0.172)
Female × (2012-19)	0.800	1.048	0.149	0.209	0.120	0.121
	(0.371)	(0.374)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.143)	(0.141)
Cumulative pubs. in top-5 journals						
# Papers in *Econometrica*	0.153	0.151	0.047	0.049	-0.014	-0.012
	(0.151)	(0.156)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Asinh citation in *Econometrica*	-0.107	-0.126	0.005	-0.002	-0.058	-0.059
	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.024)
# Papers in *Rev. of Econ. Studies*	0.422	0.476	0.019	0.033	0.061	0.070
	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Asinh citation in *REStud*	-0.075	-0.100	-0.009	-0.010	0.022	0.021
	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.029)
# Papers in *Am. Econ. Review*	-0.094	-0.073	-0.021	-0.017	-0.029	-0.022
	(0.148)	(0.163)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Asinh citation in *AER*	-0.133	-0.166	-0.011	-0.021	0.009	0.006
	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.029)	(0.029)
# Papers in *Quarterly J. of Econ.*	0.491	0.484	0.091	0.083	0.040	0.035
	(0.163)	(0.180)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Asinh citation in *QJE*	-0.009	-0.025	-0.004	-0.012	-0.097	-0.099
	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.037)
# Papers in *J. of Pol. Economy*	0.174	0.199	-0.041	-0.049	-0.065	-0.070
	(0.211)	(0.228)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.073)	(0.074)
Asinh citation in *JPE*	-0.010	-0.006	0.011	0.017	-0.028	-0.024
	(0.083)	(0.091)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Controls for Institutional Affiliation × 3 Time Periods		X		X		X
N	1,517	1,517	1,017	1,017	1,057	1,057
Pseudo R-squared	0.151	0.179	0.194	0.260	0.129	0.131

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic or Poisson regression coefficients -- see note to Table VI. All models include controls for publications in general interest/field journals, year fixed effects, and additional control variables obtained from the nomination forms. The models in Columns 2, 4, and 6 also include controls for institutional affiliation, interacted with indicators for the 3 time periods, as in Table IX. Models are estimated over the set of individuals nominated as an Econometric Society fellow only. The percent with unknown gender is 0 in the sample.

WORDS PREDICTIVE OF ELECTION AND OF ECONOMIST GENDER, NOMINATION STATEMENTS

	Logit of Election to ES Fellow, Conditional on Nomination					Logit of Female Gender, Conditional on Nomination			
	Logit Coeff. (1)	Standard Error (2)	Pseudo R-squared (3)	No. of Mentions (4)		Logit Coeff. (5)	Standard Error (6)	Pseudo R-squared (7)	No. of Mentions (8)
Positive Predictors					*Positive Predictors*				
competition	1.374	0.323	0.089	46	present	2.187	0.584	0.199	48
control	1.519	0.376	0.085	23	measurement	2.847	0.944	0.196	21
source	1.335	0.395	0.084	28	error	2.280	0.725	0.194	36
quantitative	1.301	0.501	0.083	28	method	1.130	0.387	0.187	237
influential	0.618	0.235	0.082	144	experiment	1.626	0.424	0.187	62
repeat	0.964	0.277	0.082	46	approach	1.247	0.477	0.182	122
imperfect	1.094	0.422	0.081	29	identification	1.501	0.628	0.180	70
condition	0.813	0.334	0.081	57	factor	1.544	0.643	0.180	58
derive	1.090	0.387	0.081	29	parameter	1.704	0.775	0.177	54
context	0.961	0.349	0.081	37	application	0.952	0.446	0.177	181
efficient	0.831	0.321	0.081	50	expect	1.865	0.867	0.176	22
macroeconomic	0.536	0.225	0.081	137	multiple	1.414	0.756	0.176	56
restriction	0.979	0.385	0.080	32	important	0.702	0.305	0.175	390
public	0.599	0.290	0.080	99	experimental	1.118	0.617	0.174	68
bound	0.961	0.405	0.080	27	random	1.672	1.037	0.173	32
Negative Predictors					*Negative Predictors*				
panel	-1.204	0.453	0.083	66	financial	-1.578	0.677	0.180	135
alternative	-1.241	0.524	0.083	54	highly	-1.675	0.918	0.172	68
climate	-2.209	0.899	0.082	20	foundation	-1.569	0.784	0.171	76
test	-0.700	0.310	0.081	120	matching	-1.324	0.923	0.171	84
unique	-1.792	0.839	0.081	20	society	.	.	0.170	53
nonlinear	-1.102	0.460	0.081	58	dynamic	-0.704	0.481	0.170	266
deep	-1.202	0.615	0.081	45	analyze	-1.064	0.535	0.170	116
theoretically	-1.544	0.711	0.081	28	pioneer	-0.985	0.540	0.169	118
history	-1.924	1.143	0.081	23	rule	-1.831	1.073	0.169	58
experimental	-0.852	0.383	0.080	68	incentive	-1.060	0.718	0.169	78
trading	-1.206	0.559	0.080	38	minimum	.	.	0.169	21
set	-0.747	0.359	0.080	89	hold	.	.	0.168	27
evaluation	-1.112	0.502	0.080	41	agent	-1.024	0.649	0.168	95
understand	-1.007	0.538	0.080	54	government	-1.812	1.117	0.168	36
change	-0.602	0.309	0.080	114	form	-1.356	0.746	0.168	65
Pseudo R-2 w/o word controls			0.075		*Pseudo R-2 w/o word controls*			0.161	
Number of Positive Samples				229	*Number of Positive Samples*				105
Number of Negative Samples				788	*Number of Negative Samples*				912

Notes: The sample used is all 1,017 nominations from 2006 to 2019, as the nominating statements are not available for earlier years. We identify all word lemmas used in at least 20 nominating statements, resulting in 567 words after dropping stop words (such as "she" and "the"). For each of these 567 words, we run a logit regression of the relevant dependent variable on an indicator for whether the word is used, as well as controls for cumulative number of publications in each of the top-5 journals, asinh of cumulative citations in each of the top-5 journals, and year fixed effects. We report the 15 most predictive words, in a positive and negative direction, of the dependent variable, sorted by pseudo R-squared. Standard errors are clustered by author.

TABLE AXII

EFFECT OF COAUTHORSHIP ON PROBABILITY OF SELECTION AND NOMINATION AS ES FELLOW

	Logit Regression for Selection/Nomination as Econometric Society Fellow in Year t					Logit Regression for Selection as AAAS/NAS Fellow in Year t	
	Selection as Fellow of ES:		Nomination as Fellow of ES:	Nomination by Fellow:	Nomination by Committee:	Selection as Fellow of AAAS:	Selection as Fellow of NAS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Authors' Gender (Omitted: Male Author)							
Female × (1990-99)	0.376	0.473	0.864	0.816	1.054	1.344	0.465
	(0.461)	(0.445)	(0.334)	(0.448)	(0.639)	(0.610)	(1.658)
Female × (2000-09)	0.374	0.611	0.450	0.300	0.509	1.337	1.821
	(0.328)	(0.364)	(0.284)	(0.315)	(0.508)	(0.414)	(1.122)
Female × (2010-19)	0.869	1.105	0.644	0.364	1.061	1.991	0.899
	(0.220)	(0.285)	(0.276)	(0.336)	(0.269)	(0.345)	(1.887)
Measures of Coauthorhip							
All Journals Papers Index	0.976	0.965	0.998	1.025	0.947	0.966	0.929
	(0.073)	(0.075)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.073)	(0.040)	(0.076)
All Journals Papers Index, Single-Authored Papers	0.082	0.047	-0.054	-0.153	0.088	0.098	0.067
	(0.123)	(0.125)	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.130)	(0.066)	(0.079)
Remaining Index	1.003	1.000	0.989	0.987	0.992	0.983	0.970
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.105)
Measures of Coauthorship interacted with Female							
All Journals Papers Index*Female		0.230	0.251	0.207	0.281	0.000	0.315
		(0.284)	(0.196)	(0.213)	(0.178)	(0.101)	(0.213)
All Journals Papers Index, Single-Authored Papers * Female		1.032	0.007	-0.146	-0.262	0.095	0.380
		(0.490)	(0.348)	(0.358)	(0.374)	(0.195)	(0.231)
Remaining Index*Female		-0.022	0.067	0.127	0.048	0.171	0.026
		(0.172)	(0.121)	(0.139)	(0.129)	(0.157)	(0.484)
N	465,085	465,085	465,081	400,235	400,235	474,485	463,706
Pseudo R-squared	0.420	0.421	0.428	0.418	0.391	0.455	0.390

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients in models for selection as a Fellow of the Econometric Society. We generate an index running a logistic regression only on the male sample including all the controls as in Columns 9 of Table IV, except running it over the sample 1990-2019. We decompose the index into a journal-related portion (the controls used in Column 8 of Table IV) and the additional controls. For the first part of the index, we recompute it only for single-authored papers. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.

	Characteristics of Elected Fellows in Year of Election								
	1933-1979			1980-2000			2000-2019		
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: AAAS (1933-2019)									
Fraction Female	0.79	0	100	2.96	0	100	15.57	0	100
Cum. publications in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	1.70	1.70	1.00	2.88	2.96	0.25	2.99	3.27	1.50
REStud	0.83	0.84	0.00	1.73	1.76	0.75	1.57	1.77	0.46
AER	1.39	1.37	4.00	1.96	2.00	0.75	2.30	2.39	1.81
QJE	1.06	1.06	2.00	1.47	1.46	1.75	2.47	2.51	2.23
JPE	1.34	1.35	0.00	2.06	2.08	1.50	1.85	1.99	1.08
Cum. citations in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	16.86	16.82	21.00	143.99	147.98	13.00	278.32	308.57	114.27
REStud	4.01	4.04	0.00	41.19	42.40	1.75	106.62	122.48	20.62
AER	11.13	10.73	61.00	85.11	87.17	17.75	210.45	207.91	224.23
QJE	4.82	4.59	33.00	35.42	35.62	29.00	268.20	270.40	256.27
JPE	7.02	7.08	0.00	97.61	99.53	34.75	212.69	228.45	127.27
Cum. publications in field journals									
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMaE)	0.28	0.28	0.00	2.17	2.22	0.50	3.56	4.01	1.12
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	0.61	0.60	2.00	1.64	1.69	0.00	1.29	1.29	1.27
Empirical Micro (AEJApplied/Policy+JoLE+JEH+JHE+JPu	0.33	0.32	1.00	1.67	1.66	2.00	2.10	1.95	2.92
Number of years since first publication	19.40	19.41	18.00	22.19	22.26	19.75	22.74	23.11	20.69
Number of Observations	126	125	1	135	131	4	167	141	26
Panel B: NAS (1968-2019)									
Fraction Female	0	0	--	4.76	0	100	14.06	0	100
Cum. publications in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	4.37	4.37	--	3.07	3.23	0.00	3.20	3.51	1.33
REStud	1.70	1.70	--	1.95	2.02	0.50	2.50	2.78	0.78
AER	2.50	2.50	--	2.45	2.52	1.00	3.30	3.36	2.89
QJE	1.43	1.43	--	1.45	1.48	1.00	2.80	2.69	3.44
JPE	3.13	3.13	--	2.10	2.12	1.50	2.64	2.82	1.56
Cum. citations in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	84.33	84.33	--	183.43	192.60	0.00	465.38	518.13	143.00
REStud	14.20	14.20	--	52.12	54.73	0.00	261.77	298.91	34.78
AER	32.77	32.77	--	141.38	138.28	203.50	447.75	472.75	295.00
QJE	11.10	11.10	--	48.05	49.60	17.00	506.45	484.76	639.00
JPE	44.70	44.70	--	124.36	128.93	33.00	488.33	547.49	126.78
Cum. publications in field journals									
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMaE)	0.67	0.67	--	3.24	3.40	0.00	4.02	4.58	0.56
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA)	1.20	1.20	--	0.79	0.82	0.00	1.52	1.76	0.00
Empirical Micro (AEJApplied/Policy+JoLE+JEH+JHE+JPu	0.33	0.33		1.26	1.27	1.00	3.14	2.47	7.22
Number of years since first publication	26.40	26.40	--	29.57	29.88	23.50	32.31	33.84	23.00
Number of Authors	30	30	--	42	40	2	64	55	9

	Characteristics of Elected Fellows in Year of Election								
	1933-1979			1980-2000			2000-2019		
	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel C: AEAF (1965-2019)									
Fraction Female	2.86	0	100	6.38	0	100	7.32	0	100
Cum. publications in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	2.46	2.53	0.00	1.96	2.09	0.00	3.52	3.76	0.50
REStud	0.86	0.88	0.00	1.06	1.11	0.33	1.72	1.79	0.83
AER	3.74	3.82	1.00	2.74	2.80	2.00	3.73	3.92	1.33
QJE	2.40	2.47	0.00	1.38	1.45	0.33	2.33	2.32	2.50
JPE	3.51	3.56	2.00	2.68	2.77	1.33	3.30	3.45	1.50
Cum. citations in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	41.14	42.35	0.00	86.77	92.68	0.00	809.89	868.03	73.50
REStud	6.94	7.15	0.00	26.21	27.98	0.33	178.17	190.16	26.33
AER	36.31	37.15	8.00	95.19	90.84	159.00	534.37	569.51	89.17
QJE	11.91	12.26	0.00	50.36	53.11	10.00	323.78	319.64	376.17
JPE	23.49	23.94	8.00	130.13	137.43	23.00	593.50	623.76	210.17
Cum. publications in field journals									
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMaE)	0.14	0.15	0.00	0.89	0.95	0.00	2.90	3.05	1.00
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA) Empirical Micro	0.94	0.91	2.00	0.47	0.50	0.00	2.38	2.49	1.00
(AEJApplied/Policy+JoLE+JEH+JHE+JPu	0.40	0.41	0.00	0.74	0.70	1.33	2.82	2.75	3.67
Number of years since first publication	33.69	34.00	23.00	36.85	37.59	26.00	41.99	42.37	37.17
Number of Observations	35	34	1	47	44	3	82	76	6
Panel D: Sloan (1981-2019)									
Fraction Female	--	--	--	11.03	0	100	20	0	100
Cum. publications in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	--	--	--	0.89	0.95	0.44	0.60	0.69	0.25
REStud	--	--	--	0.44	0.47	0.19	0.25	0.27	0.16
AER	--	--	--	0.71	0.73	0.56	0.96	0.96	0.97
QJE	--	--	--	0.66	0.70	0.38	0.84	0.82	0.91
JPE	--	--	--	0.63	0.64	0.62	0.47	0.42	0.66
Cum. citations in top-5 journals									
Econometrica	--	--	--	6.30	6.36	5.75	6.16	6.45	5.03
REStud	--	--	--	2.10	2.32	0.38	2.64	2.89	1.66
AER	--	--	--	4.91	5.03	3.94	10.87	10.62	11.88
QJE	--	--	--	5.23	5.71	1.44	15.73	15.79	15.50
JPE	--	--	--	6.06	6.25	4.56	6.33	6.04	7.47
Cum. publications in field journals									
Theory (JET+ET+GEB+IJGT+JMaE)	--	--	--	0.81	0.85	0.44	0.55	0.69	0.00
Econometrics (EcT+JEc+JASA) Empirical Micro	--	--	--	0.43	0.49	0.00	0.30	0.31	0.25
(AEJApplied/Policy+JoLE+JEH+JHE+JPu	--	--	--	0.54	0.53	0.56	0.57	0.52	0.78
Number of years since first publication	--	--	--	4.21	4.33	3.25	4.41	4.45	4.25
Number of Authors	--	--	--	145	129	16	160	128	32

Notes: Table presents characteristics of economists who were elected as Fellows of the AAAS (panel A), NAS (panel B), AEA (panel C) and Sloan Foundation (panel D) as of the year of their election. See notes to Table I.

	Logit Regression for Selection as Fellow in Year t:											
	AAAS						NAS					
	1933-79		1980-99		2000-19		1933-79		1980-99		2000-19	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Authors' genders (Omitted: Male Author)												
Female × (pre-1980)	-1.567	-1.376					0.000	0.000				
	(0.987)	(0.968)					(.)	(.)				
Female × (1980-89)			-0.206	0.195					0.449	1.036		
			(0.991)	(1.083)					(1.118)	(1.295)		
Female × (1990-99)			0.538	1.115					0.208	0.801		
			(0.704)	(0.672)					(1.073)	(0.704)		
Female × (2000-09)					0.897	1.282					1.148	1.940
					(0.441)	(0.459)					(0.666)	(0.762)
Female × (2010-19)					2.021	2.043					1.388	1.774
					(0.338)	(0.347)					(0.492)	(0.549)
Cum. publ. and cites in top-5 journals												
# Papers in Econometrica	0.124	0.046	0.002	0.012	0.266	0.207	0.008	-0.093	-0.053	0.036	0.023	-0.020
	(0.073)	(0.114)	(0.087)	(0.105)	(0.059)	(0.075)	(0.101)	(0.133)	(0.097)	(0.141)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Asinh citations in Econometrica	0.345	-0.012	0.377	0.191	0.256	0.131	0.897	0.756	0.451	0.236	0.209	0.069
	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.075)	(0.070)	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.202)	(0.321)	(0.134)	(0.113)	(0.088)	(0.078)
# Papers in Rev. of Econ. Studies	0.175	0.036	-0.038	-0.067	0.025	0.059	0.011	-0.034	-0.073	-0.041	-0.019	0.004
	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.147)	(0.117)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.158)	(0.185)	(0.140)	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.085)
Asinh citations in REStud	0.085	0.018	0.287	0.233	0.160	0.044	0.318	0.255	0.192	0.138	0.299	0.171
	(0.159)	(0.121)	(0.101)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.181)	(0.196)	(0.136)	(0.120)	(0.117)	(0.107)
# Papers in Am. Econ. Review	-0.060	-0.038	0.090	0.107	0.114	0.117	-0.138	-0.211	0.072	0.232	0.053	0.072
	(0.106)	(0.116)	(0.132)	(0.118)	(0.089)	(0.093)	(0.191)	(0.206)	(0.145)	(0.166)	(0.087)	(0.083)
Asinh citations in AER	0.321	-0.020	-0.050	-0.191	0.095	-0.051	0.263	0.204	0.153	-0.079	0.033	-0.158
	(0.120)	(0.094)	(0.095)	(0.084)	(0.067)	(0.054)	(0.238)	(0.221)	(0.181)	(0.132)	(0.112)	(0.108)
# Papers in Quarterly J. of Econ.	-0.191	-0.204	-0.035	0.003	0.293	0.197	-0.267	-0.161	-0.553	-0.324	-0.063	-0.026
	(0.138)	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.142)	(0.082)	(0.101)	(0.231)	(0.213)	(0.319)	(0.296)	(0.110)	(0.105)
Asinh citations in QJE	0.263	0.067	0.267	0.126	0.196	0.036	0.227	0.067	0.381	0.174	0.142	0.001
	(0.151)	(0.117)	(0.103)	(0.088)	(0.066)	(0.056)	(0.212)	(0.245)	(0.183)	(0.168)	(0.099)	(0.085)
# Papers in J. of Political Economy	-0.032	-0.031	-0.075	-0.058	0.056	0.055	0.248	0.200	0.091	0.160	0.023	0.018
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.098)	(0.140)	(0.085)	(0.081)
Asinh citations in JPE	0.120	-0.157	0.334	0.123	0.192	0.041	-0.067	-0.136	0.000	-0.108	0.197	0.033
	(0.115)	(0.088)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.051)	(0.187)	(0.184)	(0.142)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.085)
Cumulative publications in other Journals												
Papers in AEA P&P	0.378	0.349	0.622	0.544	0.242	0.242	0.468	0.354	0.391	0.267	0.222	0.192
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.162)	(0.168)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Papers in Economic Theory	0.000	0.000	-0.070	-0.220	-0.131	-0.142	0.000	0.000	-0.549	-0.435	0.136	0.094
	(.)	(.)	(0.349)	(0.348)	(0.144)	(0.120)	(.)	(.)	(0.698)	(0.589)	(0.146)	(0.136)
Papers in Econometric Theory	0.000	0.000	0.054	0.032	-0.070	-0.147	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-1.026	-1.059
	(.)	(.)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.165)	(0.142)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.674)	(0.533)
Papers in J. of Econometrics	0.127	0.034	0.195	0.112	0.021	-0.032	0.000	0.000	-0.129	-0.188	0.110	0.054
	(0.316)	(0.359)	(0.069)	(0.052)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(.)	(.)	(0.172)	(0.153)	(0.065)	(0.067)
Papers in J. of Econ. Theory	-0.322	-0.281	0.089	0.098	0.043	0.043	-0.191	-0.162	0.093	0.122	0.099	0.061
	(0.233)	(0.193)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.258)	(0.252)	(0.075)	(0.067)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Papers in J. of Math. Econ.	1.022	0.913	0.275	0.307	-0.013	-0.030	0.962	0.907	0.328	0.299	0.018	0.001
	(0.171)	(0.203)	(0.131)	(0.123)	(0.163)	(0.099)	(0.222)	(0.267)	(0.094)	(0.080)	(0.141)	(0.121)
Papers in Rand J. of Econ.	0.357	0.387	0.143	0.118	-0.212	-0.151	-0.133	0.028	0.264	0.136	-0.024	0.003
	(0.303)	(0.258)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.110)	(0.079)	(0.649)	(0.539)	(0.136)	(0.134)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Papers in Int. J. of Game Theory	0.093	0.108	0.195	0.117	-0.099	-0.077	0.460	0.401	0.055	-0.059	0.097	0.000
	(0.257)	(0.263)	(0.106)	(0.089)	(0.261)	(0.140)	(0.255)	(0.256)	(0.192)	(0.149)	(0.219)	(0.211)
Papers in AEJ: Applied Econ.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.481	0.391	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.033	0.110
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.198)	(0.201)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.268)	(0.249)
Papers in AEJ: Econ. Policy	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.595	0.258	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.635	0.440
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.397)	(0.443)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.275)	(0.257)
Papers in AEJ: Micro	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.428	-0.405	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.229	0.222
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.265)	(0.260)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.233)	(0.233)
Papers in AEJ: Macro	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.741	0.373	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.712	-0.561
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.281)	(0.264)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.633)	(0.666)
Papers in J. of Econ. Perspectives	0.000	0.000	-0.076	0.037	0.349	0.333	0.000	0.000	-0.203	0.158	0.175	0.141
	(.)	(.)	(0.201)	(0.118)	(0.090)	(0.072)	(.)	(.)	(0.500)	(0.269)	(0.048)	(0.047)
Papers in J. of Econ. Literature	1.001	1.079	0.353	0.187	0.115	0.118	-1.943	-2.196	0.765	0.552	0.398	0.383
	(0.398)	(0.391)	(0.247)	(0.232)	(0.210)	(0.172)	(0.749)	(0.766)	(0.380)	(0.295)	(0.247)	(0.217)
Papers in Games and Econ. Behavior	0.000	0.000	0.174	0.163	0.198	0.135	0.000	0.000	0.246	0.292	-0.015	0.035
	(.)	(.)	(0.163)	(0.179)	(0.083)	(0.065)	(.)	(.)	(0.292)	(0.258)	(0.078)	(0.072)
Papers in Int. Econ. Review	0.176	0.150	-0.147	-0.080	-0.473	-0.306	0.099	0.177	0.122	0.136	-0.185	-0.206
	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.099)	(0.089)	(0.148)	(0.106)	(0.211)	(0.264)	(0.193)	(0.205)	(0.135)	(0.120)
Papers in Review of Econ. and Stat.	0.007	0.003	-0.474	-0.414	-0.188	-0.158	0.103	0.114	-0.165	-0.215	-0.093	-0.060
	(0.061)	(0.053)	(0.143)	(0.127)	(0.092)	(0.086)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.178)	(0.147)
Papers in Economica	0.064	0.033	0.107	-0.008	-0.368	-0.343	0.088	0.028	0.125	-0.043	0.085	0.017
	(0.094)	(0.089)	(0.117)	(0.122)	(0.272)	(0.241)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.133)	(0.127)	(0.184)	(0.165)
Papers in Economic J.	0.040	0.043	0.071	0.061	0.095	0.104	0.089	0.053	0.186	0.141	0.027	0.005
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.096)	(0.066)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.108)	(0.075)	(0.060)
Papers in J. of Development Econ.	0.247	-0.045	0.328	0.313	-0.071	-0.110	0.000	0.000	-0.167	-0.607	0.036	-0.024
	(0.654)	(0.571)	(0.170)	(0.183)	(0.111)	(0.126)	(.)	(.)	(0.449)	(0.409)	(0.158)	(0.156)
Papers in J. of European Econ. Assoc	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.074	0.117	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.048	0.109
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.083)	(0.068)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.123)	(0.116)
Papers in J. of Finance	-0.419	-0.321	0.110	0.072	0.149	0.113	-0.772	-0.974	-0.187	-0.234	-0.038	-0.080
	(0.294)	(0.224)	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.670)	(0.706)	(0.248)	(0.278)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Papers in J. of Health Econ.	0.000	0.000	0.316	0.298	-0.133	-0.149	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.008	-0.028
	(.)	(.)	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.121)	(0.118)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.104)	(0.096)
Papers in J. of Inter. Econ.	-0.126	0.059	0.177	0.152	0.050	0.056	0.000	0.000	-0.433	-0.510	0.164	0.132
	(0.379)	(0.298)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.071)	(0.064)	(.)	(.)	(0.381)	(0.422)	(0.094)	(0.080)
Papers in J. of Monetary Econ.	0.000	0.000	0.030	0.099	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.000	-0.109	-0.057	-0.169	-0.153
	(.)	(.)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(.)	(.)	(0.242)	(0.273)	(0.118)	(0.119)

NOTE: table continues

65

	AAAS						NAS					
	1933-79		1980-99		2000-19		1933-79		1980-99		2000-19	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Papers in *J. of Labor Econ.*	0.000	0.000	0.321	0.371	0.087	0.050	0.000	0.000	0.075	0.154	0.087	0.037
	(.)	(.)	(0.241)	(0.220)	(0.098)	(0.103)	(.)	(.)	(0.280)	(0.203)	(0.120)	(0.117)
Papers in *J. of Public Econ.*	0.223	0.535	0.024	0.076	-0.110	-0.079	0.000	0.000	-0.033	0.049	-0.132	-0.110
	(0.202)	(0.188)	(0.111)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.074)	(.)	(.)	(0.135)	(0.141)	(0.080)	(0.073)
Papers in *J. of Econ. History*	0.317	0.315	0.394	0.446	0.167	0.188	0.708	0.736	0.262	0.201	0.248	0.206
	(0.107)	(0.109)	(0.080)	(0.087)	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.181)	(0.208)	(0.196)	(0.284)	(0.063)	(0.065)
Papers in *J. of Am. Stat. Assoc.*	0.028	0.009	0.162	0.108	0.103	0.113	0.143	0.092	0.157	0.046	0.166	0.151
	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.046)	(0.061)	(0.097)	(0.131)	(0.101)	(0.121)	(0.056)	(0.096)	(0.039)	(0.049)
Papers in *Quantitative Economics.*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.314	-0.205	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.008	0.164
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.981)	(0.791)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.422)	(0.357)
Papers in *Theoretical Economics.*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.490	0.463	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.224	-0.186
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.219)	(0.185)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.376)	(0.391)
Levels of Top 5s												
4-5 Top 5s		0.610		-0.085		0.470		-0.664		-0.741		0.964
		(0.394)		(0.497)		(0.506)		(1.239)		(0.927)		(0.664)
6-7 Top 5s		1.268		-0.287		0.852		0.399		0.875		0.636
		(0.465)		(0.619)		(0.547)		(0.863)		(0.759)		(0.878)
8-9 Top 5s		0.803		0.219		1.001		-0.081		-0.619		1.450
		(0.643)		(0.684)		(0.654)		(0.899)		(1.087)		(0.862)
10-11 Top 5s		0.890		-0.130		1.304		0.370		0.038		1.709
		(0.783)		(0.806)		(0.732)		(1.031)		(1.031)		(0.933)
12-13 Top 5s		0.395		0.413		1.712		0.489		-0.805		1.698
		(0.931)		(0.902)		(0.851)		(1.319)		(1.144)		(0.926)
14-15 Top 5s		0.821		-0.025		1.290		1.494		0.174		0.880
		(1.176)		(1.096)		(0.962)		(1.333)		(1.418)		(1.104)
16 or More Top 5s		0.785		-0.490		0.842		1.337		-2.285		1.709
		(1.485)		(1.368)		(1.207)		(1.664)		(2.178)		(1.271)
Levels of Top 5 Citations (Omitted: < 50 Percentile)												
50-70 Percentile		0.675		1.086		3.018		14.651		1.666		1.713
		(0.440)		(0.592)		(1.264)		(1.717)		(1.053)		(0.786)
70-80 Percentile		1.161		1.269		3.212		0.000		1.921		0.886
		(0.521)		(0.648)		(1.319)		(.)		(1.088)		(1.074)
80-90 Percentile		1.522		-0.331		4.672		13.447		2.385		1.887
		(0.479)		(1.111)		(1.130)		(1.838)		(0.901)		(0.824)
90-95 Percentile		1.953		2.110		5.360		14.157		2.053		1.693
		(0.558)		(0.637)		(1.128)		(1.642)		(1.081)		(0.862)
95-97.5 Percentile		2.764		2.945		5.318		14.692		2.167		2.160
		(0.543)		(0.605)		(1.167)		(1.648)		(1.128)		(0.846)
97.5-99 Percentile		2.982		2.968		5.368		13.149		2.724		3.126
		(0.620)		(0.640)		(1.187)		(2.100)		(1.097)		(0.836)
99+ Percentile		3.572		3.880		5.888		14.820		4.203		3.422
		(0.671)		(0.651)		(1.217)		(2.166)		(1.059)		(0.885)
Years since first publication												
20-29		0.733		0.290		-0.235						
		(0.233)		(0.240)		(0.222)						
30+		-0.253		0.812		-0.733		0.449		1.427		1.051
		(0.458)		(0.348)		(0.302)		(0.761)		(0.452)		(0.336)
N	103,002	103,002	193,488	193,488	361,987	361,987	48,028	45,823	187,705	187,705	365,267	365,267
Pseudo R-squared	0.178	0.224	0.378	0.411	0.443	0.481	0.464	0.490	0.288	0.361	0.339	0.370

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. See notes to Table X. The table entries are coefficients from the models summarized in columns 4 and 6 of that Table. All models include year fixed effects. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.

	Logit Regression for Selection as Fellow in Year t:									
	American Economic Association						Sloan Fellow			
	1933-79		1980-99		2000-19		1980-99		2000-19	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Authors' genders (Omitted: Male Author)										
Female × (pre-1980)	1.065	1.763								
	(1.047)	(1.073)								
Female × (1980-89)			0.233	1.409			0.282	0.426		
			(1.096)	(1.113)			(0.537)	(0.560)		
Female × (1990-99)			0.677	1.378			0.634	0.741		
			(0.704)	(0.836)			(0.323)	(0.335)		
Female × (2000-09)					-0.116	1.641			0.398	0.447
					(1.060)	(1.004)			(0.335)	(0.335)
Female × (2010-19)					1.050	2.167			0.545	0.534
					(0.508)	(0.541)			(0.311)	(0.288)
Cum. publ. and citations in top-5 journals										
# Papers in *Econometrica*	0.174	-0.182	0.193	-0.018	0.010	-0.019	0.360	0.187	1.286	0.422
	(0.114)	(0.156)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.137)	(0.153)	(0.201)	(0.236)
Asinh citations in *Econometrica*	0.252	0.171	0.097	-0.011	0.297	0.127	0.346	0.155	0.176	0.087
	(0.181)	(0.185)	(0.128)	(0.096)	(0.077)	(0.063)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.092)
# Papers in *Rev. of Econ. Studies*	-0.449	-0.281	-0.178	-0.120	-0.409	-0.314	0.556	0.228	0.134	-0.141
	(0.360)	(0.282)	(0.168)	(0.146)	(0.136)	(0.101)	(0.278)	(0.249)	(0.473)	(0.323)
Asinh citations in *REStud*	0.165	0.090	0.234	0.108	0.251	0.119	-0.049	-0.109	0.209	-0.018
	(0.292)	(0.302)	(0.106)	(0.133)	(0.093)	(0.075)	(0.202)	(0.155)	(0.173)	(0.131)
# Papers in *Am. Econ. Review*	0.324	0.020	0.503	0.332	0.221	0.216	0.901	0.496	1.191	0.496
	(0.176)	(0.185)	(0.161)	(0.158)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.279)	(0.253)	(0.205)	(0.220)
Asinh citations in *AER*	-0.093	-0.249	-0.095	-0.314	0.139	-0.072	-0.267	-0.266	-0.038	-0.149
	(0.229)	(0.240)	(0.203)	(0.130)	(0.103)	(0.081)	(0.170)	(0.122)	(0.095)	(0.066)
# Papers in *Quarterly J. of Econ.*	-0.434	-0.479	-0.830	-0.389	-0.160	-0.091	0.646	0.342	1.175	0.578
	(0.214)	(0.153)	(0.301)	(0.221)	(0.106)	(0.089)	(0.265)	(0.201)	(0.299)	(0.233)
Asinh citations in *QJE*	0.520	0.317	0.598	0.203	0.239	0.081	0.185	0.099	0.087	-0.089
	(0.199)	(0.202)	(0.167)	(0.140)	(0.091)	(0.075)	(0.168)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.085)
# Papers in *J. of Political Economy*	-0.079	-0.206	0.179	0.134	0.221	0.151	0.514	0.243	1.173	0.406
	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.063)	(0.073)	(0.082)	(0.071)	(0.230)	(0.223)	(0.367)	(0.282)
Asinh citations in *JPE*	0.608	0.407	0.102	-0.223	0.061	-0.096	0.192	0.084	0.035	-0.036
	(0.175)	(0.203)	(0.153)	(0.124)	(0.104)	(0.078)	(0.137)	(0.107)	(0.147)	(0.104)
Cumulative publications in other Journals										
Papers in *AEA P&P*	0.644	0.447	0.460	0.205	0.145	0.131	0.242	0.400	0.446	0.438
	(0.132)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.317)	(0.190)	(0.160)	(0.114)
Papers in *Economic Theory*	0.000	0.000	0.742	0.712	0.080	0.045	0.381	0.360	-0.743	-0.710
	(.)	(.)	(0.285)	(0.285)	(0.154)	(0.144)	(0.235)	(0.275)	(0.498)	(0.415)
Papers in *Econometric Theory*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.447	-0.512	0.464	0.455	0.327	0.328
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.275)	(0.216)	(0.126)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.219)
Papers in *J. of Econometrics*	0.000	0.000	-1.187	-0.795	0.169	0.115	0.031	0.047	0.057	-0.036
	(.)	(.)	(0.431)	(0.427)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.164)	(0.149)	(0.159)	(0.146)
Papers in *J. of Econ. Theory*	0.410	0.342	-0.048	-0.084	0.137	0.092	0.245	0.163	0.130	0.015
	(0.300)	(0.335)	(0.176)	(0.131)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.125)	(0.104)	(0.154)	(0.135)
Papers in *J. of Math. Econ.*	0.000	0.000	0.160	0.290	0.033	0.026	0.058	-0.010	0.110	0.202
	(.)	(.)	(0.258)	(0.140)	(0.112)	(0.072)	(0.224)	(0.197)	(0.330)	(0.324)
Papers in *Rand J. of Econ.*	-0.847	-0.479	-0.361	-0.216	0.018	-0.001	0.140	0.167	-0.783	-0.527
	(0.539)	(0.488)	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.156)	(0.121)	(0.556)	(0.377)
Papers in *Int. J. of Game Theory*	0.000	0.000	0.154	0.176	0.292	0.230	0.427	0.371	-1.515	-1.281
	(.)	(.)	(0.286)	(0.138)	(0.091)	(0.100)	(0.145)	(0.142)	(0.715)	(0.773)
Papers in *AEJ: Applied Econ.*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.213	0.078	0.000	0.000	0.610	0.331
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.303)	(0.380)	(.)	(.)	(0.329)	(0.236)
Papers in *AEJ: Econ. Policy*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.615	-0.846	0.000	0.000	0.802	0.508
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.856)	(1.307)	(.)	(.)	(0.459)	(0.344)
Papers in *AEJ: Micro*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-1.870	-1.362	0.000	0.000	0.458	0.138
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.606)	(0.549)	(.)	(.)	(0.665)	(0.591)
Papers in *AEJ: Macro*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.422	-0.495	0.000	0.000	0.827	0.671
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.546)	(0.580)	(.)	(.)	(0.333)	(0.273)
Papers in *J. of Econ. Perspectives*	0.000	0.000	-0.041	0.246	0.233	0.202	0.604	0.503	0.397	0.110
	(.)	(.)	(0.365)	(0.166)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.432)	(0.344)	(0.286)	(0.270)
Papers in *J. of Econ. Literature*	0.332	0.121	-0.011	0.122	0.408	0.236	-0.807	-0.657	-0.005	0.209
	(0.759)	(0.642)	(0.256)	(0.263)	(0.233)	(0.180)	(1.396)	(1.153)	(1.174)	(0.703)
Papers in *Games and Econ. Behavior*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.380	-0.371	-0.694	-0.541	0.073	0.004
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.150)	(0.144)	(0.516)	(0.395)	(0.212)	(0.178)
Papers in *Int. Econ. Review*	-0.201	0.188	0.027	-0.106	-0.024	-0.066	-0.092	-0.117	-1.029	-0.611
	(0.273)	(0.243)	(0.272)	(0.244)	(0.120)	(0.106)	(0.249)	(0.207)	(0.687)	(0.390)
Papers in *Review of Econ. and Stat.*	0.043	0.032	0.017	0.001	-0.326	-0.214	-0.215	-0.174	-1.194	-0.431
	(0.080)	(0.083)	(0.135)	(0.096)	(0.123)	(0.081)	(0.248)	(0.191)	(0.444)	(0.280)
Papers in *Economica*	0.374	0.336	0.044	-0.092	0.401	0.230	-2.179	-1.518	0.000	0.000
	(0.146)	(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.134)	(0.142)	(0.127)	(1.073)	(0.723)	(.)	(.)
Papers in *Economic J.*	-0.154	-0.272	0.175	-0.009	-0.034	-0.024	-0.302	-0.229	-0.971	-0.571
	(0.222)	(0.237)	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.080)	(0.061)	(0.412)	(0.316)	(0.517)	(0.359)
Papers in *J. of Development Econ.*	0.000	0.000	0.038	-0.163	-0.080	-0.077	-1.032	-0.846	-0.554	-0.416
	(.)	(.)	(0.280)	(0.288)	(0.175)	(0.153)	(0.461)	(0.450)	(0.446)	(0.350)
Papers in *J. of European Econ. Assoc*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.613	-0.265	0.000	0.000	-0.451	-0.329
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.247)	(0.209)	(.)	(.)	(0.337)	(0.222)
Papers in *J. of Finance*	0.181	0.079	0.019	-0.130	-0.279	-0.332	0.059	0.148	-0.099	-0.010
	(0.192)	(0.242)	(0.123)	(0.168)	(0.186)	(0.179)	(0.208)	(0.157)	(0.248)	(0.173)
Papers in *J. of Health Econ.*	0.000	0.000	0.262	0.101	-0.056	-0.101	0.185	0.321	-1.462	-1.335
	(.)	(.)	(0.198)	(0.197)	(0.116)	(0.103)	(0.263)	(0.189)	(0.723)	(0.692)
Papers in *J. of Inter. Econ.*	-0.641	0.129	-0.243	-0.135	0.091	0.047	0.152	0.180	-0.119	-0.142
	(0.582)	(0.316)	(0.210)	(0.172)	(0.083)	(0.063)	(0.233)	(0.185)	(0.369)	(0.269)
Papers in *J. of Monetary Econ.*	0.000	0.000	-0.632	-0.154	-0.076	-0.028	0.069	0.072	0.219	0.086
	(.)	(.)	(0.457)	(0.225)	(0.079)	(0.058)	(0.179)	(0.130)	(0.213)	(0.181)
Papers in *J. of Labor Econ.*	0.000	0.000	-0.208	0.069	-0.115	-0.083	-0.400	-0.289	-0.708	-0.496
	(.)	(.)	(0.238)	(0.216)	(0.163)	(0.094)	(0.371)	(0.288)	(0.746)	(0.434)

NOTE: table continues

	Logit Regression for Selection as Fellow in Year t:									
	American Economic Association						Sloan Fellow			
	1933-79		1980-99		2000-19		1980-99		2000-19	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Papers in *J. of Public Econ.*	-0.141	0.153	-0.443	-0.183	-0.022	-0.043	0.308	0.273	-0.221	-0.053
	(0.281)	(0.238)	(0.174)	(0.134)	(0.068)	(0.058)	(0.166)	(0.142)	(0.335)	(0.209)
Papers in *J. of Econ. History*	0.330	0.321	0.156	0.085	0.313	0.259	0.678	0.620	0.723	0.738
	(0.182)	(0.204)	(0.114)	(0.120)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.119)	(0.134)	(0.273)	(0.320)
Papers in *J. of Am. Stat. Assoc.*	0.109	0.041	0.170	-0.024	0.114	0.030	0.292	0.318	-0.525	-0.583
	(0.128)	(0.123)	(0.068)	(0.113)	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.150)	(0.162)	(0.598)	(0.437)
Papers in *Quantitative Economics.*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.030	0.174	0.000	0.000	-0.188	-0.322
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.718)	(0.461)	(.)	(.)	(0.797)	(0.646)
Papers in *Theoretical Economics.*	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.131	-0.065	0.000	0.000	0.507	0.397
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(0.485)	(0.501)	(.)	(.)	(0.279)	(0.291)
Levels of Top 5s										
4-5 Top 5s		0.825		1.046		0.392				
		(0.998)		(0.550)		(0.653)				
6-7 Top 5s		0.321		1.044		0.176				
		(1.087)		(0.755)		(0.662)				
8-9 Top 5s		2.572		0.669		-0.082				
		(0.967)		(0.741)		(0.859)				
10-11 Top 5s		1.586		1.076		0.538				
		(1.178)		(0.967)		(0.761)				
12-13 Top 5s		2.590		1.162		0.619				
		(0.956)		(0.895)		(0.837)				
14-15 Top 5s		2.459		-0.081		0.193				
		(1.343)		(1.650)		(0.921)				
16 or More Top 5s		4.381		1.485		0.736				
		(1.490)		(1.408)		(1.033)				
2 Top 5s								2.203		4.289
								(0.405)		(0.523)
3 Top 5s								3.061		4.834
								(0.508)		(0.683)
4 Top 5s								3.233		5.471
								(0.628)		(0.849)
5+ Top 5s								2.975		5.038
								(0.910)		(1.131)
Levels of Top 5 Citations (Omitted: < 50 Percentile)										
50-70 Percentile		1.258		0.162		0.231				
		(1.043)		(1.230)		(1.264)				
70-80 Percentile		0.000		1.758		1.148				
		(.)		(0.767)		(1.078)				
80-90 Percentile		0.716		1.603		1.849				
		(1.441)		(0.835)		(1.008)				
90-95 Percentile		1.831		2.644		2.471				
		(1.217)		(0.901)		(0.987)				
95-97.5 Percentile		2.438		1.093		1.330				
		(1.384)		(1.167)		(1.072)				
97.5-99 Percentile		2.202		2.478		3.600				
		(1.390)		(1.164)		(0.918)				
99+ Percentile		2.847		4.601		3.693				
		(1.470)		(1.099)		(0.989)				
Years since first publication										
30+		2.375		3.365		0.000				
		(0.563)		(0.673)		(.)				
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	65,141	61,980	181,379	181,379	365,491	31,343	83,446	83,446	151,457	151,457
Pseudo R-squared	0.388	0.466	0.275	0.426	0.383	0.300	0.244	0.287	0.353	0.428

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients. See notes to Table X. The table entries are coefficients from the models summarized in columns 8 and 10 of that Table. All models include year fixed effects. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.

TABLE AXVI

MODELS FOR ELECTION TO OTHER FELLOWSHIPS, PARSIMONIOUS MODEL

	Logit Regression for Selection as Fellow in Year t:									
	Econ. Society		AAAS		NAS		AEA		Alfred P. Sloan	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Authors' Gender (Omitted: Male Author)										
Female × (pre-1980)	-1.457	-1.648	-1.376	-1.425	--	--	1.763	0.619	--	--
	(0.606)	(0.585)	(0.968)	(0.951)			(1.074)	(1.098)		
Female × (1980-89)	0.628	0.564	0.195	0.315	1.036	1.057	1.409	0.935	0.426	0.407
	(0.473)	(0.463)	(1.083)	(1.028)	(1.295)	(1.030)	(1.113)	(1.026)	(0.560)	(0.528)
Female × (1990-99)	0.028	0.101	1.115	0.861	0.801	0.851	1.378	1.483	0.741	0.710
	(0.483)	(0.467)	(0.672)	(0.640)	(0.704)	(0.967)	(0.836)	(0.714)	(0.335)	(0.335)
Female × (2000-09)	0.544	0.568	1.282	1.638	1.940	1.800	1.640	0.316	0.447	0.576
	(0.341)	(0.329)	(0.459)	(0.462)	(0.762)	(0.727)	(1.004)	(1.062)	(0.335)	(0.316)
Female × (2010-19)	0.932	0.956	2.043	2.371	1.774	1.478	2.167	1.070	0.534	0.465
	(0.239)	(0.204)	(0.347)	(0.286)	(0.549)	(0.524)	(0.541)	(0.510)	(0.288)	(0.284)
Restrict to ≤8 yrs. since 1st pub.	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Model with Full Set of Controls	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Parsimonious set of controls (Top 5 Publications and Top-5 Citations)	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
N	656,573	656,573	658,477	658,949	598,795	609,921	608,850	617,221	234,903	240,089
Pseudo R-squared	0.386	0.267	0.394	0.329	0.398	0.323	0.466	0.317	0.366	0.331

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients: see note to Table IV. The sample excludes economists with unknown gender. All models include controls for the number of publications in each of the top-5 journals, interacted with indicators for the periods (pre-1980), (1980-99) and (2000-19), and year fixed effects. The controls in the odd-numbered columns are as in Columns 2, 5, and 8 of Table IV, while the controls in even-numbered columns are similar to the ones in Columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table IV (except that the indicators for top-5s span a longer number of publications for NAS, AAAS, and AEAF, and that we drop some controls to avoid over-specifying these models). See Table AXIV and AXV for the exact list of controls. Sample periods vary by fellowship: see text. Models for Sloan Fellowships are restricted to up to 8 years from the first publication in the sample.

TABLE AXVII
PREDICTORS OF ELECTION TO AEA PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT

	Logit Regression for Selection in Year t as:		
	American Economic Association President or Vice President		
	1933-79	1980-99	2000-19
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Authors' genders (Omitted: Male Author)			
Female Economist*(pre-1980)	0.306		
	(0.651)		
Female Economist*(1980-89)		2.435	
		(0.582)	
Female Economist*(1990-99)		2.710	
		(0.590)	
Female Economist*(2000-09)			4.763
			(0.911)
Female Economist*(2010-19)			5.304
			(0.747)
Cum. publ. and citations in top-5 journals			
Papers in *Econometrica*	-0.050	-0.133	-0.112
	(0.131)	(0.235)	(0.121)
Asinh citations in *Econometrica*	-0.187	0.083	0.064
	(0.168)	(0.150)	(0.087)
Papers in *Review of Economic Studies*	-0.274	-0.073	-0.131
	(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.183)
Asinh citations in *REStud*	0.568	0.169	0.124
	(0.158)	(0.131)	(0.132)
Papers in *American Economic Review*	-0.251	0.219	0.042
	(0.141)	(0.161)	(0.121)
Asinh citations in *AER*	0.243	-0.098	0.517
	(0.201)	(0.136)	(0.337)
Papers in *Quarterly Journal of Eco.*	-0.244	-0.311	0.083
	(0.132)	(0.263)	(0.117)
Asinh citations in *QJE*	0.168	0.182	0.033
	(0.207)	(0.137)	(0.165)
Papers in *Journal of Political Economy*	-0.107	0.014	-0.009
	(0.087)	(0.159)	(0.134)
Asinh citations in *JPE*	0.118	0.089	0.155
	(0.143)	(0.145)	(0.125)
Controls for publications in general interest/field journals	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls for levels of Top 5 and Top 5 Citations	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	125,465	183,839	315,718
Pseudo R-squared	0.333	0.339	0.590

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by author, in parentheses. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients. Economists with unknown gender are excluded from the sample.