

# Immigrant franchise and immigration policy: Evidence from the Progressive Era

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PRELIMINARY, DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION

## Abstract

We study the role played by foreign born U.S. citizens in shaping migration policy between 1897–1924. Using a novel district level dataset, we find systematic evidence that this constituency supported an open door policy. At the same time, more stringent residency requirements led to a decline in the election turnout rates of naturalized Americans, and thus in their ability to affect congressmen immigration stance. Our analysis highlights also the importance of the electoral booth: congressmen were responsive to the immigrant constituency only if they were elected in a close race, or if they were not already ideologically committed to an open door policy.

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# 1 Introduction

European immigration to the United States was virtually unencumbered for most of the nineteenth century and remained so until 1917, when the “Immigration Act” introduced a literacy test provision, requiring every alien aged 16 or more to be able to read 30-40 words in a language of the immigrant’s choice. At the time, this measure was heralded as an epochal change<sup>1</sup> and even if it had by itself only a limited impact (Tichenor, 2002), it paved the way to the 1921 “Emergency Quota Act” and the 1924 “Immigration Act”, which dramatically altered immigration policy and the patterns of immigration to the United States.

As pointed out by Goldin (1994) four actors shaped this major policy change: organized labor, capital- and land-owners and the immigrants themselves. This paper focuses on the key role played by foreign born U.S. citizens. By doing so, we contribute to shed new light on the importance of this constituency in *directly* affecting the political process in the host country, a question that was at the forefront of the political debate in the Progressive era, and that is gaining new interest among researchers studying immigration today (see e.g. Dancygier et al. 2015). Historians have consistently argued that throughout this period naturalized citizens overwhelmingly supported maintaining an open door policy (e.g. see Goldin 1994, Tichenor 2002, Zolberg 2006) for at least two reasons: personal interest – they wanted to allow the admission of relatives and friends, and ideological commitment to Lady Liberty’s promise “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses, yearning to breathe free”. At the same time, the naturalized immigrants’ ability to affect policy makers’ choices varied, depending on an array of factors, ranging from the sheer size of the immigrant population in the constituency (Goldin 1994, Shertzer 2014), to its ability to coalesce in organized groups, and – importantly – to the extent to which immigrants were able to materially exercise the voting franchise. In fact, as argued by Keyssar (2009), broadening the access to the polling booth in this period was hardly a monotonic process. For example, poll taxes and literacy requirements were gradually introduced in the South with precisely the goal to disenfranchise black voters. Similarly – and more subtly – stringent residency tests, requiring individuals to live in the same state often for up to two years led to the disenfranchisement of large mobile sections of the population, estimated in 1960 to represent approximately 8 percent of the total eligible voters (Schmidhauser, 1963).

Starting from these stylized facts, we carry out what is to the best of our knowledge the first systematic exploration of the link between restrictions to the electoral franchise enacted in the progressive era, and voting behavior of U.S. representatives on immigration policy. To this end, we construct a novel dataset combining roll call votes on immigration policy cast between 1897 and 1924, with a wealth of congressional district level economic

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<sup>1</sup>“While ostensibly a selective measure, putting the finishing touch to our classification of undesirables, it will affect so large a proportion of the ordinary immigration stream as to be really restrictive” (Fairchild (1917))

and demographic characteristics, which we have compiled using the 1900, 1910 and 1920 population censuses,<sup>2</sup> and individual level information for the representatives, obtained from Congressional Directories.<sup>3</sup> Data on voting requirements at the local level were instead obtained from Keyssar (2009).

Our analysis delivers several interesting results. First, we find systematic evidence consistent with the idea that throughout the Progressive Era, foreign born Americans were in favor of keeping an open door policy: representatives elected in districts with a large share of naturalized citizens were less likely to support immigration restrictions than their counterparts for whom a foreign born constituency was less important. At the same time, as residency requirements became more stringent, the foreign born's ability to influence the behavior of U.S. congressmen declined, making them more likely to support restriction. Interestingly, we find evidence that the channel through which immigrant preferences affected policy choices was the electoral booth: high immigrant districts exhibited higher voter turnout rates, which declined in the presence of stricter residency requirements. Moreover, congressmen were responsive to the immigrant constituency only if they were elected in a close race, or if they were not already ideologically committed to an open door policy.

In the benchmark model, we have used a fixed effect specification, controlling for a variety of congressional district and individual representative level characteristics. Still, we are concerned that our findings might be biased because of unobserved, time varying district level factors that could affect both the stringency of residency requirements and the voting behavior of the elected representative. To address this concern, we use a spatial discontinuity design, comparing all contiguous districts that are located on opposite sides of a state border, exploiting differences in policies adopted at the state level. Importantly, the results obtained from this additional specification confirm the broad patterns uncovered in our benchmark analysis. A second potential source of omitted variable bias at the individual congressman level is represented by the fact that House Representatives might have enjoyed long political careers before entering national politics, taking up seats in the State Congress or acting as Governors. Through their actions in these roles, they might well have contributed to shape the variation in the residency requirements exploited in our analysis. We address this concern by excluding from the analysis congressmen who held important offices at the State level, and our findings are broadly unaffected.

Our results continue to hold also when we change the definition of our dependent variable and account for the possibility of selection in the decision of casting a ballot on migration policy. We also show that naturalized foreign born saw their political power diminished only by stricter residency requirements and not by the other measures adopted in this period to

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<sup>2</sup>Individual level data for the 1890 census are not available.

<sup>3</sup>As census data of this period allow us only to identify county level information, the construction of district level aggregates required us to keep track both of counties split across multiple districts, and of periodic redistricting. For more details, see section 3.

limit the franchise, namely poll taxes or voting literacy test provisions. This is probably not surprising as naturalized citizens were as literate as natives in this period (see section 2 for more details), and did not differ from natives in their labor market outcomes (Abramitzky et al., 2014).

This paper is related to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the analysis of the political economy of U.S. immigration policy. Much of the existing quantitative studies in this tradition have focused on the post 1965 era, emphasizing the role played by both economic (Gonzalez and Kamdar 2000, Fetzer 2006, Bodvarsson et al. 2006, Facchini and Steinhardt 2011) and non-economic factors at the congressional district level (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, Milner and Tingley 2011). Few studies have instead analyzed the role played by district level drivers in earlier periods, and in particular during the Progressive Era. One important exception is represented by Goldin’s (1994) pioneering contribution, which highlights the role played by shifting coalitions in shaping the introduction of the literacy test provision in 1917. Limited data availability constrained though her quantitative analysis of the determinants of congressional behavior to the subsample of representatives elected in U.S. cities, at a time when a large fraction of the voting population still lived in rural areas. For our analysis we have instead used individual level data from the U.S. census and detailed geographical information linking counties to congressional districts to construct new district level aggregates, which allow us to explore the role played by a rich set of factors affecting the voting behavior of *all* U.S. representatives. Moreover, our rich census data allow us to identify more precisely the role played by a key set of actors, namely naturalized foreign born citizens.

Our paper is also related to the literature studying how the introduction of legislated obstacles to the voting franchise affects the voting behavior of different subgroups of the population, and specific policy outcomes. Several papers have focused on the effects of the introduction of poll taxes and literacy test provisions on the disenfranchisement of black and poor voters (e.g. Kousser 1974, Goldman 2001, Naidu 2012), and several studies have also investigated whether the removal of these restrictions had important policy consequences (e.g. Husted and Kenny 1997, Cascio and Washington 2014). To the best of our knowledge little is known instead about the impact of state, county and precinct level residency requirements, apart for the fact that they were estimated to contribute to the disenfranchisement of approximately 8 million Americans at the eve of the Civil Rights movement (Schmidhauser, 1963). One of the goals of this paper is to fill this gap, by focusing on the effect that such measures had on a highly mobile subset of the population, namely naturalized immigrants.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a broad historical overview of international and internal migration in the U.S. in the Progressive era, and of the access to the franchise for naturalized foreign born. Section 3 introduces the data used in the analysis, whereas section 4 presents our benchmark results. Section 5 illustrates our

spatial discontinuity design and section 6 presents a series of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Immigration and the franchise in the Progressive Era

In this section we introduce the historical context of immigration policy making in the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. We start by providing an overview of international migration to the country, and we present next the legal context shaping immigrant’s access to the franchise, focusing on the role played by residency requirements. We review then the patterns of interstate mobility of both migrants and native and finally we provide a short legislative history of immigration policy making during this period.

### 2.1 International migration

The Progressive Era saw immigration to the United States reach new heights. Between 1890 and 1920 nearly 18.7 million foreigners entered the country, or an average of 622 thousand migrants per year (Carter et al., 2006) – see Figure 1(a). These figures represent gross migration flows, and it is well known that return migration during this period was substantial, even if accurate estimates are hard to come by (Gould, 1980, Taylor and Williamson, 1997, Bandiera et al., 2013). As a result, the stock of foreign born grew from 9.2 millions in 1890 to 13.9 millions in 1920, representing respectively 14.8 and 13.2 percent of the total population. In 1910, 14.7 percent of the US residents were foreign born, and this figure has not been reached again over the past one hundred years (see Figure 1(b)). Importantly, increasing numbers of immigrants settled permanently: by 1900, 7.9 million foreign born individuals (or 75 percent of the total) had lived in the United States for more than 10 years, whereas by 1920 the corresponding figure reached 10.8 millions (or 77 percent of the total) – see Figure 2.

Throughout the progressive era, the citizenship acquisition process was substantially easier than it is today. In particular, any white male immigrant, who had spent a minimum of two years in the country, could file a declaration of intention to become a U.S. citizen (“first papers”). After being a resident for an additional three years, he could then take an oath of allegiance and file a petition of naturalization (filing the so called “second papers”), thus completing the process. As a result, together with an increase in the share of long term immigrants, we observe also a substantial increase in the share of foreign born who become U.S. citizens: from 30 percent in 1900, to 49 percent in 1920 (see Figure 2), and mobilizing this growing constituency become a priority in many elections (Shertzer 2014).

Turning to the human capital characteristics of the migrants, Figure 3 compares the

literacy rates among the natives and foreign born in 1900, 1910 and 1920.<sup>4</sup> Throughout this period the fraction of natives reporting to be able to read and write increases from slightly less than ninety percent in 1900, to 94 percent in 1920. Overall, the foreign born appear to be only slightly less literate, with about 80 percent of the total declaring to be able to read and write throughout this period. Interestingly, naturalized foreign born citizens appear to be positively selected compared to other migrants, and as a result both in 1900 and 1910 they are slightly more likely than natives to be literate, whereas the two groups are broadly comparable in 1920.

The distribution of immigrants varied substantially across different regions of the United States, as illustrated in Figure 4(a), which depicts the share of foreign born by congressional district in 1920. Immigration was sparse in the South East, and some districts in this area – such as district 3 in Georgia, district 1 in Mississippi or district 2 in North Carolina – hosted negligible numbers of foreign born. In the North East, the region around the Great Lakes, California and some parts of Texas immigrants represented instead a substantial share of the population, reaching about 30 percent in district 12 in Michigan, in district 5 in California and in district 15 in Texas.

Figure 4(b) illustrates instead the share of naturalized foreign born by district. Interestingly, while some districts exhibit both a high proportion of foreign born and naturalized foreign born residents, some others show diverging patterns. Consider for example district 11 in Wisconsin. In 1920, 23.4% of the population was foreign born, and 15.6% of the population was made up by naturalized U.S. citizens. In other words, in this district approximately two thirds of the immigrant population had acquired U.S. citizenship. Consider instead Texas' district 28. In the same year 28.5% of its population was made up by foreign born, but only one in twelve foreign residents had naturalized.

## 2.2 Suffrage

Male suffrage was introduced in the United States with the 15th amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1870, which prohibits the federal and state governments from denying a citizen the right to vote based on that citizen's "...race, color, or previous condition of servitude." As argued by Keyssar (2009) though, the democratic extension of the franchise was not a one-directional process, and throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, measures were put in place across the country to limit access to the voting booth. In the South, poll taxes and literacy test provisions were targeted especially at Black voters, who started to be systematically discriminated against right after the beginning of Recon-

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<sup>4</sup>The three censuses all had columns for whether able to read and whether able to write. The instructions to the enumerators indicate to write "Yes" for all persons 10 years or age and over who can read any language, whether English or some other, and "No" for all such persons who can not read any language. For persons under 10 years of age, the columns were left blank.

struction in 1877. All over the United States another, less well known but equally effective tool to disenfranchise large swath of the mobile population was the enforcement of residency requirements.

Introduced in the first half of the nineteenth century, the notion of residency was aimed at capturing both the physical presence in a community and the “intention” to remain therein for what the courts ended up describing as “an indefinite period of time”. Jurisdiction on the matter throughout this period was left in the hands of the various states, and this principle was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1904, when it ruled in the case of *Pope vs. Williams*, supporting the constitutionality of residency requirements, and of state efforts to enforce them. Residency requirements typically involved a minimum amount of time spent not only in the state, but also in the county and in the electoral precinct were the citizen wanted to cast his ballot. While one year was a fairly common requirement at the state level, substantial variation existed with some Southern states requiring a two-year stay, whereas some states in the Midwest choosing instead a shorter period of six months (Keyssar, 2009). More variation existed at the county and precinct level, ranging from a few days to a year (see Table 1 for more details). Throughout the period considered in our analysis (1897-1924), these requirements were mainly strengthened - out of the eleven states that changed their electoral laws, eight made them more restrictive. As pointed out by Keyssar (2009), two main arguments were put forward by those in favor of these measures: first, voters needed time to become interested in local politics, and to become identified with the interests of the local community; second, the citizens of any precinct should be able to “protect themselves” against a floating population, made up by short term residents temporarily relocated in a certain area for employment reasons. In particular, great concerns existed with regard to election fraud (Schmidhauser, 1963). The result of these measures was that mobile Americans, who were compelled to relocate from place to place for work reasons, were often disenfranchised in large numbers. On the eve of the Civil Rights revolution, the impact of these restrictions came under closer scrutiny, and estimates suggest that 8 million people – out of a total of 104 million adult citizens of voting age – were kept from voting in the 1960 elections (Schmidhauser, 1963). Lengthy residency requirements were removed only in 1972 as a result of *Dunn vs. Blumstein*, when the Supreme Court argued that they violated the equal protection clause, as granted under the Fourteenth Amendment.

## 2.3 Internal mobility

As it was pointed out already by de Tocqueville (2003), Americans are an extraordinarily mobile people: “Millions of men are marching at once toward the same horizon; their language, their religion, their manners differ; their object is the same. Fortune has been promised to them somewhere in the west, and to the west they go to find it”. During the twenti-

eth century, Americans were two times as likely to relocate as British or Japanese nationals (Greenwood 1997), and more recent figures indicate that even today an American on average moves 11 times during his/her life (Gill and Raiser 2012).<sup>5</sup>

Measuring internal mobility during the progressive era is not an easy task. In particular, over this period the US census only asked information on the place of birth, but did not ask a question on where an individual lived five years before. Thus using only the question in the census allows us only to measure “lifetime migration”. More detailed information on internal mobility patterns can be gathered though by using the linked census dataset recently constructed by Abramitzky et al. (2014) to study the assimilation of immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century. In particular, using information on first and last name, age and country or state of birth the authors are able to follow male individuals from 16 origin countries, who were aged 18-35 in 1900, across three different censuses (1900, 1910 and 1920), and compare them to a sample of native born males.<sup>6</sup> Building on this dataset and using information on the state of residence of the individual, we can construct a measure of intercensal mobility, and compare native born and migrants. Our results are reported in Table 2. The top panel illustrates the simple unconditional probability that an individual observed in the 1900 (respectively 1910) census has changed his state of residence ten years later. In the bottom panel, we report instead the predicted probability that an individual changes his state of residence, resulting from a probit model in which we control for a full set of age and year of immigration dummies and for his country/state of birth. Two interesting stylized facts emerge from this analysis. First, our data indicate that every ten years between one out of five and one out of four natives changed their state of residence in this period. This is true both when we consider simple probabilities and predicted probabilities. Second, immigrants appear to be substantially more likely to move than their native counterparts: both between 1900–1910 and between 1910–1920, two immigrants out of five changed their state of residence, a rate which is almost twice as high as that of natives.<sup>7</sup> Using this dataset, we can also illustrate the main state of destination of different subgroups of the population. In particular, focusing on the 1910-1920 decade, in Figure 5 we report the share of internal immigrants in the total population who have moved over this period, split by immigration status. In the top panel, we focus on US natives, whereas in the bottom panel we focus on the foreign born.<sup>8</sup> As it turns out, natives’ internal migration tends to exhibit a clear westward

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<sup>5</sup>For a detailed analysis and a comprehensive discussion of the main conceptual issues, see Molloy et al. (2011).

<sup>6</sup>For more details concerning the sample construction, see the Appendix section of Abramitzky et al. (2014).

<sup>7</sup>Comparing the internal mobility of natives and immigrants over the period 1980-2010, Molloy et al. (2011) find roughly similar rates of mobility for natives, but much lower for immigrants. In particular, Molloy et al. (2011) highlight that migrants at the turn of the twenty-first century are slightly less likely to move than their native counterparts.

<sup>8</sup>Unfortunately due to the limited size of Abramitzky et al. (2014) dataset, we do not have enough



pattern: recent internal migrants represent fifty percent or more of the native population in California, Oregon and Washington, whereas outside of these states recent arrivals represent a large share of the native population only in Oklahoma. When it comes instead to the internal mobility of the foreign born, the bottom panel of Figure 5 points out that recently relocated migrants play an important role in a larger number of states, including not only the West, but also the North-East and the Southern US.

## 2.4 Immigration policy legislation

Throughout the nineteenth century, European migration to the United States was virtually unopposed, even if restrictions were introduced on arrivals from other parts of the world – the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 being a prominent example. By the 1890’s several forces started to coalesce around the idea that an intervention to curb European migration was needed (Goldin, 1994) and some proposals were discussed already in 1895, during the first session of the 54th Congress (Hutchinson, 1981). The Republican Party made immigration reform part of its platform for the 1896 presidential election, focusing explicitly on the need for a literacy test provision: “For the protection of the quality of our American citizenship, and of the wages of our workingmen, against the fatal competition of low-priced labor, we demand that the immigration laws be thoroughly enforced, and so extended as to exclude from entrance to the United States those who can neither read nor write” (cited in Hutchinson 1981).

The first version of the literacy test provision to see full action on the floor of the two Houses was contained in H.R. 7864, and vote on a conference report on this bill took place on January 27, 1897, with the bill passing with a close margin of 135 vs. 123, and 97 abstentions. The bill defined an excludable class of illiterates defined as “All persons physically capable and over 16 years of age who can not read and write the English language or the language of their native or resident country...” Some exceptions were made for elderly parents of qualified immigrants. The Senate amended the conference report and introduced an exception also for “a wife or minor child not so able to read and write”. The second conference report was voted upon in the House on February 9 and it cleared the floor with a majority of 218 vs 37, with 100 abstentions. On March 2 the bill was vetoed by President Cleveland, who motivated his decision questioning literacy as a basis for selection, and more broadly expressed disagreement for the bill’s restrictive attitude towards immigration. The House voted to override the presidential veto on March 3, and the measure passed with a large margin (even if the number of abstentions raised to 146). As the Senate took no further action, the bill died.

A literacy test provision was reintroduced in H.R. 12199, which was brought up for  

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observations to construct reliable figures for a group of states in the Midwest and Western U.S.

discussion in the House in May 1902. The bill included also a provision to increase the head tax to two dollars and extended the list of excludable aliens to include epileptics, people who have been insane over the past five years, anarchists and prostitutes. After several rounds of negotiations between the House and the Senate, the literacy test was dropped from the text, and the bill was approved by both Houses and signed into law as the Immigration Act of March 3, 1903.

With migration continuing to grow, President Roosevelt repeatedly called the House to act on the matter. The 59th Congress reacted by introducing a variety of bills to amend and strengthen the provisions of the 1903 Act. One of them saw full congressional action, i.e. H.R. 18673. Among its various provisions, there were tougher measures to keep out “undesirable” aliens and an increase in the head tax to four dollars. An attempt to introduce a literacy test provision failed, but instead the bill called for the appointment of a commission to investigate the immigration issue. The bill cleared the House on Feb 18, 1907 with a majority of 92 votes and 83 abstentions, was approved also by the Senate and signed into law as the Immigration Act of February 20, 1907. Immediately after its enactment a commission to study immigration in the United States was appointed under the chairmanship of Senator William P. Dillingham. The commission worked over the subsequent three years, involving several prominent researchers of the time and produced a massive 42–volumes long report, which had a substantial impact on the subsequent immigration debate. When the report was presented to Congress, it highlighted the existence of large differences between recent and earlier immigrants to the United States, and called for a great reduction in their number.

Based on the report’s result, Dillingham introduced in 1911 a new initiative to restrict immigration (S. 3175), which included both a further increase in the head tax to five dollars, and a literacy test provision. The House approved a modified version of the bill on December 18, 1912, but the Senate disagreed with several of the amendments. A conference was called and the final report was approved by the House on January 25, 1913 with a comfortable majority of 99 votes and 118 abstentions. President Taft vetoed the bill though on February 14, pointing out that while there was much merit in the bill, he could not agree on it because of the literacy test provision. An attempt to override the presidential veto in the House failed by a narrow margin on February 19.

A new attempt to enact a literacy test provision was made in the subsequent Congress by representative Burnett of Alabama. The measure was very similar to the Dillingham bill vetoed by Tufts. It was approved by the House on February 4, 1914. After amendments by the Senate which led to an increase in the head tax to 6 dollars, the bill cleared the House once again on January 15, 1915, but was vetoed by President Wilson. His main motivation was the presence of a literacy test, and the denial of political asylum. The House failed to override the veto on February 4, and this represented the third successful presidential veto of the literacy test provision.

Representative Burnett reintroduced a literacy test provision in a new bill acted upon in the subsequent congress. The bill included also a provision for a further increase in the head tax to 8 dollars, and the bill was passed by the House with a very large margin on March 30, 1916. A similar version was passed also by the Senate. President Wilson vetoed once again the bill, but this time the veto was comfortably overridden by both houses. The bill was enacted as the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917. Twenty years after its first introduction on the congressional floor, the literacy test provision had finally become law – representing a turning point in American immigration policy, “a definite move from regulation to attempted restriction” (Hutchinson (1981), page 167).

In the aftermath of the first world war migrant inflows to the United States gained rapidly momentum, highlighting the inability of the literacy test provision included in the 1917 bill to effectively curtail new arrivals. To address this concern, Congressmen Johnson introduced H.R. 14461 with the goal of suspending immigration for a period of fourteenth months. The initiative was approved by the House by a large majority on December 13 1920, but it was subsequently vetoed by President Wilson.

The drive to limit immigration continued during the 67th Congress, and given the inability of literacy test provisions to effectively curtailed new arrivals, the focus changed on the explicit introduction of immigration quotas. Representative Johnson of Washington introduced in early 1921 H.R. 4075, which included a provision to limit immigration to 3 percent of the “the number of foreign–born persons of such nationality resident in the United States as determined by the United States census of 1910”, with some important exceptions.<sup>9</sup> The measure cleared the House with a large majority on May 13, 1921 and was enacted by President Harding on May 19, 1921. The measure was initially supposed to be in effect until June 30, 1922, but was later extended until June 30, 1924 (by H. J. Res 268 of 1922).

As the deadline of June 1924 approached, new legislation was required to make limits to the additional inflow of immigrants permanent. Representative Johnson was once again an important player, introducing a more restrictive new bill, H.R. 7995, which further reduced the national quota to 2 percent of the 1890 population of the given country of birth. The bill cleared the House on April 12, 1924, with a large margin. The bill was then sent to the Senate, which retained its basic provisions but reduced the quota exempt “relatives” categories to wives and children of American citizens. The bill went to conference, and as a result the 2 percent quota was to be replaced, after July 1, 1927, by an overall numerical limit of 150,000 immigrants per year. A system of quota preferences was also introduced. The revised bill cleared the House on May 15, 1924 and was enacted by the President on May 26, 1924.

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<sup>9</sup>For more details, see Hutchinson (1981), page 180.

### 3 Data

Our dataset draws on a number of different sources. We collect information on all legislative votes on migration policy that took place in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1897 and 1924, i.e. between the year in which the first initiative proposing the introduction of a literacy test provision was put forward and the year in which the nationality based quota system entered into force. We have used the detailed historical account of Hutchinson (1981) to identify them, and the VOTEVIEW project (<http://voteview.ucsd.edu>) of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) to obtain the corresponding voting records of individual representatives.

We restrict our attention to final passage votes, which determine whether a bill clears the House or not. In doing so, we exclude votes on amendments.<sup>10</sup> Seventeen bills are included in our sample and Table 3 summarizes their main characteristics. As it can be easily seen, in all the bills of the period, a majority of the House voted in favor of measures restricting the inflow of foreign nationals, and the only reason most of them were not enacted was a presidential veto. At the same time though, the margin of victory varied substantially over time, ranging between 12 votes in the case of H.R. 7864 of 1897, to 250 votes in the case of H.R. 7995 of 1924. Moreover, in several instances a large number of congressmen abstained from casting a ballot, highlighting how controversial the migration issue was in the period considered in our study.<sup>11</sup>

The VOTEVIEW database includes information on congressmen’s name, party affiliation, state of residence, and congressional district, which enable us to link legislators to their constituencies. The information on representatives’ age, tenure, educational attainment and experience in other offices has been obtained from ICPSR Study number 3371. As for the characteristics of their congressional district, we have encountered two main difficulties in gathering them. The first problem is that district-specific data are not readily available for the period we are studying, and must instead be constructed by aggregating county-level data obtained from decennial censuses. Importantly, a county may be split into different districts, and at the same time, a district might span several counties. Figure 7, depicting counties and congressional districts of the state of Massachusetts in the 62nd Congress, illustrates the type of challenges we have encountered. Consider for example Worcester county. Portions of it belong to Congressional districts 2, 3 and 4. If in turn we look at Congressional district 1, we can see that it encompasses Berkshire county in its entirety, and portions of Franklin, Hampshire and Hampden counties. The second issue is that the geographic definition of districts changes over time, following decennial censuses and the incorporation of new territories

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<sup>10</sup>We follow this approach to avoid including multiple decisions on the same legislation. Moreover, votes on amendments are often strategic and less likely to reflect the interests of a legislator’s constituency.

<sup>11</sup>On average 19 percent of the House did not cast a vote on the proposals considered in our analysis. We tackle the presence of a large number of abstentions in several ways. See the discussion in section 6.

in the Union.<sup>12</sup> We have addressed these concerns as follows. To obtain district-level data from county level information, we first extract county characteristics from the decennial censuses and then aggregate them at the district level. For those counties that were split across more than one district, we follow Baldwin and Magee (2000) among others, and construct weighted averages, which are based on the share of the population of a county assigned to that district. To deal with the problem of redistricting, we have kept track of changes in the boundaries of the constituencies that occurred after each of the censuses of 1900, 1910, and 1920.

Our dependent variable is the representative’s vote on bills regulating immigration ( $Vote_{idt}$ ), which takes a value of one if the congressman has voted in favor of a restrictionist measure. In our benchmark analysis, it takes instead a value of zero if the representative has either voted against the measure, or has abstained from casting a ballot.<sup>13</sup> The rationale for this choice is that each bill put forward was aimed at changing the existing status quo, and in a context in which the presidency was not keen to introduce a restrictionist measure, and repeatedly vetoed the bill approved by Congress, an abstention had an effect equivalent to a “no” vote. We assess the robustness of our choice of dependent variable in two ways. First, we use an alternative definition,  $VoteAlt_{idt}$  which takes a value of one if the congressman voted in favor of the bill and zero if he voted against it. In other words, we drop from our sample observations in which the representative “abstained”. Second, we run a Heckman selection model, in which we explicitly describe the voting process as a two-step decision in which the individual first chooses whether to cast or not a ballot, and next he decides whether to support or not the initiative.

Two sets of drivers are used to explain the voting behavior. The first is a group of district level measures; the second is a set of individual representative characteristics. We are interested in studying how the effects of voting restrictions vary depending on the importance of the foreign born population that is potentially entitled to exercise the franchise. To this end, we have constructed the variable  $High\ Foreign_{dt}$ , which is an indicator taking a value of one if the share of naturalized foreign born individuals is in the 90th percentile of the distribution across districts in our sample period. The 90th percentile of the distribution of the naturalized foreign born corresponds to a share of the total population of approximately 9.5 percent, but we have also experimented with alternative thresholds – see section 6.<sup>14</sup> To validate the role played by immigrant disenfranchisement, we have also experimented with

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<sup>12</sup>In particular, Oklahoma became the 46th US state in 1907, whereas Arizona and New Mexico joined the Union in 1912.

<sup>13</sup>For simplicity we have treated congressmen who decided not to vote (i.e. they abstained) and those who voted but did not express a preference (i.e. they voted “present”) as equivalent. The latter group represents a very small share of Congress, averaging one percent over our time period.

<sup>14</sup>Using a sample of US cities which were major destinations of immigrants around the turn of the twentieth century, Shertzer (2014) has also emphasized the idea that to be politically effective newly arrived immigrants had to be part of a minimal winning coalition.

demographic characteristics of the district to carry out a placebo exercise. In particular we have constructed an indicator variable taking a value of one if the share of individuals less than 21 years old ( $Age_{dt} < 21$ ) is in the 90th percentile of the distribution across districts in our sample period.<sup>15</sup> Our second key explanatory variable,  $Residency_{st}$  is an index of the residency requirements that must be fulfilled to exercise voting rights in state  $s$  at time  $t$ . As described by Keyssar (2009), they typically involved varying minimum thresholds at the state, county and precinct level and did change in the time period considered in the analysis. Our baseline measure is given by the sum of the requirements at these three levels, but in robustness checks we have experimented with alternative definitions. In particular we have also used separately requirements at the state, county and precinct level (respectively  $Residency\ State_{st}$ ,  $Residency\ County_{st}$  and  $Residency\ Precinct_{st}$ ) – see section 6.<sup>16</sup> Descriptive statistics on our main explanatory variable are illustrated in Table 1. Column (1) reports the total residency requirement in days at the beginning of our sample period, i.e. in 1896; column (2) reports the congress when the requirement was first changed and its new value, and finally column (3) reports the congress in which the requirement was changed for the second time and its new value. As we can see, out of the 45 states that were part of the Union in 1896, ten changed their residency threshold, and Louisiana did so twice, during both the 57th and 67th Congress. Moreover, in eight out of eleven instances the direction of the change was towards making it more restrictive. We have also investigated the role played by alternative barriers to exercise the franchise – namely literacy requirements ( $Literacy_{st}$ ) and poll taxes ( $PollTaxes_{st}$ ), which have been the focus of much attention in the existing literature.

To capture the role played by labor market drivers, we construct the variable  $Skilled_{dt}$ , which measures the share of individuals in the total population employed in clerical and professional occupations, or in sales and crafts.<sup>17</sup> To proxy for the long run trends in labor market participation we use  $Share\ Employed_{dt}$  i.e. the share of individuals aged 15-65 employed. To capture the sectoral composition of output in a district we use two variables: the total value of agricultural output ( $Value\ of\ Farm\ Product_{dt}$ ) and the total value of manufacturing output  $Value\ of\ Manufactured\ Product_{dt}$ , taken from ICSPR studies 13, 14 and 15.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to controlling for the ideological orientation of the individual congressmen, we account for the ideological leaning of a congressional district using the share of Democratic votes in the past election ( $Share\ Democrat_{dt}$ ). Our last set of district-level controls includes

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<sup>15</sup>During the period we are considering. the franchise was restricted to citizens 21 years and older, and universal female suffrage was introduced only with the Nineteenth Amendment in August 1920, even though several states had introduced it before. See Lott and Kenny (1999). See section 6 for more details.

<sup>16</sup>Note that residency requirements do not vary within state, as they are set at the state level.

<sup>17</sup>Unfortunately during the years studied in our analysis the Census did not collect information on individual level educational attainment.

<sup>18</sup>Note that in this period a measure of GDP at the district level is not available.

proxies for the degree of urbanization of the district, its ethnic composition and for the role played by organized groups active in the civil society. To this end we use Census data, and start by constructing the variable  $Urban_{dt}$  that captures the share of the population living in urban areas, to account for potential differences in attitudes towards immigration between cities and the countryside. We explore instead the role of possible coalitions among minorities in shaping migration policy by including  $Black_{dt}$ , i.e. the share of blacks in the population. Finally, we use the Census of Religious Bodies (ICPSR 8) to construct the share of Catholics and the share of Jewish in an electoral district ( $Share\ of\ Catholics_{dt}$ ,  $Share\ of\ Jewish_{dt}$ ), which is used to proxy for the intensity of the activities carried out by Catholic organizations, which as argued by the literature, played an important role in the immigration policy debate in these years (Tichenor, 2002).

The second sets of drivers includes standard individual-level controls. We start with a measure of ideology, which is proxied by  $Democrat_{it}$ , a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the representative is a member of the Democratic party. We further take into account regional differences among Democrats by including a dummy coded as 1 if the representative belongs to a Southern state ( $Southern\ Democrat_{it}$ ).<sup>19</sup> We have also used an alternative measure of a legislator’s ideology, namely the first dimension of the DW nominate score,  $DW\ Nominate_{it}$  which increases in an individual’s conservative orientation.<sup>20</sup> We additionally control for a representative’s age ( $Age_{it}$ ), tenure in office ( $Tenure_{it}$ ), whether he has attended or not an Ivy League institution for his tertiary education ( $Ivy\ League_{it}$ ), and finally whether he has held any previous office in the state, county or local municipality ( $Other\ of\ fice\ held_{it}$ ).

Table 4 provides summary statistics for the sample used in our analysis. The first stylized fact that emerges is the broad support for restrictionist measures. Slightly more than sixty percent of the recorded votes supported increasing barriers to the entry of foreigners. Turning to our main explanatory variable, namely the residency requirement to be eligible to vote, we see that on average the total time an individual needed to spend in the same state, county and precinct is 16.6 months or 1.38 years. More specifically the individual had to spend at least 12 months in the same state, 3.5 months in the same county and 22 days in the same precinct. These figures shows, like the voting behavior on immigration policy, a strong variation across congressional districts, and the main goal of our paper is to investigate whether there exists a systematic relationship between a representative’s voting behavior on immigration policy, the voting requirements and the share of foreign born in his home district.

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<sup>19</sup>Several studies of U.S. congressmen’s voting behavior distinguish between Northern and Southern Democrats (e.g. Peltzman 1985). We follow Brewer et al. (2002) and define the South as including: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

<sup>20</sup>The DW-nominate measure is provided by the VOTEVIEW project, and the average DW-Nominate score for every legislator is constrained to lie between 1 and -1.

## 4 Empirical analysis

Our goal is to study the determinants of a representative’s voting behavior on immigration policy measures introduced between 1897 and 1924. In particular, we are interested in exploring the role played by the immigrant voting bloc – which will be affected by both the size of the foreign born population entitled to vote and by how easy it is to materially exercise the franchise. More specifically, we estimate the following linear probability model:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Vote_{idt} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 HighForeign_{dt} + \beta_2 Residency_{st} + \delta Residency_{st} \times HighForeign_{dt} + \\
 & + \mathbf{X}'_{dt}\gamma_1 + \mathbf{Z}'_{it}\gamma_2 + I_t + I_s + I_{rt} + \epsilon_{idt}.
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

where  $Vote_{idt}$  is a dummy variable taking a value of one if representative  $i$  of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero otherwise.  $HighForeign_{dt}$  is an indicator variable capturing the presence of a high concentration of naturalized U.S. citizens in the district – in our benchmark analysis it takes a value of one if it exceeds 9.5%, i.e. if the district falls in the top decile of immigrant receiving congressional constituencies in our sample period;<sup>21</sup>  $Residency_{st}$  is our index of how stringent the residency requirements are in state  $s$  at time  $t$ ;  $\mathbf{X}'_{dt}$  is a matrix of additional controls at the district level, and  $\mathbf{Z}'_{it}$  is a matrix of individual characteristics. All our specifications include a set of year ( $I_t$ ) and state ( $I_s$ ) fixed effects, as well as region specific trends ( $I_{rt}$ ) to account for unobserved state-specific factors, common time varying unobserved shocks and potential Census–region specific trends.<sup>22</sup>

We start our analysis by investigating the average impact of a high concentration of naturalized immigrants and of residency requirements across all districts. Our results are reported in Table 5. Column (1) contains a parsimonious specification, in which we only control for the two key variables of interest and the full set of fixed effects. Our results indicate that representatives of high immigration districts are more likely to support open border policies, and two possible explanations have been suggested for this finding: the existence of social and family networks, and identification with minorities. First, freer immigration helps relatives and friends of existing immigrants enter the U.S. (Goldin, 1994), and several papers have emphasized the importance of immigrant networks in shaping migration flows (Munshi, 2003). Second, existing immigrants tend to identify with new immigrants due to their common experience (Tichenor, 2002). We also find that more stringent residency requirements are positively correlated with support for more restrictive migration policies, suggesting that dis-enfranchising geographically mobile subgroups of the population strengthens opposition to migration. In column (2) we additionally account for the role played by economic charac-

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<sup>21</sup>We experiment with alternative definitions in section 6.

<sup>22</sup>Note that we cannot use state year interactions as our main explanatory variable is defined exactly at that level.



teristics at the district level. We find that the structure of the economy plays an important role, and representatives elected in constituencies characterized by a larger manufacturing sector are less likely to support migration restrictive measures, whereas the opposite is true for representatives of districts in which the agricultural sector played a more important role. Our estimates are consistent with Goldin (1994), who suggests that throughout this period industrialists were actively involved in supporting open immigration policies and with the arguments made by Tichenor (2002), who points out that agrarian interests, especially in the South, opposed more open immigration after 1900. In column (3) we add a set of controls which capture the degree of urbanization and the ethnic composition at the district level. We find that voting behavior on immigration varies substantially between representatives of cities and rural areas: congressmen elected in more urban districts are less likely to support immigration restrictions. Moreover, we find some evidence for the idea that ethnic minorities might form political coalitions in favor of less restrictive immigration policies. These findings resemble previous results obtained for different eras by Gimpel and Edwards (1999) and Facchini and Steinhardt (2011). In column (4) and (5) we control also for a set of individual level characteristics of the representative. We start by accounting for his ideological orientation by looking at his party affiliation and by allowing this effect to potentially vary across areas of the United States.<sup>23</sup> Confirming previous arguments put forward in the literature (Tichenor, 2002), our analysis indicates that congressmen affiliated with the democratic party are less supportive of restrictionist measures than their republican counterparts. Still, there are significant differences between southern democrats and members of the same party elected elsewhere in the country, with the former being more likely to favor anti-immigration legislations (see Tichenor, 2002). Next, in column (5) we control also for a representative's age and for whether he has attended an Ivy League institution. While age has no effect on voting behavior, individuals educated in elite universities are more likely to support restrictive migration policies. This finding is broadly consistent with the Progressive ideology prevalent at the time among the intellectual elites, which inspired the influential Dillingham Commission Reports on immigration published in 1911.

Importantly, in all our specifications, more stringent residency requirements continue to be correlated with greater support for immigration restrictions, whereas the concentration of naturalized foreign born in the constituency has only a limited impact on representatives' voting behavior. What drives these findings? To start shedding light on the mechanism underlying our results, in column (6) we allow for the effect of residency requirements to vary between constituencies characterized by a high and those characterized by a low concentration of naturalized foreign born. In this way we can gather some evidence on the impact of a stronger residency requirements on the political power of a subgroup of the population –

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<sup>23</sup>As argued for instance by Peltzman (1985) during this period Southern Democrats tend to be more conservative than their Northern counterparts.

namely naturalized immigrants – which as argued in Section 3, exhibited a high propensity to relocate within the United States throughout this period. Our results indicate that for low-immigration districts, residency requirements do not affect voting behavior on immigration. The average effect we have uncovered in columns (1)-(5) is driven instead by high immigration districts, suggesting that the residency requirement might have disenfranchised disproportionately this group of the population, reducing its ability to influence the behavior of the locally elected congressman.

How large are these effects? Figure 8 illustrates the predicted probability of voting in favor of restriction, as a function of the length of the residency requirements. In panel (a), we consider districts characterized by a low share of naturalized foreign born, whereas panel (b) captures districts with a high share of naturalized immigrants. Panel (a) shows that the predicted probability of voting in favor of restricting immigration policy hovers around 0.6, and does not vary with the residency requirements if the potential immigrant voting bloc is small. Panel (b), on the other hand, illustrates that in the presence of large groups of naturalized citizens, a more stringent residency requirement has a significant and large impact on the congressman’s voting behavior. Consider for instance district 1 in Michigan and district 14 in New York State during the 62nd Congress. Both have high shares of immigrants, but while Michigan applies total residency requirements that are less stringent than the national average at 0.5 years, the opposite is true for New York State, where the residency requirement in this period are stable at 1.41 years. Our analysis indicates that, other things being equal, the representative of Michigan’s district is 16 percentage points less likely to support the restriction of immigration than the representative of New York State’s district, and that this difference is statistically significant.<sup>24</sup>

The evidence we have uncovered so far is consistent with the idea that elected representatives are less likely to support open immigration – even in the presence of a large potential immigrant voting bloc who favors an open door policy – in those constituencies that made it more difficult for mobile Americans to exercise their voting rights. One possible explanation for this finding is that longer residency requirements reduced immigrants’ ability to influence congressional elections, making them less likely to play a key role in choosing a representative, and thus decreasing the elected official’s accountability to this constituency’s preferences. If electoral accountability plays a key role in explaining these findings, we expect that – *ceteris paribus* – turnout will decline more in those states that have introduced stricter residency requirements. Furthermore, the role of the immigrant bloc should be greater in “marginal” districts, i.e. in constituencies that were won with a narrow margin in the previous election, than in those that were carried with a large majority. At the same time, the behavior of politicians ideologically committed to an open immigration stance should be less likely to be affected by changes in the electoral power of the immigrant voting bloc than the behavior

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<sup>24</sup>The p-value= 0.024.

of politicians with a more ambiguous position on this matter. Finally, short term electoral responsiveness to the preferences of a given constituency implies that changes in the franchise should affect the power only of naturalized immigrants, i.e. those eligible to vote, and not of those who did not become U.S. citizens.

We assess these arguments in Table 6. We start by investigating in column (1) the effect of residency requirements on voter turnout. Our results suggest that *ceteris paribus* turnout was higher in high immigration districts, but that it declined in those districts as residency requirements became more stringent. This evidence is compatible with a direct disenfranchisement effect of these measures. Next, in columns (2) and (3) we split the sample between “safe” districts, i.e. districts which were won in the previous election with a large margin of victory and the rest.<sup>25</sup> Our results indicate that restrictions to the franchise in high immigrant districts had an effect on a representatives’ voting behavior only if he was elected in a contested election. If he instead won a safe seat, more stringent residency requirements did not have a significant impact.<sup>26</sup> This finding is illustrated in the top two panels of Figure 9, where we have plotted the marginal effect of a high share of naturalized immigrants as a function of residency requirements. The left panel focuses on seats won with a large margin, whereas the right panel considers all other seats.

Next, we separate the sample between votes cast by “conservative” and “liberal” representatives as measured by the first dimension of the DW-nominate score.<sup>27</sup> Interestingly, our results suggest that liberal representatives’ voting behavior was not affected by residency requirements or the presence of large numbers of naturalized foreign born. At the same time, while conservative members of congress were less likely to support immigration policy restrictions in high immigration districts, they were less likely to do so in presence of stricter residency requirements, suggesting that the disenfranchisement of mobile migrants might have affected their choices.<sup>28</sup> The bottom two panels of Figure 9 illustrates this point.

Finally, we investigate whether the voting behavior of an elected representative was shaped by the overall presence of immigrants in his constituency, rather than only by those migrants that by becoming citizens were actually formally entitled to take part in elections. Interestingly, our results in the last column of Table 6 indicate that only the presence of naturalized foreign born mattered. This result is not surprising, as during most of the period we consider, less than half of the foreign born observed in the U.S. census became actually citizens, and

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<sup>25</sup>A safe district is one in which the margin of victory in was at least two standard deviations above the average margin of victory in our sample period. This corresponds to approximately 64 percentage points.

<sup>26</sup>This difference is statistically significant. A t-test of the difference in the interaction terms across these two types of districts delivers a statistic of 5.596 with an associated p-value of 0.018, as shown in the bottom panel of the table.

<sup>27</sup>A liberal (conservative) representative is characterized by a DW-nominate score below (above) the median of our sample period.

<sup>28</sup> A t-test of the difference in the interaction terms across these models shows that such differences are statistically significant at 10% confidence level (see bottom panel of the table).

return migration was widespread (see e.g. (Bandiera et al., 2013)).

## 5 Threats to identification

So far our results have highlighted that immigrant disenfranchisement is correlated with increased support for immigration restrictions by locally elected representatives in districts where the share of foreign born is sufficiently high as to hold politicians accountable at the time of election. Still, we are concerned that our analysis does not allow us to disentangle the effects of changes in the extent of the franchise from the impact of other unobserved, time-varying, district-level drivers. For instance, there might still be time-varying, labor market, geographical or even cultural shocks that affect both residency requirements and congressmen voting behavior. To address this potential source of omitted variable bias, we use a spatial discontinuity design. In particular, we compare all contiguous electoral districts that are located on opposite sides of a state border, exploiting differences in the policies adopted at the state level. Intuitively, unobserved local characteristics and shocks affecting two districts located at state borders should be broadly similar. At the same time, administrative boundaries provide assignment of districts to varying levels of residency requirements. As state borders are historically determined, and are not related to our variable of interest, assignment to the treatment can be considered random.

State border discontinuities have been used before in the literature to assess the causal impact of policy interventions that vary at the state level. For instance, Holmes (1998) uses this methodology to identify the effect of pro-business policies on employment in the manufacturing sector; Dube et al. (2010) to identify the effect of minimum wage legislation on employment, and Duranton et al. (2011) to assess the impact of local taxation on firm re-location and growth. Finally, in a recent historical paper Naidu (2012) has deployed this approach to study the effect of voting restrictions on political competition and public goods provision. We apply this identification strategy to address possible omitted variable biases in our analysis of congressmen voting behavior on migration policy during the progressive era.

To this end we build a dataset containing all contiguous electoral district pairs in the United States. To identify the congressional units located along state borders, we use the historical congressional district maps produced by Lewis et al. (2013). The sample of contiguous congressional districts is then given by all the district pairs that straddle a state boundary. As a result, each district in the sample is matched to at least one other district, but possibly more. Figure 10 illustrates for each congress the total number of districts which sent a representative to the House. As the number of states and population increased over time, this number increased from 353 in 1896 to 435 in 1924. The figure also reports the number of districts that are part of a contiguous district-pair that exhibits differences in residency requirements, as well as the average difference in the total residency requirements

between all pairs expressed in days. As we can see the gap in residency requirement is substantial and varies over the time period peaking at 215 days in 1912. This variation will allow us to identify the effect of different residency requirements within each pair.

Table 7 reports the summary statistics of the contiguous district sample. Contiguous districts represent a good control group to estimate the effect of changes in the franchise on support for immigration restriction as long as there is enough variation in the treatment (residency requirement), and the districts that straddle state borders are more similar to each other than to the average district in the country. The results in Table 7 indicate that this is indeed the case: there is as much variation in the treatment among contiguous districts as in the entire sample; moreover contiguous districts are more similar when it comes to our key explanatory variable, namely the share of districts with a large proportion of naturalized immigrants. This finding is confirmed by the balancing tests carried out in Table 8, where we fit a set of simple linear regressions of each explanatory variable on our treatment (the index of residency requirements), using both the contiguous districts and the full sample. In particular, as we can see immediately, the stringency of the residency requirements does not affect the probability that a district has a high share of naturalized foreign born individuals in the contiguous districts sample, whereas this effect is significant when considering the entire sample. A similar pattern holds also when we consider our proxy for the skill composition of the population.

The spatial discontinuity design is based on a modified version of equation (1) which is estimated on a set of contiguous district-pairs that share a state boundary. Because the same district can be in multiple pairs and be included multiple times, we follow Dube et al. (2010) in correcting the standard errors for the mechanic correlation that this implies, by clustering the standard errors at the state and border segment separately.<sup>29</sup> Our empirical model is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Vote_{ipt} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 HighForeign_{dt} + \beta_2 Residency_{st} + \delta Residency_{st} \times HighForeign_{dt} + \\
 & + \mathbf{X}'_{dt}\gamma + \mathbf{Z}'_{it} + I_t + I_s + I_{rt} + I_{pt} + \epsilon_{ipt}.
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{2}$$

Compared to equation (1), in equation (2) we have introduced a subscript  $p$  to indicate that districts might be repeated if they belong to multiple pairs and we have added district-pair specific time effects ( $I_{pt}$ ). These pair-year fixed effects allow us to control for within-pair unobservable characteristics that vary over time.<sup>30</sup> While the model in equation (1) assumes that any random district in the U.S. can work as a control group, the model in equation (2) emphasizes that the best control group is the district that shares a common border. To illustrate the source of the identifying variation used in our analysis, consider district 1

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<sup>29</sup>For details, see Dube et al. (2010) et al., page 952.

<sup>30</sup>To carry out this analysis we have tracked possible changes in district boundaries following decennial redistricting and have redefined pairs so that each of them remains time invariant.

in Iowa and district 1 in Missouri. Throughout our sample period, they shared a border and, until congress 66, had a constant difference in residency requirements of 145 days. In congress 66, Missouri increased its residency requirements to 425 days. Our analysis will take advantage of this type of changes that occur within a district pair over time.

Table 9 reports estimates of equation (2) following the same structure as Table 5. The results of the benchmark specification (column 6) confirm the key finding of our analysis: residency requirements have no effect in low-immigration districts, whereas they do have an impact in high-immigration districts, making the elected representative more likely to support immigration restrictions. Note also that the magnitudes of the coefficients uncovered are slightly larger in absolute value and more precisely estimated than those reported in Table 5, suggesting that our fixed effect estimates provide a lower bound to the true effects. At the same time, the greater similarity between districts straddling state boundaries is reflected in the loss of significance of the additional controls included in our various specifications: only a representative's political affiliation with the democratic party and his age continue to play a role in shaping his voting behavior.

A second potential source of omitted variable bias at the individual congressman level is represented by the fact that House Representatives might have enjoyed long political careers before entering national politics, taking up seats in the State Congress or acting as Governors. Through their actions in these roles, they might well have contributed to shape the variation in the residency requirements exploited in our analysis. To address this concern we proceed in two steps. First, in column 1 of Table 10 we focus only on those states (38 out a total of 48) that did not change residency requirements during the period, thus exploiting only the cross-sectional variation in the share of naturalized foreign born. The sign and significance of our baseline results are broadly unaffected. Next, in columns (2)-(4), using detailed information on congressmen biographies, we exclude from the sample votes cast by House Representatives who previously held important offices at the State level. In particular, in specification (2) we drop former state governors, in specification (3) we exclude individuals who previously served either in the State House or Senate, and in column (4) all individuals who served in any of these offices.<sup>31</sup> As we can see, even if the sample size declines substantially, the broad patterns identified in our benchmark analysis of Table 5 continue to hold.

A last source of concern is that immigrant's location decisions within the United States might be affected by the voting behavior of the local representative. In our baseline analysis we address this issue using information on the stock of naturalized foreign born that predates the congressman voting decision. For instance, while studying behavior on H.R. 18673 of 1907, we use information obtained from the 1900 Census. Still, our analysis exploits

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<sup>31</sup>An alternative approach to address this concern would be to use individual congressmen fixed effects. As we can see in Table ??, the average tenure in office for a House Representative during our sample period is only slightly over 4 years, which implies that only very few members of the House voted on multiple immigration bills.

variation in residency requirements set at the local level, to explain the voting behavior of a congressman at the national level.

## 6 Robustness

In this section, we assess the robustness of our empirical findings by implementing a number of additional specifications. We start by experimenting with alternative definitions of our dependent variable and by explicitly modeling the decision to cast a ballot on an immigration policy measure. Next, we further investigate the mechanism through which restrictions of the franchise affected voting behavior on immigration policy. We then consider alternative definitions of our main explanatory variables, and the role played by additional controls. Finally, we experiment with alternative sample structures.

As discussed in section 3, in our benchmark analysis our dependent variable  $Vote_{idt}$  takes a value of one if the representative has voted in favor of a restrictionist measure, and zero if he has either voted against it or if he has abstained. The rationale for this choice is that each bill put forward was aimed at changing the existing status quo, in a context in which the presidency was not keen to introduce a restrictionist measure and repeatedly vetoed the bills approved by Congress. In this environment an abstention had an effect equivalent to a “no” vote. Still, as shown in Table 3, representatives often chose to abstain – on average 19 percent of the House did not cast a vote on the proposals considered in our analysis. As a result, it is important to assess the robustness of our empirical findings to an alternative definition of our dependent variable and to explicitly accounting for the decision to cast a ballot. Table 11 reports our results. In column (1) we use an alternative dependent variable,  $VoteAlt_{idt}$  which takes a value of one if the congressman voted in favor of the bill, and zero if he voted against, and our results are comparable with those obtained in our benchmark specification in column (6) of Table 5. In columns (2) and (3) we report instead the results of a Heckman selection model, which is specified as follows:

$$Vote_{idt} = \mathbf{X}\beta + u_{idt} \tag{3}$$

$$CastBallot_{idt} = 1 \text{ if } \mathbf{Z}\gamma + e_{idt} \geq 0 \tag{4}$$

where  $\beta$  and  $\gamma$  are parameter vectors,  $\mathbf{X}$  and  $\mathbf{Z}$  are vectors of controls (with potentially common elements),  $u_{idt}$  and  $e_{idt}$  are normally distributed error terms and  $Corr(u_{idt}, e_{idt}) = \rho$ . Equation 3 is the main specification, whereas equation 4 models the possible presence of sample selection. In particular, note that  $Vote_{idt}$  is observed only if  $CastBallot_{idt} = 1$ . Of course, if  $\rho = 0$ , selection is not a concern, and equation 3 can be estimated consistently on its own. These ‘stand alone’ estimates are those reported in column (1) of Table 11. To identify the possible effect of selection, we need to include in equation 4 at least one

additional control that is not included in equation 3 and that, conditional on  $\mathbf{X}$ , affects the probability of casting a ballot without directly affecting the vote on the migration initiative.

To this end, for each representative we have constructed a proxy for his propensity to cast a ballot in that Congress,  $ShareVoted_{idt}$ , using the share of times he has voted “Yes” or “No” on all the measures for which roll call votes are available, with the exclusion of the immigration bills included in our analysis. Column (2) reports our estimates of the main equation, whereas column (3) presents the results for the selection equation. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no sample selection bias, as the estimate for  $\rho$  is negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, the coefficient of  $ShareVoted_{idt}$  is positive and strongly significant in the selection equation, suggesting that a greater average propensity to vote does also increase the likelihood that the representative will cast a ballot on migration bills. Still, our main results in column (6), Table 3 do not appear to be materially affected (see column (2)).

Our findings so far are consistent with the idea that residency requirements had a disproportionate effect on naturalized Americans’ ability to exercise the franchise. To provide further evidence for this mechanism, we carry out a series of placebo exercises, the results of which are reported in Table 12. We start by focusing on a subgroup for which we know that changes in the residency requirements did not have an effect on the ability to exercise voting rights, i.e. men aged 21 or less, which throughout this period were not allowed to cast a ballot. Our results are reported in column (1) and indicate that there is no differential impact of residency requirements on representatives’ voting behavior in constituencies with a high share of young individuals. We turn next to consider the effect of alternative measures to restrict access to the franchise, which were in place during the Progressive era: literacy tests and poll taxes. Both provisions have been shown to have an effect on voter turnout in the United States (Husted and Kenny, 1997), because they limited access to the franchise for specific subgroups of the population. What was their impact on support for immigration restrictions? Column (3) focuses on the role of literacy provisions captured by the indicator  $Literacy_{st}$ , which takes a value of 1 if a state had a literacy test in place in year  $t$ , whereas in column (4) we assess the effect of the presence of poll taxes, captured by the indicator  $PollTaxes_{st}$ , which takes a value of 1 if a state  $s$  charged a tax in year  $t$  to allow a citizen to vote. Our findings in column (3) indicate that literacy provisions did not have a differential impact on the support for immigration restrictions depending on the share of naturalized foreign born in the population. This result is not surprising, in the light of the evidence discussed in section 2, indicating that naturalized migrants are – if anything – slightly more likely than natives to know how to read and write. We uncover a similar pattern also when we focus on the effect of poll taxes, which is compatible with the idea that naturalized migrants during this period did not differ from natives in their labor market outcomes, as it has been recently argued by Abramitzky et al. (2014).



In Table 13 we experiment with alternative definitions of our key explanatory variables. In columns (1)-(5) we start by focusing on different definition of High Foreign born districts, whereas in columns (6)-(8) we consider residency requirements at different levels. In our baseline specification, we used an indicator taking a value of one if the share of naturalized foreign born individuals belongs to the 90th percentile of the distribution across our sample (i.e. it is above the 9.5 percent of the total population). In columns (1) and (2) we experiment with alternative thresholds, i.e. the district belongs to the 85th percentile (the corresponding threshold is 8%) and and the 95th percentile (11%) respectively. Our main results continue to hold, but the magnitude of the coefficients is larger as the the definition of High Immigration district becomes more restrictive.<sup>32</sup> In column (3) we have instead used the same definition as in our benchmark, but applied it to the distribution of naturalized foreign born in each congress and in column (4) we have considered instead the share of naturalized foreign born who have been in the country for more than 15 years. The sign and significance of our main results are unaffected. Interestingly though, we find that the direct impact of high foreign born is about 20% smaller when we restrict our attention to long term naturalized foreign born rather than looking at the overall group. This result is consistent with the idea that more recent immigrants were more in favor of an open door policy than their more established counterparts. To provide additional evidence for differences in preferences among individuals with a foreign background, in column (5) we replace our key explanatory variable with a similarly defined indicator capturing whether the district is characterized by a high number of second generation migrants.<sup>33</sup> Our results indicate no effect of the disenfranchisement of this group on the representative’s voting behavior, suggesting that second generation migrants’ preferences were perceived by elected politicians to be similar to those of native voters.

Turning to the residency requirement, our main analysis used an index given by the sum of the requirements at the state, county and precinct level. In column (6) to (8) we use instead each component separately, focusing only on the requirement at the state (column 6), county (column 7) and precinct level (column 8). Our findings suggest that the overall effect uncovered in the benchmark specification is driven by changes in the stringency of the requirements at the county level, rather than at the state or precinct level.<sup>34</sup>

In Table 14 we assess the robustness of our empirical analysis to the introduction of additional controls. In our main analysis we have accounted for a representative’s party affiliation, age and educational attainment. In columns (1) we further investigate the role

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<sup>32</sup>Note that if we make the definition less restrictive (i.e. share of naturalized foreign born less than 7%) the sign of the main coefficients of interest is unchanged, but they become no longer statistically significant. This confirms previous findings on how immigrant political power was a function of their ability to join minimum willing coalitions. See Goldin (1994) and Shertzer (2014) for more on this issue.

<sup>33</sup>Second generation migrants are individuals with at least one parent born abroad.

<sup>34</sup>See Appendix Table A1 for a detailed breakdown of the changes at the three different levels.

played by the congressmen career path. We focus on his tenure in office (column 1) and we find that it had a small but negative impact on support for immigration restrictions.

In columns (2)-(4) we account for a set of additional district-level controls. Lee et al. (2004) argue that an elected representative’s party affiliation is an imprecise proxy for a district’s partisan leaning. Consequently, in column (2) we also control for the extent of party strength in the previous congressional election, but we do not find any significant effect. As argued by many observers, pressure groups have played an important role in shaping immigration policy making during the Progressive era (Tichenor, 2002, Zolberg, 2006, Shertzer, 2014). In particular, Jewish and Catholic organizations have been at the forefront of the debate, typically lobbying in favor of maintaining an open door policy. To account for their role, we have experimented by including the share of Catholics and Jewish in the districts, taken from the Census of Religious Bodies (ICPSR 8), and report our results in columns (3) and (4). We find that a higher share of Catholics and Jewish is negatively related to restrictionists voting behavior – even if only the former has a significant impact – and this provides quantitative support for the existing historical narrative. At the same time, including these additional controls does not affect the findings of our benchmark analysis.

In columns (5) through (7) we further explore the role played by residency requirements on voting behavior. We start by investigating the impact of the disenfranchisement of native internal migrants in column (5),<sup>35</sup> and we find no significant effect on the likelihood that the elected representative will support stricter immigration control. The same holds true in column (6), when additionally control instead for the share of African Americans in the population. Importantly, including these drivers does not affect our main results. In column (7) we explore instead the role played by the diversity of the immigrant population. On the one hand, one might expect a more homogeneous migrant population to be able to exert greater influence on an elected politician. On the other, natives’ views and perceptions of immigrants might be exacerbated by the presence of large, homogenous groups of foreigners. As a result, the effect of diversity on a representative’s voting behavior is an empirical question. To capture its role, we introduce an indicator variable *HighDiversity*, which takes a value of one if the Birthplace Diversity index proposed by Alesina et al. (2016)<sup>36</sup> is larger than the median of the High Foreign born districts. Our result in column (7) indicate that in districts characterized by highly heterogeneous foreign born populations, in which residency requirements are low, elected politicians tend to oppose more actively immigration restrictions. At the same time, there is no additional effect of diversity in the presence of more stringent residency requirements. These results are broadly compatible with the view that

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<sup>35</sup>During our sample period the only information available on internal mobility in the standard U.S. Census compilations concerns the state of birth. Thus, our indicator for High Natives internal migration focuses on the share of individuals living in a state different from the one where they were born.

<sup>36</sup>This index is defined as  $Div_{pop} = 1 - \sum_i s_i^2$ , where  $s_i$  is the share of the foreign born population originating in country  $i$ .

more diverse immigrant communities are less likely to be perceived as a threat by the native population.

Table 15 explores the robustness of our results using alternative samples. Our analysis covers 14 final passage votes that took place in Congress between 1897 and 1924. Previous studies (e.g. Goldin 1994) have included also votes on four additional bills that were subsequently amended by the Senate<sup>37</sup>. In column (1) we consider also these bills in our analysis, and the results are unaffected.

As argued by Goldin (1994), politician elected in rural America played an important role in supporting the passage of restrictive legislation. In particular, she points out that “What shifts did occur in rural America from 1890 to 1920 were a retreat from an open immigration stance among older immigrant groups, such as Germans and Scandinavians in the upper midwestern areas, not a change of heart among the native born.” (page 224). Our data allows us to shed more light on these groups. In particular, in columns (2) and (3) we split our sample between votes cast by congressmen elected in the Midwest<sup>38</sup> and politicians elected elsewhere in the country. Comparing our findings, we can immediately see that while the broad patterns we have uncovered in our benchmark analysis hold in both subsample, the estimates are much more precise for the Midwest subsample. Interestingly, we find that politician elected in high immigrant districts are on average more likely to vote *against* restriction even in these part of the country, but that as residency requirements become more stringent, they are more likely to support closing the borders.

A defining moment in the history of migration policy making during the Progressive Era was the establishment by President Roosevelt in 1907 of the Immigration Commission, also known as the Dillingham Commission from the name of its chairman. The purpose of the commission was to apply modern scientific methods to assess the impact of recent immigrants on the host country’s economy and society. The Commission worked for three years, spent over a million dollars to fund research on the matter by the leading social scientists of the time and produced a massive 42–volume long report, which was published in 1911. The most important message from this undertaking was that recent immigration to the U.S. was vastly different from previous waves. As pointed out by Tichenor (2002), ... “Whereas old immigration brought skilled and industrious settlers who were well acquainted with republican institutions, newer arrivals represented an invasion of ‘unskilled laboring men’ from ‘less progressive countries of Europe’.” Several of the individual studies also relate a variety of social problems with the presence of new immigrants. To assess to what extent the report changed the political discourse on immigration policy, in columns (4) and (5) of Table 15 we split our sample between votes cast in the House before and after 1911. As we can see,

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<sup>37</sup>These are the bills: H.R. 7864, 27-Jan-97; S3175, 18-Dec-12; H.R. 6060, 4-Feb-14 and H.R. 7995, 12-Apr-24

<sup>38</sup>The Midwest includes: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota.

the pattern we have uncovered in our baseline analysis exist primarily after the Dillingham Commission issued its final report.

## 7 Conclusions

In this paper we have studied the role played by naturalized U.S. citizens in explaining congressional support for restrictive immigration policy measures during the Progressive era. Our analysis has delivered several interesting results. First, we find systematic evidence consistent with the idea that throughout the Progressive Era, foreign born Americans were in favor of keeping an open door policy: representatives elected in districts with a large share of naturalized citizens were less likely to support immigration restrictions than their counterparts for whom a foreign born constituency was less important. At the same time, as residency requirements became more stringent, the foreign born’s ability to influence the behavior of U.S. congressmen declined, making them more likely to support restriction. Interestingly, we find evidence that the channel through which immigrant preferences affected policy choices was the electoral booth: high immigrant districts exhibited higher voter turnout rates, which declined in the presence of stricter residency requirements. Moreover, congressmen were responsive to the immigrant constituency only if they were elected in a close race, or if they were not ideologically committed to an open door policy.

The immigration experience of many Western destination countries today resembles that of the U.S. at the beginning of the twentieth century. Over the past two decades large inflows have occurred, and it is not uncommon in many European countries to register a share of the population that is foreign born representing more than ten percent of the total. Economic and cultural integration have received much attention among social scientists, but several authors have started to document and study also the extent of immigrant’s political integration in destination countries (e.g. Dancygier et al. (2015)). Our analysis points out that migrants might well have different preferences from the rest of the host country polity, and these preferences might in turn affect the political process. At the same time, the extension of the franchise is likely to favor the assimilation and integration of foreign born nationals, by making them more willing to carry out “country specific” investments in the host society (Cox and Posner, 2009). Understanding this key tradeoff is crucial for the design of optimal immigration policies.

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# A Tables

Table 1: Variation in Residency Requirements, in days

State	Requirement in 1896, in days	Change 1	Change 2
Alabama	485	1185 (57th Congress)	
Arizona	365		
Arkansas	575		
California	395		
Colorado	280	465 (59th Congress)	
Connecticut	365		
Delaware	395	485 (57th Congress)	
Florida	545		
Georgia	545		
Idaho	210		
Illinois	485		
Indiana	210		
Iowa	240		
Kansas	180		
Kentucky	605		
Louisiana	395	910 (57th Congress)	820 (67th Congress)
Maine	0	90 (66th Congress)	
Maryland	545		
Massachusetts	545		
Michigan	180		
Minnesota	270		
Mississippi	1095		
Missouri	385	425 (66th Congress)	
Montana	395		
Nebraska	230		
Nevada	210		
New Hampshire	0		
New Jersey	515		
New Mexico	485		
New York	515		
North Carolina	1030		
North Dakota	635	485 (68th Congress)	
Ohio	415		
Oklahoma	575		
Oregon	180		
Pennsylvania	425		
Rhode Island	730		
South Carolina	1215		
South Dakota	575		
Tennessee	545		
Texas	545		
Utah	545		
Vermont	365		
Virginia	455	1125 (57th Congress)	
Washington	485		
West Virginia	425		
Wisconsin	395	375 (57th Congress)	
Wyoming	425	435 (62th Congress)	



Table 2: Average and Predicted Probability of Changing State of Residence, by Nativity and over Time

	1900-1910	1910-1920
	Average (Standard deviation)	
Natives	0.2413 (0.4280)	0.2259 (0.4183)
Migrants	0.4024 (0.4904)	0.4102 (0.4919)
	Predicted (Standard error)	
Natives	0.2165 (0.0203)	0.239 (0.0167)
Migrants	0.3956 (0.0676)	0.4201 (0.0723)
Observations	20775	20836

The first panel shows the average and standard deviation of an indicator that equals one if the state of residence in a Census differ from the state of residence in the previous Census.

The second panel shows predicted probabilities and standard errors, from a probit model in which the probability of changing state of residence in two subsequent censuses is explained by a full set of age dummies, year of immigration dummies and country/state of birth dummies.

Table 3: U.S. House Votes on immigration legislation, 1897-1924

	Cong.	Date	Bill	Dir	Brief Description	Yes	No	Abstained	Valid Records	Law?
(1)	54	09-Feb-97	H.R. 7864	Pro	Additional changes in the text of the literacy test provision	218	37	100	355	No
(2)	54	03-Mar-97	H.R. 7864	Pro	To override presidential veto	195	40	120	355	No
(3)	57	03-Mar-03	H.R. 12199	Pro	Increases and extension of the head tax	194	11	146	351	Yes
(4)	59	18-Feb-07	H.R. 18673	Pro	Further increases in the head tax and calls for a commission to study immigration	193	101	83	377	Yes
(5)	62	25-Jan-13	S. 3175	Pro	Restrictive bill that includes literacy provision	183	84	118	385	No
(6)	62	19-Feb-13	S. 3175	Pro	To override presidential veto	223	119	40	382	No
(7)	63	15-Jan-15	H.R. 6060	Pro	Increases and extension of the head tax	241	108	86	435	No
(8)	63	04-Feb-15	H.R. 6060	Pro	To override presidential veto	269	141	25	435	No
(9)	64	30-Mar-16	H.R. 10384	Pro	Restrictive bill that includes literacy provision, raises head tax	321	100	12	433	No
(10)	64	01-Feb-17	H.R. 10384	Pro	To override presidential veto	309	117	8	434	Yes
(11)	66	13-Dec-20	H.R. 14461	Pro	Suspension of immigration	316	60	58	434	No
(12)	67	13-May-21	H.R. 4075	Pro	Introduction of a quota system, based on the 1910 census figures	285	41	104	430	Yes
(13)	67	02-May-22	H.J.R. 268	Pro	Extension of operation of the immigration act of 1921	264	32	134	430	Yes
(14)	68	15-May-24	H.R. 7995	Pro	Introduction of quotas system	318	72	43	433	Yes

*Cong* and *Date* describe the congress/date in which/when the vote took place. *Bill* shows the name under which the bill is originating in the House of Representatives (H.R.) or Senate (S.). *Dir* shows whether the bill is pro or contra restricting immigration. *Brief description* provides some basic information about the content of the legislation. *Yes/No/Abstained/Present* show the overall number of yes/no/abstained and present votes. *Total votes* include the count of present individuals.

Table 4: Summary statistics

	Mean	Standard Deviation
Vote	0.6173	0.4861
VoteAlt	0.7493	0.4335
Residency	1.3892	0.6863
Residency State	1.0285	0.4217
Residency County	0.2945	0.2747
Residency Precinct	0.0661	0.0957
Literacy	0.2767	0.4474
Poll Tax	0.4750	0.4994
High Foreign	0.0981	0.2975
High Young	0.0997	0.2996
High Female	0.0998	0.2998
Skilled	0.4818	0.0797
Labor Force	0.5725	0.0494
Value of Farm Product (in logs)	14.1295	1.8464
Value of Mfg. Product (in logs)	15.1445	3.2284
Share Democrat	0.5167	0.2305
Black	0.1094	0.1766
Urban	0.4126	0.3067
Share of Catholics	0.1635	0.1495
Share of Jewish	0.0093	0.0774
Democrat	0.4590	0.4984
Southern Democrat	0.2492	0.4326
DW-Nominate	0.0560	0.4295
Age	49.9272	9.2998
Tenure	4.4415	5.2563
Ivy league	0.0933	0.2909
Other office held	0.6571	0.4747
N	5699	

*Vote* is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero otherwise. *VoteAlt* is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero if he voted against. *Residency* is an index capturing the number of years of residency in the state, county and parish required for voting. *High Foreign* is an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens is above the 90th percentile of the distribution for our sample period. *Skilled* represents the share of individuals employed in professional and clerical occupations, in sales and craft occupations. *Labor Force* represents the share of employed individuals aged 15-65. *Value of Farm Product* and *Value of Mfg Product* represent the value of farm product (not fed to livestock) and the value of products of all manufacturing establishments, in logs. *Black* represents the share of black individuals in the district, *Urban* represents the share of households residing in cities and incorporated places of 2,500+ inhabitants. *Democrat* is an indicator of the representative belonging to the democratic party. *Age* is the age of the representative at the beginning of the congress. *Rep. Tenure* is the number of years a representative has been in service at the beginning of the congress. *Attended Ivy League* is an indicator of the representative having attended an Ivy League school.

Table 5: Baseline specification: residency requirements, foreign-born population and immigration policy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
High Share of Foreign-Born	-0.1667*** (0.0397)	0.0044 (0.0369)	-0.0077 (0.0363)	-0.0006 (0.0407)	-0.0026 (0.0393)	-0.2942** (0.1365)
Residency	0.1047** (0.0450)	0.1054** (0.0460)	0.1082** (0.0454)	0.0886* (0.0491)	0.0887* (0.0495)	0.0879* (0.0494)
High Foreign x Residency						0.2478** (0.1156)
Skilled		-0.1640 (0.2399)	-0.2147 (0.2190)	-0.1476 (0.2360)	-0.1342 (0.2372)	-0.1950 (0.2380)
Labor Force		-0.4285 (0.3876)	0.2186 (0.4656)	0.2198 (0.4388)	0.2387 (0.4346)	0.2127 (0.4359)
Value of Farm Product (in logs)		0.0465*** (0.0095)	0.0334*** (0.0100)	0.0215** (0.0097)	0.0219** (0.0097)	0.0238** (0.0096)
Value of Mfg. Product (in logs)		-0.0542*** (0.0100)	-0.0311*** (0.0114)	-0.0239** (0.0102)	-0.0236** (0.0101)	-0.0266** (0.0104)
Black			-0.3295** (0.1251)	-0.3049** (0.1261)	-0.3081** (0.1258)	-0.3152** (0.1268)
Urban			-0.2464*** (0.0609)	-0.2541*** (0.0490)	-0.2610*** (0.0483)	-0.2529*** (0.0459)
Democrat				-0.2465*** (0.0333)	-0.2459*** (0.0328)	-0.2484*** (0.0329)
Southern Democrat				0.2011*** (0.0521)	0.2021*** (0.0525)	0.2046*** (0.0524)
Age					-0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0007 (0.0008)
Ivy league					0.0579** (0.0266)	0.0565** (0.0266)
Adj. R-Square	0.16	0.19	0.20	0.23	0.23	0.23
N	5699	5699	5699	5699	5699	5699

Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the state level.

All columns include region trends, state and time fixed effects and all controls of Table 5, column 6.

The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero otherwise. *Residency* is an index capturing the number of years of residency in the state, county and parish required for voting. *High Foreign* is an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens is above the 90th percentile of the distribution of our sample period. *Skilled* represents the share of individuals employed in professional and clerical occupations, in sales and craft occupations. *Labor Force* represents the share of employed individuals aged 15-65. *Value of Farm Product* and *Value of Mfg Product* represent the value of farm product (not fed to livestock) and the value of products of all manufacturing establishments, in logs. *Black* represents the share of black individuals in the district, *Urban* represents the share of households residing in cities and incorporated places of 2,500+ inhabitants. *Democrat* is an indicator of the representative belonging to the democratic party. *Age* is the age of the representative at the beginning of the congress. *Ivy League* is an indicator of the representative having attended an Ivy League school.

Table 6: Electoral channels

	Voter	Safe seat		Ideology		Non-
	Turnout	Yes	No	Liberal	Conservative	Citizens
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
High Share of Foreign-Born	0.3359*** (0.0874)	0.3799 (0.2971)	-0.3300** (0.1333)	-0.0597 (0.1817)	-0.3773*** (0.1316)	-0.1144 (0.1038)
Residency	-0.0385 (0.0390)	0.0223 (0.0920)	0.0762* (0.0385)	0.0869 (0.0649)	0.1152 (0.1180)	0.0884* (0.0493)
High Foreign x Residency	-0.3011*** (0.0853)	-0.3755 (0.3080)	0.2683** (0.1138)	0.0188 (0.1406)	0.3560*** (0.1254)	0.0102 (0.0761)
T-test difference interaction term		6.091		6.783		
P-Value		0.014		0.009		
Adj. R-Square	0.77	0.29	0.23	0.41	0.16	0.23
N	5309	1270	4291	2821	2878	5699

All columns include region trends, state and time fixed effects; columns (2)-(6) additionally include all controls of Table 5, column 6.

All regressions have robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the state level. In all columns, *Residency* is an index capturing the number of years of residency in the state, county and parish required for voting and *High Foreign* is an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens is above the 90th percentile of the distribution for our sample period.

*Voter Turnout* represents a regression in which the dependent variable is the share of eligible voters who casted a ballot in the previous election. In addition to the baseline fixed effects, shown in the table, we also control region trends, state and time fixed effects interacted with the indicator for high share of naturalized. *Safe seat* indicates districts in which the margin of victory exceeds 36%. This threshold corresponds to the average margin of victory in the House for each congress plus one standard deviation. According to this definition, 22% of observations in our sample refer to safe seats. We exclude districts with representatives at large. *Ideology* indicates districts in which the ideology of the representative, as captured by the first dimension of the DW-nominate score, is above (Conservative) or below (Liberal) the median of the period. These last two regressions exclude indicators for being a Democrat and a Democrat in the South.

*Non-Citizens* indicates a regression in which is an indicator that equals one if the share of non-naturalized foreign-born in the country is above the 90th percentile of the distribution for our sample period.

Table 7: Summary statistics: contiguous districts sample

	Mean	Standard Deviation
Vote	0.6952	0.4603
Residency	1.4068	0.7459
High Foreign	0.0540	0.2260
Skilled	0.4962	0.0821
Labor Force	0.5659	0.0525
Value of Farm Product (in logs)	13.8777	2.3038
Value of Mfg. Product (in logs)	14.0740	3.2673
Black	0.1175	0.1814
Urban	0.2968	0.2258
Democrat	0.4672	0.4990
Southern Democrat	0.2738	0.4459
Age	49.9476	9.3745
Ivy league	0.0622	0.2415
N	8170	

*Vote* is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero otherwise. *VoteAlt* is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero if he voted against. *Residency* is an index capturing the number of years of residency in the state, county and parish required for voting. *High Foreign* is an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens in the country for more than 15 years is above the 90th percentile of the distribution for year  $t$ . *Skilled* represents the share of individuals employed in professional and clerical occupations, in sales and craft occupations. *Labor Force* represents the share of employed individuals aged 15-65. *Value of Farm Product* and *Value of Mfg Product* represent the value of farm product (not fed to livestock) and the value of products of all manufacturing establishments, in logs. *Black* represents the share of black individuals in the district, *Urban* represents the share of households residing in cities and incorporated places of 2,500+ inhabitants. *Democrat* is an indicator of the representative belonging to the democratic party. *Age at first election* is the age of the representative when first elected. *Rep. Tenure* is the number of years a representative has been in service. *Ivy League* is an indicator of the representative having attended an Ivy League school.

Table 8: Balancing of the sample

	Contiguous District Sample		Overall Sample	
	Coeff on Restr	P-value	Coeff on Restr	P-value
High Share FB	0.007	0.157	-0.044	0.000
Skilled	0.001	0.337	-0.026	0.000
Labor Force	0.014	0.000	0.026	0.000
Value Farm	-0.085	0.096	-0.235	0.000
Value Manuf	-0.333	0.000	-0.712	0.000
Urban	-0.009	0.024	-0.097	0.000
Democ	0.111	0.000	0.323	0.000
Dem South	0.158	0.000	0.416	0.000
Age	-0.452	0.060	-1.135	0.000
Ivy	0.028	0.000	-0.006	0.000
Black	0.050	0.000	0.179	0.000

The table shows the difference in characteristics as residency requirements change, in the full sample and in the contiguous district sample. The reported estimates are coefficient of a regression of the mentioned characteristics on the residency index.

Table 9: Contiguous-district specification: residency requirements, foreign-born population and immigration policy

	(1)	(2)
High Share of Foreign-Born	-0.4720*** (0.1406)	-0.4711*** (0.1430)
Residency	0.0345 (0.0608)	0.0345 (0.0610)
High Foreign x Residency	0.4577*** (0.1455)	0.4568*** (0.1479)
Skilled		0.0200 (0.4980)
Labor Force	-0.1698 (0.5102)	-0.1588 (0.5668)
Value of Farm Product (in logs)	0.0226 (0.0179)	0.0225 (0.0180)
Value of Mfg. Product (in logs)	-0.0045 (0.0182)	-0.0043 (0.0177)
Black	-0.0994 (0.2111)	-0.0966 (0.2133)
Urban	-0.2254 (0.1840)	-0.2245 (0.1895)
Democrat	-0.1529*** (0.0525)	-0.1528*** (0.0526)
Southern Democrat	-0.0426 (0.0842)	-0.0425 (0.0846)
Age	-0.0024 (0.0014)	-0.0024 (0.0014)
Ivy league	0.0425 (0.0523)	0.0426 (0.0523)
Adj. R-Square	0.32	0.32
N	8170	8170

Robust standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered on the state and border segment levels. A border segment is to be intended as the set of all districts on both sides of a border between two states.

All columns include region trends, state and time fixed effects and all controls of Table 5, column 6. See Table 5 for variable description.

The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero otherwise.



Table 10: Threats to identification: Reverse Causality

	Exclude Non-changing States	Exclude Governor	Exclude House Rep./Senator	Exclude all with experience
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High Share of Foreign-Born	-0.2422** (0.1172)	-0.3027** (0.1395)	-0.1877 (0.1478)	-0.1863 (0.1482)
Residency		0.0951* (0.0513)	0.1130** (0.0450)	0.1141** (0.0489)
High Foreign x Residency	0.1906* (0.1015)	0.2663** (0.1176)	0.2079* (0.1205)	0.2098* (0.1200)
Skilled	-0.2817 (0.2287)	-0.2548 (0.2238)	-0.3897* (0.1982)	-0.3862** (0.1917)
Labor Force	0.1082 (0.5036)	0.0347 (0.4737)	-0.0909 (0.5746)	-0.0752 (0.5814)
Value of Farm Product (in logs)	0.0233** (0.0097)	0.0264*** (0.0097)	0.0221** (0.0100)	0.0220** (0.0099)
Value of Mfg. Product (in logs)	-0.0177 (0.0127)	-0.0289*** (0.0103)	-0.0286*** (0.0089)	-0.0296*** (0.0089)
Black	-0.3902*** (0.1379)	-0.3383** (0.1462)	-0.4457** (0.1948)	-0.4318** (0.1955)
Urban	-0.2950*** (0.0505)	-0.2281*** (0.0523)	-0.2706*** (0.0803)	-0.2769*** (0.0792)
Democrat	-0.2404*** (0.0354)	-0.2585*** (0.0331)	-0.2330*** (0.0355)	-0.2386*** (0.0358)
Southern Democrat	0.1781*** (0.0546)	0.2055*** (0.0491)	0.1554** (0.0697)	0.1569** (0.0658)
Age	-0.0011 (0.0009)	-0.0008 (0.0009)	-0.0003 (0.0013)	-0.0003 (0.0014)
Ivy league	0.0569* (0.0283)	0.0535* (0.0279)	0.0203 (0.0322)	0.0217 (0.0326)
Adj. R-Square	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23
N	4787	5308	3420	3372

Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the state level.

All columns include region trends, state and time fixed effects and all controls of Table 5, column 6. See table 5 for variable description

The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero otherwise. *Exclude non-changing states* is a regression in which only states that do not change residency requirements over time are kept. *Exclude Governor* is a regression in which we exclude representatives who served as governors in last non-judicial state office held prior to service in the House. *Exclude House Rep.* is a regression in which we exclude representatives who served in the State House in last non-judicial state office held prior to service. *Exclude Senator* is a regression in which we exclude representatives who served in the State Senate in last non-judicial state office held prior to service. *Exclude all with experience* is a regression in which we exclude representatives who served as Governors, House representatives or the State Senators in last non-judicial state office held prior to service.

Table 11: Robustness checks: alternative specifications of the dependent variable

	Heckman		
	VoteAlt	Outcome	Selection
	(1)	(2)	(3)
High Share of Foreign-Born	-0.2975* (0.1492)	-0.2608*** (0.0828)	-0.2523 (0.3306)
Residency	0.0609 (0.0618)	0.0187 (0.0403)	0.2291* (0.1255)
High Foreign x Residency	0.2495* (0.1267)	0.2187*** (0.0672)	0.1353 (0.2689)
Skilled	-0.2220 (0.2165)	-0.3414*** (0.1210)	0.5285 (0.4968)
Labor Force	0.1687 (0.4524)	-0.2178 (0.2410)	2.5980** (1.0598)
Value of Farm Product (in logs)	0.0262** (0.0101)	0.0248*** (0.0069)	-0.0236 (0.0304)
Value of Mfg. Product (in logs)	-0.0280** (0.0115)	-0.0283*** (0.0066)	0.0297 (0.0290)
Black	-0.2618*** (0.0945)	-0.1404 (0.0864)	-0.6513* (0.3753)
Urban	-0.3176*** (0.0507)	-0.2904*** (0.0457)	-0.2667 (0.2031)
Democrat	-0.2712*** (0.0376)	-0.2689*** (0.0153)	-0.1270* (0.0661)
Southern Democrat	0.1683*** (0.0523)	0.1519*** (0.0434)	0.0824 (0.1693)
Age	-0.0006 (0.0011)	-0.0002 (0.0006)	-0.0025 (0.0024)
Ivy league	0.0525 (0.0332)	0.0491** (0.0202)	-0.0018 (0.0817)
ShareVoted	-	-	3.7502*** (0.1795)
Mills ratio		-0.1890	
St. error Mills ratio		0.0303	
Rho		-0.5461	
Adj. R-Square	0.33		
N	4695	5699	

All columns include region trends, state and time fixed effects and all controls of Table 5, column 6. All regressions have robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the state level.

*VoteAlt* is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero if voted against. The Heckman selection model describes the voting process as a two-step decision: the selection equation estimates first the likelihood of an individual casting or not a ballot on a migration bill; then the outcome equation estimates the likelihood of a representative then deciding whether to support or not the initiative.

Table 12: Placebo tests

	Placebo	Alternative Restrictions	
	High Young	Literacy	PollTax
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Placebo Variable	-0.1008 (0.0723)		
Residency	0.0810 (0.0535)		
Placebo Variable $\times$ Residency	0.0261 (0.0375)		
Literacy		0.1541*** (0.0534)	
High Foreign Born $\times$ Literacy		-0.0677 (0.0871)	
Poll Tax			-0.0564 (0.0879)
High Foreign Born $\times$ Poll Tax			0.0433 (0.0606)
High Share of Foreign-Born		0.0112 (0.0382)	-0.0136 (0.0378)
Skilled	-0.0987 (0.2460)	-0.1436 (0.2345)	-0.1292 (0.2376)
Labor Force	0.2838 (0.4280)	0.2036 (0.4312)	0.2643 (0.4377)
Value of Farm Product (in logs)	0.0220** (0.0102)	0.0229** (0.0094)	0.0226** (0.0094)
Value of Mfg. Product (in logs)	-0.0240** (0.0100)	-0.0245** (0.0101)	-0.0241** (0.0102)
Black	-0.3247*** (0.1178)	-0.3037** (0.1271)	-0.3210** (0.1234)
Urban	-0.2663*** (0.0496)	-0.2539*** (0.0475)	-0.2561*** (0.0502)
Democrat	-0.2458*** (0.0326)	-0.2445*** (0.0313)	-0.2475*** (0.0331)
Southern Democrat	0.1920*** (0.0575)	0.2037*** (0.0506)	0.2142*** (0.0542)
Age	-0.0007 (0.0009)	-0.0006 (0.0009)	-0.0007 (0.0008)
Ivy league	0.0579** (0.0269)	0.0564** (0.0269)	0.0585** (0.0268)
Adj. R-Square	0.23	0.23	0.23
N	5699	5699	5699

All columns include region trends, state and time fixed effects and all controls of Table 5, column 6. All regressions have robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the state level.

*High Young* is an indicator for the share of individuals less than 21 years old exceeding the 90th percentile of our sample period. *High Female* is an indicator for the share of females exceeding the 90th percentile of our sample. We restrict the analysis to those states in which female suffrage was restricted. *Literacy* is an indicator that equals one if the state had imposed literacy requirements. *PollTax* is an indicator that equals one if the state had imposed poll taxes.

Table 13: Robustness checks: alternative definitions of foreign born and residency requirements

	Alternative Definitions of Foreign Born					Alternative Definitions of Residency		
	85th Pct	95th Pct	90th Pct in $t$	Long Stay	Second Gen.	State	County	Precinct
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
High Share of Foreign-Born	-0.1722** (0.0771)	-0.3604*** (0.0919)	-0.2749*** (0.0789)	-0.3127*** (0.0844)	-0.1400 (0.1161)	-0.1686* (0.0971)	-0.1244*** (0.0371)	-0.0224 (0.0516)
Residency	0.0886* (0.0494)	0.0885* (0.0495)	0.0879* (0.0493)	0.0878* (0.0492)	0.0883* (0.0494)	0.1451* (0.0827)	0.3210*** (0.0890)	-0.3235 (0.4349)
High Foreign x Residency	0.1415** (0.0677)	0.3174*** (0.0895)	0.2007*** (0.0637)	0.2146*** (0.0755)	0.0847 (0.1044)	0.1838 (0.1162)	0.6116*** (0.1963)	0.2767 (0.8361)
Skilled	-0.1856 (0.2442)	-0.2055 (0.2350)	-0.1985 (0.2443)	-0.1765 (0.2390)	-0.1507 (0.2610)	-0.1686 (0.2392)	-0.1616 (0.2307)	-0.1324 (0.2394)
Labor Force	0.2239 (0.4378)	0.2056 (0.4410)	0.2337 (0.4380)	0.2677 (0.4481)	0.2595 (0.4367)	0.2274 (0.4337)	0.2403 (0.4361)	0.2413 (0.4325)
Value of Farm Product (in logs)	0.0229** (0.0099)	0.0232** (0.0095)	0.0216** (0.0097)	0.0209** (0.0096)	0.0208* (0.0110)	0.0229** (0.0097)	0.0242** (0.0094)	0.0213** (0.0095)
Value of Mfg. Product (in logs)	-0.0249** (0.0101)	-0.0256** (0.0104)	-0.0242** (0.0100)	-0.0235** (0.0099)	-0.0230** (0.0110)	-0.0251** (0.0103)	-0.0259** (0.0103)	-0.0238** (0.0104)
Black	-0.3148** (0.1263)	-0.3165** (0.1274)	-0.3220** (0.1255)	-0.3231** (0.1267)	-0.3177** (0.1259)	-0.3132** (0.1260)	-0.3125** (0.1265)	-0.3146** (0.1225)
Urban	-0.2594*** (0.0514)	-0.2585*** (0.0474)	-0.2546*** (0.0516)	-0.2581*** (0.0507)	-0.2588*** (0.0487)	-0.2578*** (0.0474)	-0.2524*** (0.0469)	-0.2596*** (0.0492)
Democrat	-0.2472*** (0.0330)	-0.2473*** (0.0324)	-0.2468*** (0.0328)	-0.2459*** (0.0323)	-0.2441*** (0.0316)	-0.2466*** (0.0327)	-0.2503*** (0.0331)	-0.2481*** (0.0327)
Southern Democrat	0.2034*** (0.0525)	0.2034*** (0.0524)	0.2036*** (0.0523)	0.2029*** (0.0521)	0.2007*** (0.0516)	0.2045*** (0.0522)	0.1999*** (0.0510)	0.2140*** (0.0535)
Age	-0.0007 (0.0009)	-0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0008 (0.0009)	-0.0008 (0.0008)	-0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0007 (0.0008)
Ivy league	0.0581** (0.0271)	0.0562** (0.0271)	0.0557** (0.0276)	0.0578** (0.0269)	0.0576** (0.0274)	0.0570** (0.0267)	0.0568** (0.0266)	0.0583** (0.0265)
Adj. R-Square	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23
N	5699	5699	5699	5699	5699	5699	5699	5699

All columns include region trends, state and time fixed effects and all controls of Table 5, column 6.

All regressions have robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the state level.

*85th Pct* defines *High Foreign* as an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens is above the 85th percentile of the distribution of our sample period. *95th Pct* defines *High Foreign* as an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens is above the 95th percentile of the distribution of our sample period. *90th Pct in t* defines *High Foreign* as an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens is above the 90th percentile of the distribution in each congress  $t$ . *Long Stay* defines *High Foreign* as an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens in the country for at least 15 years is above the 90th percentile of the distribution of our sample period. *Second Gen.* uses indicators for the share of second generation migrants being in the 90th percentile of the distribution of our sample period and the interaction of this variable with Residency. *State*, *County* and *Precinct* indicate n. of years of residency required in the state (only), in the county (only) or in the precinct (only).

Table 14: Robustness checks: alternative controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
High Share of Foreign-Born	-0.2924** (0.1354)	-0.2839** (0.1385)	-0.2746* (0.1540)	-0.2938** (0.1366)	-0.2953** (0.1366)	-0.2854** (0.1387)	-0.2445* (0.1396)
Residency	0.0857* (0.0493)	0.0850* (0.0497)	0.0878* (0.0498)	0.0879* (0.0494)	0.0872* (0.0497)	0.1062* (0.0544)	0.0884* (0.0493)
High Foreign $\times$ Residency	0.2491** (0.1147)	0.2411** (0.1169)	0.2538* (0.1262)	0.2475** (0.1158)	0.2504** (0.1159)	0.2451** (0.1167)	0.2554** (0.1153)
Tenure	-0.0037** (0.0017)						
Share Democrat		0.0689 (0.0623)					
Share of Catholics			-0.4723*** (0.1697)				
Share of Jewish				-0.0141 (0.0632)			
Natives Internal Migration					-0.0278 (0.1069)		
Natives Internal Migration $\times$ Residency					0.0481 (0.0846)		
High Share of Blacks						0.0187 (0.0804)	
High Share of Blacks $\times$ Residency						-0.0328 (0.0388)	
High Diversity $\times$ High Foreign							-0.4773* (0.2461)
High Diversity $\times$ High Foreign $\times$ Residency							0.2621 (0.1920)
Adj. R-Square	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23
N	5699	5699	5699	5699	5699	5699	5699

All columns include region trends, state and time fixed effects and all controls of Table 5, column 6.

All regressions have robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the state level.

The dependent variable is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the representative of district  $d$  has voted in favor of a bill restricting migration at time  $t$ , and zero otherwise. *Residency* is an index capturing the number of years of residency in the state, county and parish required for voting. *High Foreign* is an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens is above the 90th percentile of the distribution for our sample period. *Natives Internal Migration* is an indicator that equals one if the share of natives in the district whose state of birth differ from the state of residence is above the 90th percentile of the distribution for our sample period. *High Share of Blacks* is an indicator that equals one if the share of blacks is in the 90th percentile of the distribution in our sample. *High Diversity* is an indicator that equals one if the diversity within the migrant population is above the median of the distribution in our sample.

Table 15: Robustness checks: alternative samples

	Include	Regions		Time-period	
	All Votes	Non-South	Midwest	Pre-1911	Post-1911
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(4)
High Share of Foreign-Born	-0.2417* (0.1204)	-0.3089** (0.1159)	-0.3757** (0.1451)	-0.1995 (0.1631)	-0.2775** (0.1296)
Residency	0.0804* (0.0423)	0.5701** (0.2530)	0.9927*** (0.1940)	0.1477*** (0.0388)	-0.6925 (0.6643)
High Foreign $\times$ Residency	0.1925* (0.0994)	0.2623** (0.0984)	0.3787** (0.1506)	0.1080 (0.1385)	0.2304** (0.1125)
Skilled	-0.1462 (0.2424)	-0.4728** (0.2051)	-0.2943 (0.4453)	0.2051 (0.3724)	-0.2123 (0.2659)
Labor Force	0.0795 (0.4019)	-0.0406 (0.3574)	-1.0051*** (0.3162)	1.5968** (0.6335)	-0.2553 (0.5635)
Value of Farm Product (in logs)	0.0287*** (0.0088)	0.0359*** (0.0097)	-0.0269 (0.0342)	-0.0041 (0.0267)	0.0381*** (0.0112)
Value of Mfg. Product (in logs)	-0.0288*** (0.0096)	-0.0385*** (0.0079)	-0.0517* (0.0283)	0.0079 (0.0213)	-0.0377*** (0.0120)
Black	-0.2587** (0.1128)	-0.4164 (0.2723)	-0.8777 (0.9158)	-0.5812*** (0.2054)	-0.2000 (0.1620)
Urban	-0.2382*** (0.0522)	-0.2182*** (0.0534)	-0.0174 (0.2368)	-0.2882*** (0.1058)	-0.2184*** (0.0651)
Democrat	-0.2145*** (0.0343)	-0.2013*** (0.0295)	-0.1609*** (0.0405)	-0.4288*** (0.0639)	-0.1641*** (0.0344)
Age	-0.0009 (0.0008)	-0.0009 (0.0009)	-0.0022** (0.0010)	-0.0010 (0.0014)	-0.0009 (0.0010)
Ivy league	0.0601** (0.0288)	0.0499* (0.0287)	0.0185 (0.0859)	0.0040 (0.0481)	0.0772** (0.0351)
Adj. R-Square	0.24	0.24	0.15	0.22	0.30
N	7312	4150	1934	1457	4242


All columns include region trends, state and time fixed effects and all controls of Table 5, column 6.

All regressions have robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the state level.

*Include All Votes* keeps all votes, including non-final passage votes. See text for details. In *Pre-1911* and *Post-1911* the sample is split into two subperiods: before and after 1911, year in which the 41-volume report of the United States Immigration Commission were issued. In *Midwest* we keep only states in the Midwest and in *Other* we keep all states that are not in the Midwest. *Residency* is an index capturing the number of years of residency in the state, county and parish required for voting. *High Foreign* is an indicator that equals one if the share of naturalized citizens is above the 90th percentile of the distribution for our sample period.

## B Figures

Figure 1: Foreign-born arrivals and stocks, 1850-1940.




(a) Foreign-born arrivals



(b) Foreign-born stocks


Source: U.S. Census (stocks) and Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition online (flows).

Figure 2: Stock of foreign-born individuals, by citizenship and length of stay, over time



Source: Authors' calculations based on the 1900-1920 IPUMS Census data.

Figure 3: Literacy rates, by citizenship, over time.




Source: Authors' calculations based on the 1900-1920 IPUMS Census data.


Notes: Literacy is defined as being able to read and write. Native born are individuals born in the U.S., foreign born are individuals born abroad, individuals born abroad who have received first papers but have not naturalized yet. Naturalized individuals are foreign born who have taken U.S. citizenship.



Figure 4: Distribution of the naturalized and non-naturalized foreign-born population in 1920, across electoral districts




(a) Share of foreign born by district




(b) Share of naturalized foreign born by district

Source: Authors' calculations based on the 1900-1920 IPUMS Census data.

Figure 5: Share of internal migrants, by states and nativity, in 1920




(a) Share of native internal migrants, 1910-1920, by state




(b) Share of foreign born internal migrants, 1910-1920, by state

*Source:* Authors' calculations based on Abramitzky et al. (2014). We constructed an indicator that equals one if the state of residence in 1920 differ from the state of residence in 1910, by nativity. *Notes:* The maps represent the 1920 share of natives and foreign-born migrants who arrived in states in the last ten years (i.e. between 1910 and 1920). We have dropped the states for which statistics are based on less than 10 observations.

Figure 6: New destination states, by nativity, in 1920



(a) Natives




(b) Foreign-born

*Source:* Authors' calculations based on Abramitzky et al. (2014).


*Notes:* We define “new destination” as those states for which the share of new arrivals has increased between 1910 and 1920 (i.e. we calculate the change between the share of arrivals in the last ten years in state  $s$  in 1920 and the share of arrivals in the last ten years in state  $s$  in 1910 and define new destinations to be those states for which the change is strictly positive). We have dropped the states for which statistics are based on less than 10 observations.

Figure 7: Counties and congressional districts




Source: Congressional Directory, Congress 62

Figure 8: Predicted probability of voting in favor of immigration restrictions, by presence of foreign born.




Source: Authors' calculations.


Figure 9: Marginal effects of the presence of naturalized citizens on the probability of voting in favor of immigration restrictions: electoral channels.




(a) Safe seat: Yes



(b) Safe seat: No




(c) Liberal



(d) Conservative

Notes: Panel (a) and (b) show the marginal effect of *High Foreign* in districts which were won in the previous election with a high and low margin of victory respectively. Panel (c) and (d) show the marginal effect of *High Foreign* in districts with a liberal or conservative representative. See text for additional explanations.

Figure 10: Number of districts in a pair with residency requirement differential and average differential in days.



Source: Authors' calculations.

# A Tables

Table A1: Variation in Residency Requirements, in Days, by State, County and Precinct.

State	Requirement in 1896, in days			Change 1 (Change 2)		
	State	County	Precinct	State	County	Precinct
Alabama	365	90	30	730	365	90
Arizona	365	0	0	0	0	0
Arkansas	365	180	30	0	0	0
California	365	0	30	0	0	0
Colorado	180	90	10	365	90	10
Connecticut	365	0	0	0	0	0
Delaware	365	30	0	365	90	30
Florida	365	180	0	0	0	0
Georgia	365	180	0	0	0	0
Idaho	180	30	0	0	0	0
Illinois	365	90	30	0	0	0
Indiana	180	0	30	0	0	0
Iowa	180	60	0	0	0	0
Kansas	180	0	30	0	0	0
Kentucky	365	180	60	0	0	0
Louisiana	365	0	30	730 (730)	0	180 (90)
Maine	0	0	0	90	0	0
Maryland	365	180	0	0	0	0
Massachusetts	365	180	0	0	0	0
Michigan	180	0	0	0	0	0
Minnesota	180	0	90	0	0	0
Mississippi	730	365	0	0	0	0
Missouri	365	0	20	365	60	0
Montana	365	30	0	0	0	0
Nebraska	180	40	10	0	0	0
Nevada	180	30	0	0	0	0
New Hampshire	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Jersey	365	150	0	0	0	0
New Mexico	365	90	30	0	0	0
New York	365	120	30	0	0	0
North Carolina	730	180	120	0	0	0
North Dakota	365	180	90	365	90	30
Ohio	365	30	20	0	0	0
Oklahoma	365	180	30	0	0	0
Oregon	180	0	0	0	0	0
Pennsylvania	365	60	0	0	0	0
Rhode Island	730	0	0	0	0	0
South Carolina	730	365	120	0	0	0
South Dakota	365	180	30	0	0	0
Tennessee	365	180	0	0	0	0
Texas	365	180	0	0	0	0
Utah	365	120	60	0	0	0
Vermont	365	0	0	0	0	0
Virginia	365	90	0	730	365	30
Washington	365	90	30	0	0	0
West Virginia	365	60	0	0	0	0
Wisconsin	365	30	0	365	10	0
Wyoming	365	60	0	365	60	10