Forced Migration, Female Labor Force Participation, and Intra-household Bargaining: Does Conflict Empower Women?[ζ]

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Abstract

Civilian displacement is a common phenomenon in developing countries facing internal conflict. While displacement directly affects forced migrants, it also contributes to deteriorating labor conditions of vulnerable groups of receiving communities. For the displaced population the income losses are substantial, and as they migrate to cities they will most likely join the informal labor force. Qualitative evidence reveals displaced women are better suited to compete in urban labor markets as their labor experience is more relevant for some urban low skilled occupations. Our study uses this exogenous change in female labor force participation to test how this affects female bargaining power within the household. Our results show female displaced women work longer hours, earn similar wages and contribute in larger proportions to household earnings in contrast to rural women that stayed in rural areas. However, larger contributions to households' earnings are not strengthening bargaining power, measured with several indicators, but severe forms of domestic violence is increasing among displaced women. The anger and frustration of displaced women increases violent punishment of children. Because children of displaced families have been direct victims of conflict and domestic violence, the intra-generational transmission of violence is highly likely.

Key words: Forced migration, female labor participation, intra-household bargaining, domestic violence

JEL Classification: D13, D74, J12, J61

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1. Introduction

Internal conflicts abruptly modify the context in which economic agents operate, generating benefits and costs to different groups of the civil population. Besides the economic impact of massive deaths in combats, warfare changes household composition, reduces investment in human capital, depletes productive assets, deteriorates child health, and creates poverty traps (André and Platteau 1998; Justino and Verwimp 2006; Shemyakina 2006; Camacho 2008; Blattman and Miguel 2009). On the other hand, internal conflicts may also generate positive outcomes. Empirical evidence shows some particular groups of the population connected with armed groups may improve their economic conditions after the conflict ends, strong institutions may emerge, and collective action may be strengthened, among others (Tilly 1992; Verwimp 2005; Bellows and Edward 2009).

Despite recent empirical evidence on the consequences of internal conflict, research on other potential channels through which warfare affects households and the heterogeneous impact for different groups of the population, in particular women, is scarce. Conflict affects women in different dimensions. Women face sexual assault, are obliged frequently to participate in labor markets due the death of the main breadwinner or to sudden drops in income, and are forced to become combatants (USAID 2007). In addition, changes brought by conflict may spur more subtle variations in women's behavior. For example, Shemyakina (2009) find that Tajik women marry and have children younger due to the male shortage produced by war deaths. Some sociological studies find that conflict may increase the bargaining power of women within the household. When forcefully displaced, women actively participate in labor markets, becoming in many cases the main breadwinners and presumably strengthening their bargaining power (Meertens and Stoller 2001).

Understanding the consequences of conflict for women and identifying the channels that transmit them are crucial to design purposive policies to mitigate the costs and increase the unexpected benefits. Moreover, as impact on women transmits easily to children, reducing these costs contributes to eliminate long-term effects of warfare such as malnutrition, lower investment in human capital or the inter-generational transmission of violence.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of forced displacement on female labor participation, and the subsequent impact on bargaining power and domestic violence. The rationale of the paper is the following. Forced displacement causes a sharp drop in labor income and large asset losses. In order to compensate for income losses, women's participation in labor markets increases significantly. Since forced migration occurs frequently from rural to urban areas, the labor experience of women is more akin to urban occupations, while male's experience is mostly in agricultural activities hardly valued in urban labor markets. As a result, the contribution of women on household earnings enlarges, which may potentially increase their bargaining power within the household. Thus, the increasing female labor participation may cause an unexpected benefit of armed conflict: stronger bargaining power, improvements in women's welfare, and larger investments in children, particularly girls.

Our analysis uses data for Colombia, a country that has faced a long-standing conflict during 50 years and has the second largest magnitude of forced displacement in the world after Sudan. Today Colombia has 3.6 million persons forcefully displaced, figure that is equivalent to 7.8 percent of the Colombian population. Results show labor income of women increases, but women's welfare is constant at best or decreases. Despite contributing more to household earnings than the control group, the bargaining power of displaced women within the household is not statistically different from the control group, but domestic violence is larger for displaced women, who in turn recur to violent punishment against their children.

The results of the paper seem to suggest that, although women are more actively involved in labor markets, their condition within the household does not improve. Since increments in earnings are driven by longer working hours and not wages, bargaining power remains intact after displacement. On the other hand, the deterioration of male labor conditions may spur frustration on the spouse, which in addition to the presumable challenge of patriarchal structures and the violence they endure before displacement, may increase the need of men to control women and the propensity to inflict domestic violence. Larger contributions to households' earning are accompanied by a rise in domestic violence against women and children; thus, the unexpected benefits of conflict are not straightforward.

The structure of the paper is as following. Next section briefly discusses the economic impacts of conflict, and examines the link between female labor participation, intra-household bargaining and domestic violence. The empirical strategy, data and econometric results are presented in the third section. Section four concludes and discusses policy recommendations.

2. Civil conflict: impact on female labor participation and household bargaining

Internal conflicts affect disproportionately the civil population. Combatants purposively attack the civil population as an effective strategy to weaken civil support to the opponent, expand territorial strongholds, and increase the war loot (Azam and Hoeffler 2002). The victimization of the civil population forces many to flee in order to prevent aggressions or after being attacked. Pervasive internal conflicts and the rising attacks against the civil population produced in 2009 the largest number of forcefully displaced since it has been recorded: 27.1 million persons worldwide[1].

During the middle of the 1990's, illicit drug trade intensified the Colombian conflict and aggressions against the civil population heightened. Death threats, massacres, sexual assaults, selective homicides, conscription, and temporary town takeovers forced the population to flee seeking a safe haven. Today 3.6 million Colombians, equivalent to 7.8 percent of the Colombian, were forced to migrate. Forced displacement is not confined to isolated regions of Colombia: more than 90 percent of the Colombian municipalities[2] have expelled or received displaced population[3].

Evidence for Colombia shows forced displacement causes large economic costs on its victims. First, losses of productive assets due to destruction and illegal seizure weaken the main income sources of displaced households. Second, returns to human capital drop. Most displacement occurs from rural areas to urban areas. Because the labor experience of displaced persons was mostly in agricultural activities, finding a job in destinations sites is difficult and labor income drops significantly. Third, access to financial capital and to risk coverage is limited, which increase vulnerability of

[1] www.internal-displacement.org, retrieved 19th of May 2010.
[2] Municipalities are the smallest administrative unit in Colombia. The country is divided in 1,100 municipalities.
[3] www.accionsocial.gov.co, retrieved 26th of May 2010.

displaced households to future shocks. The occurrence of all these losses may push displaced households to poverty traps difficult to overcome (Ibáñez and Moya 2010).

Participation in urban labor markets is often difficult for the displaced population. Low educational levels and a labor experience predominantly in agricultural activities becomes an obstacle to finding a job in the new urban setting. However, access to labor markets is heterogeneous for male and female. While women's skills are more akin to the demand of urban labor markets, the agricultural experience of male is hardly valued. The need to compensate for large income losses and the higher probability of finding a job push women to work.

Some studies argue that migration, by improving women's labor conditions and increasing their contribution to household earnings, may strengthen their bargaining power within the household (Chen, Conconi et al. 2007). This impact may increase further when women migrate from rural to urban societies with less gender-based discrimination. In the case of forcefully displaced women in Colombia, the larger demand for skills of female forced migrants, in contrast to men, may amplify this effect (Meertens and Stoller 2001).

Distribution of power within the household is determined by the threat point, which is represented as the utility of opting out from marriage or of a non-cooperative marriage. Economic conditions, the institutional environment and the cultural context shape the threat point of each spouse. Improvements in economic conditions of women or an exogenous change in the institutional or cultural environment that favor women alter the distribution of power within the household.

Empirical evidence shows that rising female contributions to earnings not always translate into increased bargaining power. Increments in actual or potential wages for women improve their economic options after divorce or even if the marriage remains intact, leading to a redistribution of power within the household. Conversely, when women's earning rise as an increased allocation to working hours and not because wages are higher, bargaining power remains constant (Chiappori, Fortin et al. 2002; Pollack 2005; Anderson and Eswaran 2009; Aizer 2010). Establishing the causality between wages and bargaining power is difficult. Spouses may overinvest in education before marriage in order to gain bargaining advantage during marriage or may increase

labor participation anticipating a divorce (Pollack 2005; Stevenson 2008; Anderson and Eswaran 2009).

Several studies rely on exogenous shift in economic conditions or in institutional environments to identify a causal link between changes in bargaining power and women's welfare. Findings show that shifting power to spouses in the household allows women to appropriate a larger share of the gains from marriage interaction, and increases leisure time and investment in children (Gray 1998; Chiappori, Fortin et al. 2002; Duflo 2003; Rangel 2006)

Domestic violence also has implications on power relations within the family. On the one hand, domestic violence serves to exercise control over the spouse or influence their behavior (Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; Bloch and Rao 2002; Bowlus and Seitz 2006). Stress, in particular economic stress, poor self-esteem, traditional ideas about gender roles, and witnessing abuse as a child are other factors correlated with domestic violence (Gelles 1976; Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; Bowlus and Seitz 2006). On the other, change in economic conditions favoring women contributes to reduce domestic violence (Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; Aizer 2010).

Nevertheless, the link between female labor participation and domestic violence is highly dependent on previous decisions before marriage, and male's labor conditions. A deterioration of labor conditions for male sometimes causes an escalation of domestic violence, which serves as an instrument to release frustration and vent stress (Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; Macmillan and Gartner 1999; Bloch and Rao 2002). When male unemployment is accompanied by an improvement in female's labor conditions, the risk of violence may increase further. Husbands are more likely to resort to violence and coercion when loosing the traditional role as the sole bread winner and having a disadvantage in power with respect to their spouse (Macmillan and Gartner 1999). In the case of forcefully displaced women in Colombia, the need to vent stress, due to the frustration caused by unemployment and the violence endured before migration, as well as the challenge to traditional gender roles seem to induce the escalation of domestic violence (Meertens and Segura-Escobar 1996).

3. Empirical Framework

The purpose of the paper is to examine the impact of forced displacement on female labor participation, bargaining power and domestic violence. We assume a non-unitary model in which decisions within the household are based on the utility function of each spouse. The bargaining power of each spouse determines the distribution of goods within the household, represented by consumption and leisure time. Women's consumption includes investment in children.

The threat point - the utility a spouse can reach after divorce or in a non cooperative marriage - determines bargaining power and the ability of each spouse to appropriate a larger share of goods. As spouses are better able to earn higher wages and reach higher consumption levels on their own, the threat point, and thus the bargaining power, are stronger. Any change in economic conditions which increases the returns of women in labor market will also improve their bargaining power within the household, implying higher consumptions, leisure time and investment in children. Spouses anticipate the bargaining process that will take place within the marriage and invest in education in order to tilt the distribution of power to their advantage. Similarly to other papers, we assume domestic violence produces utility to male (Tauchen, Witte et al. 1991; Bowlus and Seitz 2006; Aizer 2010). Violence becomes a source of gratification, to release frustration or vent stress, and an instrument to control the victim.

The empirical framework described above has several implications. First, increments in females' wages, by improving the threat point, contribute to increase their bargaining power. Second, higher bargaining power of women implies a larger appropriation of goods within the household, represented by higher consumption and investment in children as well as more leisure time. Third, given that women anticipate the bargaining process within the marriage and may decide to increase investments in education, employment and bargaining power, as well as employment and domestic violence, have a reverse causality. Fourth, an increasing contribution of the wife on household earnings does not necessarily cause a higher bargaining power. If the increasing contribution comes through more hours dedicated to work and less to leisure time, bargaining power remains constant, at best, or decreases. Lastly, when females' economic contribution to the household is rising while male's contribution decreases, the need to exercise control upon the spouse and to vent stress causes an increment in violence.

The empirical framework described above is used to examine the impact of forced displacement in labor conditions and bargaining power. Conflict forces households to migrate to urban areas after being victimized or to prevent future aggressions. Thus, migration is not a voluntary decision to improve economic conditions of household members. Displaced women participate actively in labor markets whereas before migration their work was confined to domestic activities (Meertens and Stoller 2001). Although female contribution to household earnings is much larger after displacement, working hours, and not wages, seem to be driving this increment. In addition, the reallocation of the gender division of labor within the household in which women may become the main breadwinners and men face long unemployment spells increases tensions between the household and domestic violence may escalate (Meertens and Segura-Escobar 1996). Forced displacement may be creating a vicious cycle in which women spend longer hours working and less in leisure time while domestic violence escalates. Thus, "women empowerment" brought by conflict may hardly be a reality.

Two important features of forced displacement facilitate the empirical analysis. First, education decisions of displaced women were based on a context completely different than the present one: a rural context where traditional gender roles predominated and returns to education were extremely low. This implies that past education decisions are exogenous to present labor market participation. Second, forced displacement is an exogenous shock: families migrate to save their lives and not to improve economic conditions. However, this exogenous shock implies a change in the institutional environment that modifies labor decisions within the household and presumably the bargaining position. This exogenous change facilitates establishing causality between forced displacement, on the one hand, and labor decisions, bargaining power, and domestic violence, on the other.

3.1. The Data

Two different sources of data are used in this paper. The first is the Demographic and Health Survey for 2000 and 2005 (DHS-2000/5). This survey is representative of the Colombian female population ranging from 12 to 50 years of age, and covers 232 municipalities in 33 departments. The survey collects information on fertility behavior, child conditions, decision-making within the household, and domestic violence, among others. The DHS surveys for 2000 and 2005 oversample displaced households to have a

representative sample of forcefully displaced women. Although the questionnaire collects information on the causes and the process of migration, the 2005 surveys does not ask about the municipality of origin. Since the purpose is to examine changes in bargaining power due to displacement, we restrict the sample to married or cohabiting couples that were formed before forced migration.

The second is the National Household Survey 2001-2005 (ECH 2001-2005 for its acronym in Spanish), which is a repeated cross-section of household survey data collected quarterly by the National Statistics Department (DANE) in the 13 largest metropolitan areas. The surveys included in the paper cover the period from January 2001 to September 2005. This particular period was chosen because the conflict intensified and displacement soared during this time frame. The questionnaire for the first quarter includes migration questions that identify displaced persons as those that migrated due to violence and conflict. The module elicits detailed information on the migration process: year of migration, municipality of origin and cause of migration. The National Household Survey also collects information on household characteristics, education variables, and labor force information. In order to have a similar sample than the DHS-2000/5, we use the population ranging from 12 to 50 years of age.

We use non-displaced households from the Colombian rural areas as the control group for the displaced population. Forcefully displaced persons migrated mainly from the Colombian rural areas. Thus, we expect household and individual characteristics (e.g. household structure, education and labor conditions before displacement) and unobservable variables (e.g. gender discrimination and the cultural norms) to be similar for displaced households and the control group. However, violence is not random. Armed groups attack municipalities with particular characteristics that contribute to achieve their war strategies. In order to eliminate possible selection biases, we construct two samples: (i) sample of rural households; and (ii) sample of rural households from municipalities with out-migration of forcefully displaced. Since results are robust to both samples, we use the sample of rural households, but we also show the results for the second sample as a robustness check.

3.2. Estimation strategy

The purpose of the estimation strategy is to examine the impact of forced displacement on labor conditions, bargaining power and domestic violence. We examine changes in

labor conditions for members living in households with married or cohabiting partners (henceforth married) using the ECH 2001-2005. We expect forcefully displaced married women to work for longer hours and earn higher or similar wages than their rural counterpart. On the other hand, we expect forcefully displaced married male to work similar hours than their counterparts and have similar or lower wages. In order to identify the effect of being a displaced person on labor conditions, we use the following reduced form of labor outcomes:

$$y_{ict} = \beta_0 + \beta_t + \beta_c + \beta_{io} + X_{ict}\delta + \alpha D_{ict} + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

where y_{ct} denote hourly wages or number of working hours per week for individual *i* in state c at time *t*, and X_{ct} are individual characteristics that influence labor outcomes such a potential experience, years of education completed, and number of households members. To control for potential demand shocks, conflict dynamics and unobservables, we include year dummies (β_t), state fixed effects (β_c) and labor occupation dummies (β_{io}). The variable D_{ict} is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual was forcefully displaced and α is the parameter of interest. We estimate bootstrapped standard errors as the fixed effects do not allow us to calculate clustered standard errors.

Hourly wages are for the working age population (12-50 years of age) that has a complete report on all earnings and only include the main occupation. Weekly working hours are also for the working age population and include the main and secondary occupation. We estimate the regression for the whole sample, married or cohabiting men, and married and cohabiting women. The regressions are estimated using the Heckman selection model. As exclusions variables for the selection probability we use the number of children under five years of age in the household. By comparing the whole sample to the married or cohabiting sample, we can identify whether the results are for all the displaced population or are limited to married or cohabiting couples.

We use two sources of data to gauge the impact of forced displacement on bargaining power. The first source of data is the ECH 2001-2005. A measure of bargaining strength is constructed based on wages. Let w_f denote female wages and w_m male wages. Bargaining strength is measured as $w_f/(w_f + w_m)$, such that, as women wages increases, the contribution to households' earnings will rise if working hours are

constant. The estimation strategy for bargaining strength measured with wages is identical than for labor outcomes.

As argued before, forced displacement is exogenous to labor conditions because migration is not voluntary, but prompted by armed groups. Nevertheless, as armed groups deliberately attack certain groups of the population, such as wealthy individuals or community leaders, we control for education of the household head and the spouse and household size, which are proxies for economic status before displacement.

In addition, we estimate OLS and IV regressions to test whether displacement is indeed exogenous. Although the decision to migrate is not voluntary, the decision to locate in a particular city may depend on labor conditions. To instrument for displacement, we use the number of massacre victims in which displacement occurs and the distance from the origin to the destination municipality, for displaced persons. For non-displaced households, we include the number of massacre victims for the year in which the survey is applied. Massacres, a deliberate aggression against the civil population in rural areas of Colombia, are strongly correlated with displacement outflows, but do not determine labor market outcomes. Distance between origin and destination represents migration costs and captures the decision of households to migrate to a particular city. Dube and Vargas (2010) find exogenous downfalls in the prices of agricultural products intensify violence in rural areas by reducing agricultural wages and pushing some rural workers to join armed groups. If changes in rural wages are transmitted to urban wages, our instrument will not be exogenous. Calderón and Ibáñez (2009) show that variations in agricultural prices do not influence urban wages. Thus, massacres are not correlated to urban labor conditions in destination sites.

Based on this instrument, we test whether displacement is endogenous and results are presented in Table 1. The *F*-test for excluded instruments shows the instruments are strongly predicting the probability of displacement. Since the first stage is overidentified, we can test whether the exclusion restriction holds. For all regressions, except for working hours for displaced men, the Hansen test is not statistically significant. The Hausman test shows forced displacement is not endogenous to labor outcomes in any of the regressions. However, the exclusion restriction for working hours of men does not hold and we perform additional robustness checks. We estimate separate Hansen Tests for working hours of displaced men and find that the exclusion

restriction does not hold for distance between origin and destination. Thus, as an alternative instrument we use the shared of forced migrants with respect to the total population lagged two years. In this case, the exclusion restriction holds and we find again that forced displacement is exogenous. Given that the instruments are relevant and the exclusion restriction holds, we feel confident about failing to accept the endogeneity of displacement. Thus, we estimate all the regressions for labor outcomes without instrumenting for it.

[Table 1 goes about here]

The second source of data to measure bargaining power is the DHS 2000/5 data that collects information on several variables that proxy bargaining strength within the household as well as on domestic violence. To estimate the impact of displacement on bargaining power and domestic violence, we use the following reduced form

$$y_{ict} = \beta_0 + \beta_t + \beta_c + X_{ict}\delta + \alpha D_{ict} + \varepsilon_{ict}$$

where y_{ct} represents bargaining power or domestic violence. As measures of bargaining power, we use whether the wife pays more than half expenditure; and whether the wife has a final say in health issues, large purchases, daily needs and food expenditures. Final say for the wife is defined when she alone makes the final decision. However, results were robust for different definitions. We also define two more strict measures for bargaining strength: (i) whether the wife has the final say on all issues, and (ii) a principal component index constructed with the four individual measures for final say.

Domestic violence was defined as whether the wife had experience any mild or severe violence from her partner. Because domestic violence against women may spur violence from the mother against their children, we also estimate the impact of forced displacement on violent punishment from the father and the mother against the children. As additional controls (X_{ct}), we include the age of the wife and partner, years of educations of the wife and partner, a wealth index estimated using principal components, number of household members, a dummy variable indicating whether there are children under five years of age in the household, and a group of dummy variables for length of marriage. We include as an additional control for domestic violence a dummy variable equal to one when the father mistreated the mother of the displaced women. This variable captures the propensity to violence as individuals who

were more exposed to violence as a child are more likely to inflict violence on their partners (Gelles 1976; Bowlus and Seitz 2006). We control for labor conditions of the partner, using a dummy variable equal to one when the partner is employed in an unskilled occupation. Domestic violence may arise from frustration with labor conditions and not necessarily due to shifts in intra-household bargaining. Since forced displacement changes both sources of domestic violence, the coefficient estimate may be capturing also male frustration from the deterioration of labor conditions. We also control for other sources that may strengthen women's bargaining power and were also caused by forced displacement; namely, whether the brother and sister of the spouse migrated with the family.

The dummy variable D_{ict} is equal to one if the individual was forcefully displaced and α is the parameter of interest. Displacement in this case is exogenous: households flee to save their lives and not to improve the bargaining power of women within the household. Moreover, the decision to choose a particular city is not driven by the desire to change the distribution of power within the household. Despite this, we test whether displacement is endogenous. Since the DHS2000/5 does not collect information on the municipality of origin, we need to use two different instruments: the share of displaced population with respect to the total population in the destination municipality and the number of victims of massacres for the year in which the survey is applied. Unfortunately, we can only identify the municipality of origin for households that migrated within the same municipality. For these households, we use the figure of massacres of the municipality of origin. We can also identify the state of origin for households that migrated within the same department. For these cases, we use the figure of massacres at the department level. For the remaining households, we use the national figure. The share of forced migration with a two year lag, a common instrument used in the migration literature, explains the decision to select a particular destination municipality. Migrants may select destination sites in which a larger diaspora of their region is present (Altonji and Card 1989; Card 1990; Lalonde and Topel 1991). All regressions are estimated using clusters at the municipality level.

We report the results of the first stage for the probability of being displaced in Table 2. The instruments are strongly predicting the probability of displacement, as shown by the F-test. The Hansen test for the exclusion restriction is not statistically significant for all the regressions. Forced displacement is not endogenous to bargaining power or

domestic violence in any of the regressions; thus, we do not instrument forced displacement for the regressions using the DHS2000/5 data.

[Table 2 goes about here]

We eliminate economic migrants from the sample. Economic migrants move to other cities to seek better opportunities and empirical evidence shows the bargaining power of migrants women improve. If we include migrants in the sample, the coefficients for displacement might be overestimated. However, we estimate as a robustness check the same regression for migrants. The purpose of comparing forcefully displaced with economic migrants is to establish whether the impacts are caused by the change in context brought about by any type of migration, or whether forced displacement produces particular transformations in behavior within the household.

3.4. Results

Descriptive statistics comparing the displaced population and the control group are presented in Table 3. Besides reporting the mean and the standard deviation for the treatment and control groups, we calculate the normalized difference between both groups to gauge the overlap between the treatment and control groups. Overall, displaced households and rural households are similar. The statistical difference between the groups is not significant and the normalized difference is small. However, displaced households are more educated than their rural counterparts, signaling presumably that better-off households are more likely to be attacked by armed groups.

[Table 3 goes about here]

Forced displacement seems to change female labor conditions significantly, as shown in Table 4. Although employment levels are similar, displaced women work eight hours more per week than their rural counterpart and their wage rates are 1.8 times higher. Conversely, displaced men are faring worse than rural male workers. Employment rates drop five percentage points, but those employed work more hours per week and earn higher wages. A first approximation of bargaining strength, measured as the ratio between the female's wage rates divided by the sum of the female and the male wage rates, shows contribution to household earnings by women through improvement in wages increases by 14 percent after displacement.

[Table 4 goes about here]

More detailed information on bargaining strength and domestic violence is collected in the DHS2000/5. First, we gauge whether displaced female contribute more to household earnings. The survey asks female respondents whether their contribution to household expenditure is none, almost none, less than half, about half, more than half, and all. We construct a dummy variable equal to one when women's contribution is more than half of expenditure. Indeed, displaced women appear to contribute more to household expenditures than non-displaced women: 26.6 percent of displaced women contribute more than half expenditure, whereas this figure is 15.4 percent for non-displaced women (see Table 5). Next we include information on whether the spouse has a final say on a wide arrange of dimensions: health issues, large purchases, daily needs, and expenses on food to eat. Displaced women report a stronger influence for all dimensions, but for say on food expenses, yet the difference is only significant for food expenses. When using a more strict measure of influence on household decisions, 10.5 percent of displaced women reports having a final say in all dimensions in contrast to 8.1 percent of rural women. Again, the difference is not statistically significant. Thus, the contribution of displaced women to household expenses increases substantially, yet this does not seem to be improving women's power within the household.

Moreover, domestic violence is more prevalent among displaced households. In contrast to rural women, displaced women report more frequently being the victim of emotional violence (31.0% vs. 26.0%), mild violence (35.3% vs. 32.8%) and severe violence (13.5% vs. 7.5%). Differences are statistically significant for emotional and severe violence. Propensity for domestic violence does not seem to be driving higher frequency of domestic violence within displaced households. While 31 percent of rural households report the husband was mistreated by its parents, this figure is 27.1 percent for displaced households. Domestic violence against women appears to be inducing harsh punishment against children by their mothers, as displaced children are six percentage points more likely to be punished violently.

[Table 5 goes about here]

Figures in Table 6 confirm the differences shown in Table 3. Displaced persons and the control group are similar: ages of the household head and the spouse, household size and the number of children under five years of age are similar. As with the ECH2001-

2005 data, displaced persons are better-off, and have higher levels of education, which presumably signals targeting against better-off families.

[Table 6 goes about here]

Table 7 presents the estimation results for the selection probability of the Heckman model. Results for the selection probability show that while women's labor conditions are improving, men's conditions are deteriorating. After controlling for other variables, displaced men are less likely to be employed. When the sample is restricted to married and cohabiting couples, the disadvantage widens. On the other hand, female employment increases after displacement, yet the effect is not significant for married women.

[Table 7 goes about here]

Impact of displacement on wage rates differs by marital status. Table 8 shows the coefficient estimate for displaced men and women is statistically significant and positive, implying larger wage rates after displacement. Nonetheless, the statistical significance of the coefficient estimate disappears after restricting the sample to married men and women. Thus, the probability of employment and wages are similar for married displaced and non-displaced persons.

[Table 8 goes about here]

Table 9 reports the estimation results for the number of hours worked per week by gender. Before restricting the sample to married couples, the number of hours worked per week is higher for both groups of the displaced population. However, when we estimate the regression only for married couples, the coefficient estimate for displaced men is no longer statistically significant, while for displaced women the coefficient estimate is positive and significant. The sharp decline in income caused by forced migration, and the difficulties of finding a job once in destination cities for their partners, may push displaced women to expand working hours, yet wages are similar. Before displacement, the contribution of displaced women to household earnings was low as they were dedicated to household chores. After displacement, income earned by women increases due to an expansion in working hours while wages remain constant.

[Table 9 goes about here]

The contributions to household earnings are likely to increase as women work more hours than rural female workers. However, increasing contributions does not necessarily strengthen bargaining power. If increments are mainly driven by longer working hours and not higher wages, bargaining power may remain intact. We use a ratio of female wages compared to total household wages as a first approximation to bargaining strength. Results are reported in Table 10. The coefficient estimate for displaced women is positive and statistically significant. Once we include fixed effects and year dummies, the statistical significance disappears. Despite substantial changes in female labor conditions brought by forced displacement, bargaining power apparently is not changing.

[Table 10 goes about here]

As a robustness check, we estimate the same regression for economic migrants original from rural areas and living in urban areas. Findings in Table 11 show wages increase for economic migrants, men and women, working hours are higher for men and the crude measure for bargaining strength is significantly higher. Thus, forced displacement and economic migrations have a different impact on labor outcomes of migrants. A word of caution is in order with this result. As migration is indeed endogenous to labor conditions, the coefficients reported might be biased.

[Table 11 goes about here]

Estimations results based on the ECH2001-2005 indicate a significant change in labor conditions of displaced women. In contrast to rural women, displaced women participate more in labor markets, earn higher wages, and work a higher number of hours per week: 5.3 more hours per week, which is equivalent to an increase of 15 percent with respect to the control group. Parallel to this improvements, displaced men are faring worse by facing a lower probability of employment, similar wages and no additional working hours. Employment for married men falls by 8.8 percent due to displacement. Despite these changes in labor conditions for displaced women, a first approximation to measuring bargaining strength shows no significant difference between rural and forcefully displaced women.

The contribution of wives to household's expenditures is examined again in Table 12 using the measure constructed with the DHS2001/5 survey. Displaced wives are more

likely to contribute more than half to household's expenditures. The results are robust to the different specifications. Column (1) shows the coefficient estimates for the regressions with no controls. A displaced woman is 10.9 percent more likely to contribute more than half to household expenditures. Once all controls are included, the coefficient decreases to 7.7 percent (Column (5)). Column (6) controls for labor conditions of husbands and the presence of a network of support for displaced women. The first variable seeks to capture poor labor conditions of the male partner, while the second controls for the protective role of social networks that may strengthen bargaining power. After including both controls, the coefficient decreases to 6.0 percent. Thus, being displaced women increases contribution to household earnings by 38 percent with respect to the control group.

[Table 12 goes about here]

The larger contribution to household expenditures of displaced women is not translating into a stronger bargaining power within the household. Table 13 shows the results for whether women have the final say on a group of decisions within the household: health issues, large purchases, expenditures on daily needs, and food purchases. In addition, we report results for stringent measures of bargaining power: whether women have a final say in all issues and a principal components index built with the four questions. Because coefficient estimates are robust to the different specifications, we only report results for the estimations with all controls. The coefficient estimates for the displacement dummy is not statistically significant for four of the six measures of bargaining power. In fact, women are less likely to have a final say on food expenditures and health issues. Thus, displaced women are earning a large proportion of household income, but their distribution of power within the household remains intact.

[Table 13 goes about here]

In addition, displaced women are more at risk to domestic violence. Tables 14 and 15 report the estimation results for whether women experienced any form of mild violence and severe violence from their partner, respectively. Coefficient estimates for traditional controls are similar to other studies. Domestic violence is more likely in households where husbands and spouses are less educated, younger and were raised in violent households. Forced displacement is not influencing the incidence of mild domestic

violence. Although the coefficient is positive, it is not statistically significant. On the other hand, displaced women are more likely to be the victims of severe domestic violence. When no controls are included, the coefficient estimate is 0.06. Once controls are included, the coefficient increases in magnitude a displaced woman is 6.5 percent more likely to experience severe violence from their partner that is a 87.3 percent increase in domestic violence with respect to the control group. The result holds after controlling for the partner's occupation. Interestingly, migration of brothers and sisters, a proxy of the women's social network, acts as a protection mechanism and reduces domestic violence significantly. In fact, the presence of family members seems to outweigh the effect of forced displacement.

[Table 14 goes about here]

[Table 15 goes about here]

As discussed in previous sections, two causes might be producing a sudden emergence of domestic violence in forcefully displaced families. First, the violence endured before migrating may cause post-traumatic syndrome, which may escalate aggressive behavior against other household members. Second, the frustration caused by male's unemployment, the improved labor condition of women, and the challenges to traditional gender roles may spur domestic violence in order to vent stress and increase control. Ideally, in order to disentangle both channels, we should include a variable capturing the victimization process households faced before displacement. This variable would capture the effect of the trauma from enduring violence on the incidence of domestic violence. An alternative is to introduce an additional interaction term between the displacement dummy and whether the man in the household is employed in a unskilled occupation. The interaction term may capture the frustration of man for poor labor conditions. Results are reported in Table 16. The trauma from violence, and not the need to vent stress, seems to be escalating domestic violence after forced displacement.

[Table 16 goes about here]

The higher incidence of domestic violence among forcefully displaced could be present before displacement and persisted after migration. However, we do not have information about the incidence of domestic violence among displaced families before

forced migration. To explore this, we estimate whether the probability of domestic violence in the parent's family of the partner is systematically higher for forcefully displaced. If the effect is positive and significant, our results might be driven by a persistence of domestic violence and not necessarily emerged as a result of forced displacement. Results in Table 17 show this is not the case. The coefficient for forced displacement is negative and not significant.

[Table 17 goes about here]

The escalation of domestic violence against women seems to be inducing mothers to violently punish their children. Table 18 reports the results for whether children were violently punished by their father and mother. While forcefully displaced fathers are not more likely to violently punish their children, mothers are 7.0 percent more likely to use violent punishments. This is equivalent to an increase in violent punishment of 10.3 percent with respect to the control group. Increased violent punishment of children might be the result of forced displacement, and the traumatic events the family faced as a consequence, or mounting frustration of mothers whom are being victimized by their partners.

[Table 18 goes about here]

To explore further these issues, we estimate separate regressions for women who work and do not work. If violent punishment from the mother occurs in households in which the woman is not employed, the causes may lie on post-traumatic stress due to the violence that ultimately triggered displacement. As Table 19 indicates, violent punishment from displaced mothers occurs in households in which woman are not employed, while the coefficient is not statistically significant for employed mothers. Thus, violence against children is presumably a consequence of the traumas caused by the violence from conflict and not to vent stress. This reinforces the findings of Table 16.

[Table 19 goes about here]

We conduct two additional robustness checks. First, we estimate the same regressions for economic migrants from rural areas. Results in Table 20 reveal a different picture. Female migrants are not more likely to contribute more than half to household expenditures. Bargaining strength in each dimension is not higher in contrast to the

control group, yet the more stringent measure of bargaining strength estimated with principal components shows a positive and significant effect for economic migrants. Domestic violence is larger, yet the coefficient is much smaller than for displaced women and violent punishment against children from economic migrants is not higher.

[Table 20 goes about here]

Second, we estimate all the regressions for the sample of rural households from municipalities with out-migration of forcefully displaced. Results are similar to the complete sample, the only difference being that impact of forced displacement in women's wages is positive and statistically significant. Although we drop many observations for the DHS2000/5, the main results hold: bargaining power remains intact and severe violence increases. Indeed the coefficient for severe violence is very similar to the coefficient estimate with the complete sample.

[Table 21 goes about here]

By using labor and bargaining power data, we have a comprehensive picture of the impact of forced displacement on labor market participation, changes in bargaining power within the household and domestic violence. The optimistic picture of conflict empowering women is less straightforward. Female labor income expands in response to drops in household income and tight labor markets for their partners. However, participation of women in household earnings rises and it is driven by an increment in working hours. As predicted by some economic models, wages, and not earnings, improve the threat point and thus the ability to appropriate a large share of the household's surplus. As a result, bargaining power for displaced households remains intact, domestic violence against women escalates, and children are more likely to be punished violently by their mothers. The frustration of husbands due to difficult labor conditions, the traumatic events before displacement, the rising female labor participation, and challenge to traditional gender roles may be the cause of this escalating violence. Since we do not observe displaced women that separated due to domestic violence, we might be underestimating the impact on bargaining strength and overestimating the coefficient for domestic violence.

4. Conclusion

Internal conflict forces large number of persons to flee seeking refuge from aggressions of armed groups. Forced migration is often accompanied with assets losses, sharp drops in income, and a deterioration of labor conditions. Changes in labor conditions are heterogeneous for forcefully displaced men and women. Labor experience of men is mainly on agricultural activities, which is rarely demanded in urban labor makers, whereas women's skills are more akin to urban occupations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of forced displacement on female labor participation, the distribution of power within the household and domestic violence.

We find that contribution to household income from displaced women from married and cohabiting couples increase. In contrast to the control group – rural female workers - displaced work more hours, yet employment and wages are not statistically different from the control group. On the other hand, displaced male participate less and have similar wages rates and working hours. Despite an increment in women's contribution to households' earning, bargaining power remains intact after displacement and domestic violence increases, presumably due to the need to vent stress and control women, as well as the victimization process they underwent before displacement. In addition, domestic violence of mother against children increases, a worrisome trend that may contribute to the inter-generational transmission of domestic violence.

Three complementary causes may explain these results. First, the larger contributions of displaced women to household earnings seems to be driving mostly by longer working hours after displacement, which presumably implies a drop in leisure time. Second, low income levels of displaced households and the difficulty to rely on social networks in a new and unknown city may restrict the possibility of marriage dissolution. Thus, improvements in labor conditions induce longer working hours, while bargaining power remains constant and domestic violence increase. Third, forced displacement is preceded by traumatic events: massacres, selective homicides, sexual assaults, and direct threat, among others. Being the victim of such events, may cause anger, frustration, and post-traumatic syndrome, which may create conditions for domestic violence to escalate.

The rising female labor participation, accompanied by the escalation of domestic violence, may amplify the costs of conflict. The participation of women in the female labor force is not strengthening their bargaining power. In addition, the prevalence of

domestic violence may imply the intergenerational transmission of violence. Policies directed to increasing women's bargaining power, such as providing subsidies directly to women and designing special education programs, as well as offering psychological support to displaced families, may help victims of war to deactivate the cycle of violence in which they are immersed.

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Table 1. First stage: labor outcomes

	Log hourly wages				Hours worked per week				Bargaining strength
	Male		Female		Male		Female		
	Single	Married	Single	Married	Single	Married	Single	Married	
Instrumental variables - first stage									
Distance from origin to destinat	0.003**	0.003**	0.002**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Massacre victims	0.007**	0.006**	0.007**	0.006*	0.005**	0.006**	0.007**	0.007**	0.006*
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Observations	5,906	2,965	2,616	1,426	13,977	5,871	5,892	2,681	1,426
R-squared	0.089	0.089	0.069	0.052	0.095	0.010	0.024	0.022	0.017
Hansen - overid. test	0.433	0.0987	0.173	0.0803	5.182	6.323	0.305	1.105	0.0314
P vale Hansen	0.511	0.753	0.678	0.777	0.0228	0.0119	0.581	0.293	0.859
F test of excluded instruments	68.67	44.81	51.81	23.95	121.7	90.98	109.6	68.63	23.95
Endogeneity test- dispalcemnt	0.366	1.163	1.894	2.520	1.875	1.471	1.059	0.495	2.147
P value	0.545	0.281	0.169	0.112	0.171	0.225	0.304	0.482	0.143

Robust standard errors in brackets

State clusters

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001-2005

Table 2. First stage: bargaining strength and domestic violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
		Women has final say in									
	Paying more than half in	Health issues	Large purchases	Daily needs	Food purchases	All issues	PC- all issues	Less severe violence	Severe violence	Violent punishment	Violent punishment
Instrumental variables - first stage											
Share (2 years lag)	0.068+	0.067+	0.067+	0.071+	0.068+	0.068+	0.068+	0.066	0.066	0.080+	0.080+
	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.040]	[0.041]	[0.041]	[0.042]	[0.042]
Massacre victims	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]
Observations	5,623	5,618	5,582	5,612	5,616	5,623	5,623	5,501	5,501	5,213	5,213
R-squared	0.036	0.040	0.016	0.033	0.069	0.018	0.108	0.019	0.016	0.028	0.044
Hansen - overid. test	1.011	0.00221	1.047	0.306	0.519	0.00802	0.122	0.0714	0.0267	0.674	0.0101
P vale Hansen	0.315	0.963	0.306	0.580	0.471	0.929	0.727	0.789	0.870	0.412	0.920
F test of excluded instruments	22.28	21.93	21.55	22.04	22.29	22.28	22.28	22.29	22.29	24.01	24.01
Endogeneity test- dispalcemnt	0.304	0.880	1.081	0.339	1.332	0.330	0.00626	0.335	0.00805	0.142	0.299
P value	0.581	0.348	0.299	0.560	0.248	0.565	0.937	0.563	0.929	0.707	0.585

Robust standard errors in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 3. Descriptive statistics: labor conditions

		All			Married Women			Married Men		
	Number of observations	Men	Women		Non displaced	Displaced	diff/sd	Non displaced	Displaced	diff/sd
Years of age	37,778	27.56	28.28	**	35.26	33.70	** 0.18	37.41	36.24	* 0.15
		(11.34)	(11.48)		(8.85)	(8.61)		(7.84)	(7.60)	
Years of completed education	36,444	5.05	5.45	**	4.50	6.61	** -0.66	4.23	6.56	** -0.73
		(3.24)	(3.40)		(3.18)	(3.86)		(3.16)	(4.13)	
Number of household members	37,778	5.62	5.68		5.02	5.13	-0.06	4.91	4.91	0.00
		(2.54)	(2.49)		(1.97)	(2.05)		(1.88)	(2.04)	
Number of children under 5 years	37,778	0.65	0.73	**	0.77	0.82	0.06	0.82	0.86	0.04
		(0.93)	(0.96)		(0.91)	(0.31)		(0.91)	(0.29)	
=1 if displaced person	37,778	0.01	0.02	*						

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001-2005

Table 4. Descriptive statistics: labor outcomes

		All			Married Women			Married Men		
	Number of observations	Men	Women		Non displaced	Displaced		Non displaced	Displaced	
= 1 if employed person	37,778	0.76	0.36	**	0.37	0.37		0.95	0.80	**
		(0.42)	(0.48)		(0.48)	(0.48)		(0.21)	(0.40)	
Real hourly wage USD	18,322	0.17	0.19	*	0.22	0.41	+	0.20	0.45	**
		(0.39)	(0.43)		(0.48)	(0.92)		(0.46)	(1.02)	
Hours worked per week	21,381	46.01	35.19	**	33.39	42.03	**	51.31	56.27	**
		(17.23)	(20.73)		(20.43)	(23.15)		(15.41)	(18.79)	
Bargaining strength	5,851	0.92	0.78	**	0.70	0.80	**			*
		(0.19)	(0.30)		(0.32)	(0.28)				

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001-2005

Table 5. Descriptive statistics: bargaining strength

	Number of observations	Non - displaced vs. Displaced households		
		Non displaced	Displaced	
Women paying more than half expenditure	5,891	15.43%	26.59%	**
Women has final say on health issues	5,886	59.87%	63.80%	
Women has final say on large purchases	5,848	18.32%	25.73%	+
Women has final say on daily needs	5,879	34.43%	40.55%	
Women has final say on food to eat	5,884	80.46%	69.26%	**
Women has final say on all issues	5,891	8.10%	10.50%	
Index say in all issues - principal components	5,891	-0.76	-0.82	
		(1.02)	(1.14)	
Experienced emotional violence	5,757	25.97%	31.04%	
Experienced mild violence	5,763	32.83%	35.34%	
Experienced severe violence	5,763	7.44%	13.47%	*
Children experienced domestic violence - father	5,463	45.05%	42.89%	
Children experienced domestic violence - mother	5,463	68.03%	74.64%	+
Father ever beat mother	5,891	31.25%	27.08%	
If seek help after violence	5,891	6.90%	8.03%	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 6. Descriptive statistics: household characteristics

		Non - displaced vs. Displaced households		
	Number of observations	Non displaced	Displaced	diff/sd
Years of age	5,891	33.85	33.51	-0.04
		(8.75)	(8.40)	
Years of age - partner	5,883	38.90	38.34	-0.05
		(10.42)	(10.35)	
Years of education	5,891	4.83	6.39 **	0.45
		(3.40)	(4.39)	
Years of education partner	5,808	4.42	6.21 **	0.52
		(3.34)	(4.38)	
Household size	5,891	5.41	5.61	0.09
		(2.22)	(2.60)	
=1 If children under 5 years in household	5,891	0.57	0.58	0.03
= 1 if unskilled worker	5,799	0.36	0.34	-0.05
= 1 if partner unskilled worker	5,891	0.59	0.45 **	-0.28
Wealth index	5,890	-1.72	-0.12 **	0.94
		(1.68)	(1.69)	
= 1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters	5,891	-	0.057	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 7. Probability of employment – Heckman two-step procedure

	Male				Female			
VARIABLES	All		Married		All		Married	
=1 if displaced person	-0.655**	-0.642**	-0.874**	-0.722**	0.063+	0.122**	-0.037	0.044
	[0.040]	[0.045]	[0.075]	[0.080]	[0.035]	[0.041]	[0.056]	[0.064]
Years of age	0.063**	0.064**	-0.004	-0.005	0.031**	0.034**	0.016**	0.017**
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Years of completed education	-0.034**	-0.029**	-0.006	-0.006	0.035**	0.044**	0.045**	0.056**
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Number of household members	-0.032**	-0.032**	0.019	0.013	-0.005	-0.003	0.044**	0.047**
	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.009]	[0.009]
Number of children under 5 years	0.147**	0.148**	0.035	0.029	0.013	0.001	-0.090**	-0.120**
	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.037]	[0.039]	[0.012]	[0.012]	[0.021]	[0.021]
Constant	-0.524**	-0.608**	1.831**	1.765**	-1.501**	-1.997**	-1.293**	-1.834**
	[0.053]	[0.068]	[0.166]	[0.193]	[0.045]	[0.065]	[0.082]	[0.107]
Observations	18,100	18,100	6,091	6,091	17,152	17,152	7,454	7,454
FE state	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Standard errors in brackets

Bootsrap standard errors

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001-2005

Table 8. Log hourly wages – Heckman two-step procedure

	Male				Female			
VARIABLES	All		Married		All		Married	
=1 if displaced person	0.419**	0.362**	-0.987+	0.120	0.413**	0.349**	0.280*	0.183
	[0.052]	[0.052]	[0.572]	[0.170]	[0.064]	[0.085]	[0.127]	[0.117]
Years of age	-0.003	-0.001	0.005	0.007**	0.008	0.004	-0.006	-0.008
	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.014]	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.007]
Years of completed education	0.049**	0.046**	0.030*	0.047**	0.064**	0.056**	0.063**	0.049**
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.012]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.012]
Number of household members	-0.007*	-0.004	0.044*	0.003	-0.009	-0.003	-0.007	0.003
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.020]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.023]	[0.012]
Lambda	-0.416**	-0.377**	3.991*	0.714	0.016	-0.003	-0.583	-0.434
	[0.076]	[0.067]	[1.722]	[0.634]	[0.439]	[0.353]	[0.903]	[0.385]
Constant	-0.518**	-0.577**	-2.055**	-1.549**	-1.090	-0.745	-0.118	0.306
	[0.163]	[0.167]	[0.377]	[0.260]	[1.029]	[0.989]	[1.841]	[1.020]
Observations	10,253	10,253	3,245	3,245	13,976	13,976	6,239	6,239
Wald	559.7**	1082**	64.15**	428.4**	624.3**	849.3**	209.4**	316.5**
FE States	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control- Occupation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in brackets

Bootsrap standard errors

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001-2005

Table 9. Hours worked per week – Heckman two-step procedure

	Male				Female			
VARIABLES	All		Married		All		Married	
=1 if displaced person	15.338**	13.960**	-2.238	-6.543	4.454*	6.899**	4.112*	5.100**
	[1.064]	[1.084]	[9.499]	[4.219]	[1.773]	[1.257]	[1.621]	[1.731]
Years of age	-0.293**	-0.235**	0.039	0.023	-0.977*	0.139	0.018	0.017
	[0.047]	[0.042]	[0.055]	[0.038]	[0.449]	[0.167]	[0.123]	[0.092]
Years of completed educatio	0.238**	0.187**	0.046	-0.002	-1.093*	0.244	-0.232	-0.170
	[0.068]	[0.063]	[0.098]	[0.090]	[0.475]	[0.223]	[0.285]	[0.254]
Number of household membe	-0.084	-0.029	-0.115	0.006	0.254	0.092	-0.115	-0.263
	[0.075]	[0.073]	[0.227]	[0.141]	[0.171]	[0.104]	[0.213]	[0.189]
Lambda	-33.136**	-30.192**	23.440	49.298*	-48.596*	1.849	-3.515	-7.226
	[2.184]	[1.924]	[38.479]	[19.540]	[20.419]	[7.467]	[7.854]	[5.648]
Constant	54.332**	51.546**	36.157**	33.230**	119.676**	23.535	40.333**	44.314**
	[2.415]	[2.331]	[3.645]	[3.070]	[38.038]	[16.184]	[14.492]	[12.712]
Observations	18,100	18,100	6,091	6,091	17,152	17,152	7,454	7,454
Wald	416.2**	1023**	169.3**	454.7**	415.8**	918.7**	316.9**	544.4**
FE States	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Year dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Control- Occupation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in brackets
Bootsrap standard errors
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001-2005

Table 10. Bargaining strength (ratio of female wages divided by sum of male and female wage) – Heckman two-step procedure

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
=1 if displaced person	0.083*	0.039
	[0.033]	[0.038]
Years of age	0.001	0.000
	[0.003]	[0.003]
Years of completed education	0.010**	0.005
	[0.003]	[0.004]
Number of household members	-0.011+	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.004]
Lambda	0.022	0.067
	[0.215]	[0.133]
Constant	0.438	0.478
	[0.456]	[0.367]
Observations	6,239	6,239
Wald	111.9**	248.2**
FE States	No	Yes
Year dummies	No	Yes
Control- Occupation	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in brackets
Bootsrap standard errors
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001-2005

Table 11. Economic migrants: labor outcomes

	Log hourly wage		Hours worked per week		Bargaining strength
VARIABLES	Married Men	Married women	Married Men	Married women	Married women
= 1 if economic migrants	4.434*	5.772**	0.176*	0.140	0.096**
	[1.817]	[1.420]	[0.081]	[0.103]	[0.034]
Observations	7589	9267	3773	7676	7676
Wald	799.5**	694.2**	535.0**	332.4**	361.2**
FE States	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control- Occupation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in brackets

Bootsrap standard errors

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on ECH2001-2005

Table 12. Contribution to household earnings (=1 if women paying more than half of household expenditure) – Linear probability model

	Married women					
VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
=1 if displaced person	0.109**	0.094**	0.092**	0.089**	0.077*	0.060+
	[0.035]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.033]	[0.032]
Years of completed education		0.007**	0.007**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**
		[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Years of completed education - partner		-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.004+
		[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Years of age		0.006**	0.006**	0.004**	0.004**	0.004**
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Years of age - partner		-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Wealth index		0.003	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003
		[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Number of household members			0.005+	0.004	0.004	0.004
			[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
=1 if partner unskilled worker						-0.029
						[0.022]
=1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters						0.274+
						[0.154]
Constant	0.076**	-0.119**	-0.145**	-0.123**	-0.127**	-0.120*
	[0.011]	[0.031]	[0.035]	[0.043]	[0.047]	[0.046]
Observations	5,891	5,800	5,800	5,800	5,800	5,800
R-squared	0.017	0.036	0.037	0.038	0.046	0.048
FE State	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets

Cluster municipality

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 13. Bargaining strength (=1 if women has final say in) – Linear probability model

	Women has final say in					
VARIABLES	Health issues	Large purchases	Daily needs	Food expenditures	All issues	PC index
=1 if displaced	-0.071+	0.042	0.033	-0.074*	0.014	0.072
	[0.038]	[0.035]	[0.041]	[0.033]	[0.026]	[0.099]
Observations	5,795	5,759	5,789	5,793	5,800	5,800
R-squared	0.057	0.048	0.070	0.098	0.034	0.139
FE State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets
Cluster municipality
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 14. Domestic violence (=1 if women experienced less severe forms of violence from partner) – Linear probability model

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
=1 if displaced person	0.025	0.035	0.033	0.026	0.008	0.009
	[0.043]	[0.045]	[0.044]	[0.043]	[0.039]	[0.040]
Years of completed education		-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.002	-0.000	-0.000
		[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Years of completed education - partner		0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.002
		[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Years of age		0.003*	0.003*	-0.003+	-0.005**	-0.005**
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Years of age - partner		-0.002+	-0.002+	-0.003*	-0.003*	-0.003*
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Wealth index		0.002	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003
		[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Number of household members			0.004	0.001	-0.000	-0.000
			[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
=1 if children under 5 years			-0.014	0.000	-0.002	-0.002
			[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.018]
=1 if father ever hurt mother				0.175**	0.156**	0.156**
				[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.017]
=1 if partner unskilled worker						-0.014
						[0.028]
=1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters						-0.020
						[0.135]
Constant	0.326**	0.316**	0.315**	0.315**	0.319**	0.324**
	[0.019]	[0.048]	[0.057]	[0.064]	[0.065]	[0.064]
Observations	5,763	5,673	5,673	5,673	5,673	5,673
R-squared	0.000	0.003	0.004	0.047	0.076	0.076
FE State	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets
Cluster municipality
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 15. Domestic violence (=1 if women experienced severe forms of violence from partner) – Linear probability model

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
=1 if displaced	0.060*	0.073*	0.073*	0.071*	0.060*	0.065*
	[0.029]	[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.030]	[0.029]	[0.030]
Years of completed education		-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.005**	-0.004**	-0.004**
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Years of completed education - partner		-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]
Years of age		0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Years of age - partner		0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Wealth index		0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001
		[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Number of household members			-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
			[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
=1 if children under 5 years			0.009	0.015	0.016	0.016
			[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]	[0.011]
=1 if father ever hurt mother				0.062**	0.056**	0.056**
				[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.010]
=1 if partner unskilled worker						0.004
						[0.016]
=1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters						-0.087+
						[0.048]
Constant	0.080**	0.067**	0.058+	0.050	0.062	0.062
	[0.010]	[0.023]	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.040]	[0.040]
Observations	5,763	5,673	5,673	5,673	5,673	5,673
R-squared	0.002	0.012	0.012	0.028	0.038	0.039
FE State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets
Cluster municipality
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 16. Domestic violence: Interaction of forced displacement and labor occupation – Linear probability model

VARIABLES	(1) Severe	(2) Less severe
=1 if displaced person	0.070+	0.049
	[0.040]	[0.048]
Displaced person x partner unskilled worker	-0.009	-0.046
	[0.048]	[0.073]
=1 if partner unskilled worker	0.004	-0.012
	[0.016]	[0.029]
Years of completed education	-0.004**	-0.000
	[0.001]	[0.003]
Years of completed education - partner	-0.001	-0.001
	[0.002]	[0.003]
Years of age	-0.001	-0.005**
	[0.001]	[0.002]
Years of age - partner	-0.000	-0.003*
	[0.001]	[0.001]
Wealth index	0.001	0.002
	[0.003]	[0.005]
Number of household members	-0.002	-0.000
	[0.002]	[0.003]
=1 if children under 5 years	0.016	-0.004
	[0.012]	[0.018]
=1 if father ever hurt mother	0.055**	0.155**
	[0.010]	[0.017]
=1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters	-0.087+	-0.038
	[0.048]	[0.134]
Constant	0.059	0.314**
	[0.042]	[0.066]
Observations	5,581	5,581
R-squared	0.039	0.077
FE State	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets
Cluster municipality
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 17. Domestic violence (=1 if father ever hurt mother)– Linear probability model

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
=1 if displaced person	-0.041	-0.046	-0.044	-0.049	-0.055	-0.054
	[0.033]	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.037]	[0.039]
Years of completed education		-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003
		[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Years of completed education - partner		-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.002
		[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.003]
Years of age		-0.002	-0.003+	-0.004*	-0.006**	-0.006**
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Years of age - partner		-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
		[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Wealth index		0.007	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006
		[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Number of household members			-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
			[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
=1 if children under 5 years			-0.021	-0.018	-0.021	-0.021
			[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.015]
=1 if partner unskilled worker						-0.023
						[0.031]
=1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters						-0.023
						[0.120]
Constant	0.319**	0.456**	0.495**	0.505**	0.460**	0.467**
	[0.020]	[0.047]	[0.051]	[0.063]	[0.062]	[0.066]
Observations	5,891	5,800	5,800	5,800	5,800	5,800
R-squared	0.000	0.003	0.004	0.006	0.041	0.041
FE State	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets
Cluster municipality
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 18. Violent punishment from parent (=1 if children experienced violent punishment from father/mother) – Linear probability model

	Father		Mother	
VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
=1 if displaced person	-0.054	-0.051	0.070*	0.071*
	[0.045]	[0.045]	[0.032]	[0.033]
Years of completed education	0.005	0.005	0.009**	0.008**
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Years of completed education - partner	-0.006*	-0.008*	-0.000	-0.006
	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.004]
Years of age	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Years of age - partner	0.002+	0.002	0.003*	0.003*
	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]
Wealth index	-0.004	-0.004	0.004	0.004
	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.009]
Number of household members	0.013**	0.013**	0.012**	0.012**
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]
=1 if children under 5 years	0.038+	0.038+	0.019	0.019
	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.017]
=1 if father ever hurt mother	0.025	0.025	0.086**	0.086**
	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.013]	[0.014]
=1 if partner unskilled worker		-0.022		-0.069**
		[0.029]		[0.025]
=1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters		-0.049		-0.024
		[0.174]		[0.118]
Constant	0.243**	0.250**	0.456**	0.477**
	[0.078]	[0.079]	[0.075]	[0.076]
Observations	5,380	5,380	5,380	5,380
R-squared	0.059	0.059	0.111	0.112
FE State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets

Cluster municipality

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 19. Violent punishment from parent by employment status – Linear probability model

VARIABLES	Employed	Unemployed
=1 if displaced person	0.056	0.081*
	[0.056]	[0.038]
Years of completed education	0.008*	0.009+
	[0.003]	[0.005]
Years of completed education - partner	-0.005	-0.006
	[0.005]	[0.005]
Years of age	-0.007*	-0.000
	[0.003]	[0.002]
Years of age - partner	0.006**	0.001
	[0.002]	[0.002]
Wealth index	-0.002	0.006
	[0.009]	[0.010]
Number of household members	0.010+	0.014**
	[0.005]	[0.004]
=1 if children under 5 years	0.007	0.029
	[0.026]	[0.023]
=1 if father ever hurt mother	0.066**	0.100**
	[0.018]	[0.020]
=1 if partner unskilled worker	-0.083*	-0.059
	[0.035]	[0.037]
=1 if respondent migrated with brothers/sisters	-0.218	0.031
	[0.289]	[0.110]
Constant	0.588**	0.431**
	[0.111]	[0.086]
Observations	2,125	3,255
R-squared	0.109	0.130
FE State	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets

Cluster municipality

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 20. Economic migrants: bargaining strength and domestic violence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
		Women has final say in									
VARIABLES	Paying more than half in	Health issues	Large purchases	Daily needs	Food purchases	All issues	PC- all issues	Less severe violence	Severe violence	Violent punishment	Violent punishment
=1 if economic migrants	0.011	-0.003	-0.026	-0.010	-0.035+	-0.010	0.129*	-0.002	0.027+	0.045+	0.025
	[0.017]	[0.029]	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.021]	[0.013]	[0.051]	[0.021]	[0.015]	[0.024]	[0.021]
Observations	7140	7135	7087	7125	7128	7140	7140	6989	6989	6626	6626
R-squared	0.043	0.049	0.042	0.062	0.090	0.027	0.138	0.065	0.029	0.059	0.100
FE State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets
Cluster municipality
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5

Table 21. All outcomes: sample of only outmigration municipalities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
		Women has final say in														
VARIABLES	Paying more than half in	Health issues	Large purchases	Daily needs	Food purchases	All issues	PC- all issues	Less severe violence	Severe violence	Violent punishment	Violent punishment	Log hourly wage Married Men	Log hourly wage Married Women	Hours worked per week Married Men	Hours worked per week Married Women	Bargaining strength
=1 if displaced	0.054	-0.082+	0.051	0.026	-0.037	-0.015	0.120	0.009	0.070+	-0.073	0.045	0.152	0.222+	3.451	5.418**	0.034
	[0.038]	[0.044]	[0.039]	[0.052]	[0.037]	[0.024]	[0.123]	[0.050]	[0.040]	[0.062]	[0.038]	[0.195]	[0.119]	[4.208]	[1.999]	[0.044]
Observations	1,408	1,407	1,395	1,406	1,407	1,408	1,408	1,389	1,389	1,305	1,305	1805	3596	3482	4212	3596
FE State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marriage length controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Year dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control- Occupation	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster municipality	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Bootsrap standard errors	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors in brackets

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: authors' calculations based on DHS2000/5